rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (02/15/85)
>>Again, you assume that because you use the rational path (e.g., rather than >>the biochemically instinctive path), employing what you call rational >>evaluation, you are engaging in acts of "free will". But you are no freer >>to "choose" a rational path than you are to "choose" a biochemically >>"instinctive" path: whatever path of "reasoning" (or non-reasoning) that is >>taken is based on your chemical makeup. [ROSEN] > You *are* freer to choose a rational path (given that you do choose one) than > those who take an instinctive path are to "choose" that path, because you can > represent the options and evaluate them. Simply put: rational actions are > chosen; instinctive ones aren't (unless part of a larger context in which > rationality operates: I rationally choose to "let myself go" sometimes). > [TOREK] Your distinction between choose and "choose" sounds as arbitrary as Wingate's Christian and "christian" dichotomy. This is just an assertion that rational choice is "freer" than choice made FOR an organism by circumstances (chemicals, environment, etc.) Both sets are in fact made FOR the organism. Choice, however, is a bad word because it implies and assumes an agent of choosing. >>You make a distinction between them (and there IS a difference in the >>methods AND [sometimes] the results), but they are functionally equivalent. > What you say in the parentheses, amounts to an admission that they are NOT > functionally equivalent! Just as the methods of "choice of action" by an amoeba differ in actual methodology and results from the methods of "choice of action" of a non-human "higher animal", the difference between the higher animals and humans is again simply one involving usage of the same functional components, in a more elaborate way. >>they are BOTH chemical methods that produce (hopefully) optimum survival >>results. You choose to make a black-and-white distinction. It is more >>of a continuous spectrum. Some organisms have minimal (even biochemical) >>means of making decisions. Some have more. Supposedly, we have the most >>advanced decision making mechanism. But that's not the same as free will >>just because you say it is. > No, it's the same as free will just because the term means "having a certain > type of advanced decision making mechanism". I do think that human reason > has qualitiative advantages over most other animals', but if not, the > difference of free will between us and them is just one of degree. I think Trissel's article on the chess program and my own articles have stated repeatedly that your definition is simply an assertion of something you believe and NOT an actual definition of free will as the term is understood. To redefine the term so that, under the new definition, it DOES exist, does not in turn cause the originally described phenonemon to suddenly exist as a result. >>But the very notion of free will implies freedom to choose a decision path >>regardless of one's surroundings, one's chemical make-up, etc. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > BULL MANURE!! The "very notion" implies no such thing. Your paradigm of > free will does, and you are confusing your paradigm with the "very notion". As I said once before, our argument is totally based on the fact that we both define free will differently. It is my contention that you simply define it the way you like so that it (thus) WILL exist. > Compare your statement above with: "But the very notion of free will > implies an ability to choose regardless of any ghost-in-the-machine". > What makes your statement any more plausible than this? That's the entire point. Even an external agent of "will" or a "ghost in the machine", in turn, must have some mechanism itself that is causing it to "want" to, to "decide" to do certain things, thus IT does not have free will. And so on. > Is it because > the whole idea of the "ghost in the machine" is that the ghost is > supposed to be *you*? Ah, but -- you and I agree -- there is no ghost, > and -- I contend -- the chemicals ARE *you*; to say "there's the chemicals > of Rosen's brain" and to say "there's Rosen" are two ways of describing > the same thing. The chemicals in "me" that "are" "me" do not have free will, either. They may CAUSE rational analysis and action *IF* I happen to be predisposed to that analysis/action based on the REST of my chemical make-up, but there exists no power of "decision" to "decide" which course to take: the course is determined by the configuration of your internal and external environment. > Free will definitely does NOT mean an ability to choose > regardless of the way one is, for then, who would be doing the choosing? > Therefore, IF the chemicals are all there is to *you*, then your chemical > make-up is NOT one of the things to include in your "regardless of" list. Since the chemicals that "are" me do not have the power of choice, the power to determine a course of action (that "power" relegated to the internal and external environment configuration, if indeed it can be thought of as a deliberate "power" with intent and purpose), thus they (and I) do not have free will. >>Which, of necessity REQUIRES the "ghost in the machine", the external >>agent. It is not a part of the definition, it is a consequence of it. > Challenge: find an ordinary language user (not a philosopher, theologian, > or such) whose use of the term 'free will' *logically implies* this > "consequence". It's funny you should ask that. One person I spoke to in searching for such an "ordinary language user" defined free will as the ability to generate ideas or make decisions independent of external dependencies. He defined external dependencies to include one's surroundings and one's chemistry. When I returned to his office later and asked "external to what?" (anticipating questions you might ask), he paused to ponder, and I mentioned your notion that the "you" IS the chemicals. Suddenly, his officemate, overhearing the bizarre conversation (who talks about free will during working hours?), blurted out "But doesn't the notion of free will imply a spirit that is separate from the chemicals?" I couldn't have asked for more, could I have? I doubt that he's alone in that. As far as I can tell, that is THE common conception of what free will means, and what it has been throughout. >>I guess my "mistake" here is that I don't equivalence rational evaluative >>capabilities with free will. Your argument has still given me no reason >>to do so. Are you simply using a word or term the way you like ... > Here's my argument again: > Agency (having free will) consists in being able to choose among > alternatives -- which raises the question how one chooses, and the > answer is by evaluating alternatives. This in turn involves the use > of reason, of having a conception of a norm and being disposed to > adopt a consistent, best justified set of norms. > Where's the hole in the argument? There is none. You've just redefined "free will" so that, by your definition, the phenomenon exists. What you describe, the ability to make a decision based upon alternatives, I'll agree, does exist. I simply fail to see why you define THAT to be free will. > Is the problem that my definition does not capture all the connotations of > the term? Probably not, but no helpful definition of a vague concept could. > My definition *does* capture what's important about it -- the varieties of > free will worth wanting. What about the variety of free will I described in my last article: free will = hot fudge sauce. Is that a variety of free will worth wanting? (It is for me, just thinking about it is making me hungry---and not by choice! :-) Define free will to be anything you want, say that you "have" it, and enjoy it. It *ain't* the phenomenon I (and apparently others) understand to be what's called free will. Which prompts me to ask: Do you believe the phenomenon that *I* refer to as free will does/does not exist? > [Aside: _The varieties of free will worth wanting_ > is the subtitle of Daniel Dennett's book _Elbow Room_ .] As Dennett points > out, the concept of free will is "essentially" one we care about, i.e. it > is something that is (supposed to be) worth wanting. Like the existence of a benevolent god, or ultimate justice, or a rewarding afterlife? Lots of things are worth wanting. >>Rationality is a human-made description of a process. One can just as easily >>say that rivers and rocks also behave rationally, though their mechanism for >>"decision-making" is less elaborate than our own. > No you can't. "Rational" has a narrower meaning than that. It may be a vague > word, but you can't stretch it that far -- talk about Humpty-Dumpty-ism. Hardly. If by rational, you imply something about decision-making processes, well, don't rivers and rocks make "decisions" about which way they will flow and fall? Quite rational, they way they make those "decisions"... From your torekocentric perspective, you say "*I*, the human, AM making decisions; these 'inanimate' objects are not!!" On what basis? >>You cannot justify logic with logic. > Yes you can. (By showing, e.g., that it is truth-preserving.) Can you prove that it is truth-preserving? Especially when the definition of truth and falsehood, concordance and contradiction, are fundamental to the notions of logic. You might as well say "truth" is the same as "hot fudge sauce" too. (Soon every word will be defined to mean "hot fudge sauce"...) >>... You can only prove to them that they are wrong if 1) they accept >>the foundations of logic, and 2) they accept the possibility that their >>conclusions might be wrong, or erroneous, or based on faulty premises. > Prove it "TO THEM"! If by that you mean "so that they accept it", then > the fact that we can't prove anything to someone who doesn't use logic, > doesn't show that we can't prove it. Oh? The notion of proof involves making no assumptions either way about the validity/falsehood of a notion, and showing that, based on other assumed or proven givens, it MUST be so. Try doing that for logic... >>You cannot seem to look at a possibility of a system of belief outside >>of reason and logic. > If someone could reject reason completely, there would remain nothing > answering the label "system of belief". There might remain at best a > bare, structureless consciousness. Because reason is an assumed given. To you. (And me...) And, I'd venture, even to those who claim that they want "proof" of reason. I could have a system of belief that claimed "All cats have four legs" AND "All cats have nine legs". How would you prove the incorrectness of such a belief system WITHOUT assuming the veracity of logic. >>You are imputing quite a lot into Carroll's intentions >>there: [he was] not trying to show that use of reason was not circular. >Read again what I said (edited, but meaning unchanged): > Carroll ... shows *not* that reason justifying reason is circular, but > that reason is not a premise but rather the way of getting from > premises to conclusions. THIS, what you've just said, is a premise! Prove it! (That's the whole point here.) >My claim that he has not shown circularity is not equivalent to saying that >he has shown absence of circularity. Absence of circularity can, however, >be concluded from what he did show, by further (valid) argument. He may have "shown" this to you, but I think his point, again, from my knowledge of Carroll's mental-contortion oriented work, was precisely what I am stating above: try to prove the premise that reason is valid. > -- Occam's Razor: I traded it in for a Norelco. No more "gotcha"! > Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 As opposed to the original: -- Occam's Razor: I liked it so much, I bought the company! Rich Rosen {ihnp4 | harpo}!pyuxd!rlr