flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) (01/09/85)
From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) > > [me]...If you believe you have free will and you're wrong, it was out of > > your power to be correct anyway so you haven't lost anything. But if > > you're right, you have gained something by exercising your power > > correctly. Therefore, anything that implies lack of free will can be > > dismissed right there. > Essentially, this is a reworking of Pascal's argument for belief > in God. If you believe in Him, and are wrong, you lose nothing, since > there is no Heaven or Hell; if you *disbelieve* and are wrong, however, > you do hard time in the flamey place. No, there's a crucial difference: Pascal's argument doesn't cover all the bases. If there's a Ubizmo that wants the exact opposite of what the Christian G-d is s'posed to want, who will send you to the flamey place for obeying the big 10 -- then making Pascal's wager can cost you big. A priori, Pascal's argument gives one no more reason to believe in one G-d than in its opposite. > Unfortunately, it shares the same flaw as Pascal's reasoning, > namely, that we do not believe or disbelieve in things based on the belief's > utility. I base my beliefs on reason, and believe in them because they > seem correct, not convenient. Kenn Barry Your dichotomy is a false one. You can't divorce practical reason from epistemology (theory of knowledge). Reason dictates believing what one has reasons to believe, and that includes can't-lose propositions like belief in free will. It may be true that you don't or even can't bring your beliefs to follow such reasoning, but that's *your* problem. --Paul V. Torek, [send replies to new address:] ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (01/17/85)
[] From umcp-cs!flink (Paul V. Torek): >> From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) >> > ...If you believe you have free will and you're wrong, it was out of >> > your power to be correct anyway so you haven't lost anything. But if >> > you're right, you have gained something by exercising your power >> > correctly. Therefore, anything that implies lack of free will can be >> > dismissed right there. >> Essentially, this is a reworking of Pascal's argument for belief >> in God. If you believe in Him, and are wrong, you lose nothing, since >> there is no Heaven or Hell; if you *disbelieve* and are wrong, however, >> you do hard time in the flamey place. > >No, there's a crucial difference: Pascal's argument doesn't cover all the >bases. If there's a Ubizmo that wants the exact opposite of what the >Christian G-d is s'posed to want, who will send you to the flamey place >for obeying the big 10 -- then making Pascal's wager can cost you big. A >priori, Pascal's argument gives one no more reason to believe in one G-d >than in its opposite. You are correct in pointing out *another* flaw in Pascal's reasoning, and in maintaining that your argument doesn't share this flaw. My comparison of your reasoning with Pascal's, however, is based on a flaw they *do* share; see below. >> Unfortunately, it shares the same flaw as Pascal's reasoning, >> namely, that we do not believe or disbelieve in things based on the belief's >> utility. I base my beliefs on reason, and believe in them because they >> seem correct, not convenient. Kenn Barry > >Your dichotomy is a false one. You can't divorce practical reason from >epistemology (theory of knowledge). Reason dictates believing what one has >reasons to believe, and that includes can't-lose propositions like belief >in free will. It may be true that you don't or even can't bring your >beliefs to follow such reasoning, but that's *your* problem. Well, perhaps you can help me with my problem; here it is: if I "believe" something, that means I think it's *true* (rightly or wrongly). Now, as far as I can see, the desirability, or lack of it, possessed by the notion of "free will", has no bearing on the likelihood of its being *true*. So what I get from your argument, is either that "believing" something DOESN'T mean thinking it's true, or that the desirability of a proposition (like free will) constitutes evidence for its being true. Are we arguing about either of the above propositions? If so, which one? And, if not, what did I miss? All I can make of your reasoning so far, is that I'm better off believing in free will, whether or not it's true. Fine; I follow your logic, and basically agree. But so what? It doesn't make free will any more likely to be *true*. - I'd rather be right than happy - Kenn Barry NASA-Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- USENET: {ihnp4,vortex,dual,hao,menlo70,hplabs}!ames!barry SOURCE: ST7891