rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/11/85)
[Oh my god, another set of articles and responses labelled "part n of xxxxx"!!] > Rich, your article definitely shows that you are capable presenting argument > in a reasonable tone. I appreciate that. It also stands above your other > writing for a couple other reasons: 1) You are not just destroying argument > with a sledge hammer, but seem to be giving the subject more carful > consideration. 2) You are trying to give some support for your own view, not > just tearing apart that of others. Even with all this I still feel like > I must be crazy to post this response. What remains to be seen is if my > response will be given thoughtful consideration or a malicious hacking and > twisting. I still have a very bad taste in my mouth from what you've done > with some of my articles, Rich. First, thank you for your kind words. Secondly, there's really very little difference in substance between what I said in this article and what I've said previously, except perhaps that what I've said previously was directly in response to other people's positions and (thus?) was interpreted to be attacking by those who held those positions. Since this article is now in the same mode (responding to a response), I hope that the trend does not continue. |Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a deity, one would |normally work (in a typical analysis of a non-religious oriented phenomena) |from the assumption that the thing for which there is no evidence does not |exist. Without evidence showing proof of a thing's existence, or its observed |effect on the "physical" world, via Occam people would generally assume that |it does not exist until evidence of a viable nature presents itself. The |*possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a possibility evinces |itself if and only if evidence is presented to support it. [ROSEN] > What makes you think that evidence used to analyse non-religious phenomena > also applies to religious phenomena? [DUBUC] What is the difference between "non-religious phenomena" and "religious phenomena"? Aren't you ASSUMING a difference to exist? Aren't you assuming your conclusion: that there is some sort of fundamental difference? > Does this really point to the conclusion that God doesn't exist or could it > be showing the limited applicability of your methods? I didn't claim that it pointed to any conclusion. (Note that again I stand accused of concluding/assuming that god doesn't exist, or reaching for such a conclusion.) You claim that my methods can't account for or don't reach for the possibility of god's existence. You are thus implying that other methods (yours?) are more suited for such work. I have been trying to show that those very "other" methods are bogus, and I have been trying to show why. > As a crude illustration, pretend the evidence for the existence of > screwdrivers had never "presented itself". All you know about are hammers, > nails, and wood screws. You could then say that you are justified in > assuming that screwdrivers don't exist, that hammers don't turn wood screws > and therefore wood screws can't be turned. We must pound both nails and > screws in with hammers. You could conclude that the screw is an inefficent > sort of nail, because all you know about are hammers, or you might propose > that something like a screwdriver exists though the hard evidence does not > support it. There you have two differing conclusions with the same "hard > evidence". 1) Screwdrivers are deliberately created entities, and to assume that the universe (or god) is like a screwdriver is to assume your conclusion: that there is a god who deliberately designed the universe. What's more, screwdrivers exist in conjunction with screws, so it's sort of a contorted analogy. 2) We are not talking about "assuming that screwdrivers don't exist", we're talking about "not assuming that they do exist". Now, *I* might "propose" (as you do above) that a tool that combines both hammerness and screwdriverness in one tool exists, because it would seem that such a tool would be useful. It might exist, but it might not. (If it did, I'm sure we'd all hear about it in late night TV commercials, being sold in conjunction with bamboo steamers. :-) But to ASSUME that such a tool exists because its usefulness is apparent is erroneous. Of course, you could always create one yourself... > God is not an object in the sense that we may be presented with his existence > (like that of the screwdriver). It seems that you are trying to say that > since your methods cannot encompass the issue of whether or not God exists, > then you feel justified in assuming he doesn't. You can explain evidence > presented for his existence in the same way you could explain the existence > of screws without positing the existence of a screwdriver (Occam's Razor). First, the first sentence I extracted above is clearly an assumption. How do you "know" that unless you've assumed that in advance? As I mentioned before, you are implying that "my" methods are insufficient for _u_l_t_i_m_a_t_e proof (which I've conceded). My point has always been that the "other" methods that have led some to certain conclusions of godness are much worse and much more flawed. Again (and if I hear this accusation once more I'm going to say something I'll regret!!!), one does NOT assume "not god" or "no god" when one simply does NOT assume god. Please remember that, as it's become extremely frustrating to have to repeat that to every person in this newsgroup. (GRRRR!) > The problem with your critierion for proof is that it demands that God be > an object that is available for examination. If he isn't you assume he > doesn't exist. [GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!!! (See what I mean?)] > So for God to prove himself to you he would have to make himself an object; > a type of machine that produces conclusive evidence on demand. ... Just > about any physical proof you could name (some act for God to perform to prove > his existence) would fall short of being conclusive for a number of reasons. > ...It could be attributed to natural as yet unexplained causes. This happens > alot. Some phenomena will convince some but not others. Important point here. Attributing something to "natural but as yet unexplained causes" seems to be a more rational step than attributing it to god. Unless of course you assume god in advance. I mean, who is jumping to conclusions, the one who says "I'm not sure what the cause of that is but let's investigate" or the one who says "I know what the cause is--it's god!!!"? > If God is not a machine but has a will for those who beleive in him, then why > should he be concerned about just proving the mere fact of his existence to > everyone? [WHY, INDEED!!] If he did, what is to prevent them from saying, > "OK, God exists. So What?". There is no gaurentee that people will follow > the implications of his existence or even understand them. They might as > well not believe. What is WRONG with their saying "OK, God exists. So what?". You seem to be making some assumptions about precisely what the "implications" are in advance, and about whether or not there will be any [implications]. Why should we worry about "preventing" them? "They might as well not believe." You are claiming some sort of knowledge of what is required of people if they learned of the existence of god, are you not? > The whole point if the previous long paragraph is that I could take > any concieveable "evidence" that meets your criterion for viability and > "skepticize" it. The whole point of most of what I've been writing on the subject is that *you* (and others) DO accept any conceivable evidence and ignore less presumptive (what you might call skeptical) possibilities in favor of what you choose to believe. > It seems to me that by insisting that God objectify > himself you necessarily require that he not be God at all, but a continual > evidence producing machine or some kind of genie in a bottle. All I > can conclude is that the existence of God (especially the Christian > God) cannot be proven under your constraints. But I don't think that > it compells me to assume God dosn't exist. (*GRRRRRRRRRRRRR*)**3!!!! I'm not "insisting" that a god be or do anything at all. *You* are formulating criteria to decide what *you* think it would take for me to believe in something you believe in. Not me. > We may not be able to penetrate to God on our own, but that doesn't mean he > can't penetrate to us. Of course, you'll say this is subjective. I agree. But > subjectivity doesn't automatically exclude accurate perceptions of reality. Subjectivity ALONE, in the absence of physical evidence, does not offer a convincing argument to a reasonable person, for reasons I've offered repeatedly. But obviously it does do so for you (not to label you as an "unreasonable person", but rather to say that this makes you different from the typical reasonable person). Why? > Another thing you seem to tacitly rule out is the testamony of others. What's > wrong with provisionally accepting God's existence based on the fact that > many will tell me he exists and that I consider many of them to be rational > people of sound judgement. "Rational" people voted for Hitler. "Rational" people read the Weekly World News (well, not many :-). "Rational" people are duped in hoaxes and con games. If you limit the scope of your evidence and observation, if you choose to accept the flawed equally with the "proven", if you base your beliefs on what you may feel for and wish for rather than on the evidence, no matter how rational you may perceive yourself (or others) to be, you run more than a minor risk of believing in falsehood. > I know that South America exists in this way > and also that Abraham Lincoln lived. I think these are valid assumptions to > make based on what I consider sound testamony. I may someday find out that > they are false, but as it is these beliefs help explain some things that I > experience here in Columbus OH and now in 1985(e.g. Headlines about political > unrest in a South America and the fact that Blacks are no longer slaves). Ignoring South America for a moment and perhaps altering your premise slightly. What if you said "I know that blacks are no longer discriminated against because it says that it's illegal to do so in the constitution." This is, in fact, a reverse situation to that which you describe above: you BELIEVE something because it is written down and accepted (as coming from authority?), even when evidence points to contradictions in the assumption. Moreover, just as I point out the problems of subjective evidence in the people I'm talking to, there is (or was) exactly the same problem in those whose testimony they choose to accept. > You assume your own framework for interpreting evidence allows you to draw > valid conclusions. What constitutes evidence of a "viable" nature? To me > and you, it may be different things. ... You assume that the explanation > that is consistent with your worldview is correct. The "worldview" is formed by the conclusions, not the other way around. In religious belief, it would seem to be quite the other way around. > At the end of this article you deny that you assume there is no God. > Yet here you are defending that very assumption. You expect everyone to > agree that there is insufficient evidence for God's existence (and that > the lack of "hard" evidence validates your assumption. I don't think > the methods you limit yourself to can ever address the issue completely > enough to justify the assumption that God doesn't exist. 1) GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!! 2) I'm not making that assumption, so how can I "expect" others to agree to it? 3) My point is that the methods added on to the strictly verifiable methods (which is what "scientific method" really means: using whatever means produces the best and most untainted data) result in faulty conclusions that have no basis in a reasonable analysis. Yes, there may be a god (as I've gone into any number of times), but your methods of "perceiving" it are fraught with inaccuracy, and in fact it is more than likely that what has been perceived was not a god but a stack of preconceptions. > Now here you go again slipping Occam's razor in as your authority. Lot's of > explainations that turn out to be correct would fail Occam's razor (e.g. > the existence of screwdrivers in the above example. The existence of > a screwdriver is not necessary to explain the existence of screws). It's > a rusty tool. What, the screwdriver? :-) As I mentioned early in the article, since screws and screwdrivers are man-made artifacts, the analogy is erroneous. You assume your conclusion by saying that the state of the universe is as an artifact with a maker, and thus the whole premise is flawed. You take a universe in which you already know screwdrivers to exist (because they were invented), and then you say "Look, there are screws in this universe. There must be screwdrivers. Lo and behold, there they are!!!" In any universe where screws were deliberately invented, if it's any sort of civilized society, they'll probably invent the screwdriver too. But if screws came about through some form of (gasp!) natural evolution, there's no reason to assume the existence of screwdrivers. If we're "lucky", perhaps some symbiotic organism will have evolved that rotates the screw organisms into the ground, for some reason. But, not seeing any screwdrivers on this particular planet we're now observing (the one with the "screw" organisms), I'm not going to assume that screwdrivers exist without seeing them. > This has been gone over before between you and others (viz. Torek and > Wingate). I am in agreement with their position. What position? That you don't like Occam's Razor? Fine. Then stop living. No, I mean that literally. Because you use that "rusty tool" every day of your life. Whenever you choose to make a minimal set of assumptions to come to a conclusion instead of adding on extra ones to come to some other conclusion, you are applying Occam's Razor. And that's done with almost every other action you choose to take. |However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of a deity despite |the lack of realistic evidence. One can only assume that 1) these people have |a different set of criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have |some vested interest in believing that particular outcome of analysis that they |believe to be true. Quite possibly both. > Again, what constitutes "realistic" evidence? I simply disagree that there > is lack of realistic evidence. You may look at the same evidence and say > its not realistic. So what is realistic? What is real? You have confirmed possibility 1 in your paragraph above. However, you have also confirmed possibility 2 elsewhere throughout the rest of this article. > Also your position can easily be reversed and applied to those believe > God does not exist. [ONLY A SLIGHT "GRRR" HERE. HE DOESN'T SAY "ASSUME"... > I FEEL LIKE NICK BELKER.] You have different criteria than I, or you may > have a vested interest in God's non-existence, or both. Again, you reiterate the fact that possibility 1 above is correct. I am claiming that because the nature of my criteria for viability is not only stricter than yours, but also because it excludes (or attempts to do so as much as possible) the unreliable, that my set of criteria is thus better than yours for making such determinations. This doesn't make me somehow *better* than you (as some would imply that I was insinuating). And, no, I don't have a "vested interest" in god's non-existence, as my discussions on deific possibilities attest to. > It seems that the purpose of your article here is to demonstrate that your > position has some inherent advantage over mine (less presumptive). Precisely (see above). > I don't see how it does. I think mine is at least equally valid. As equally valid as proposing, in a situation described before on the net (where you come home and find your bird missing and feathers in your cat's mouth), that aliens broke into your house silently and unobtrusively, drugged your cat, stole your bird, and put feathers into your cat's mouth, as opposed to proposing that the cat ate the bird. You're right, they're equally valid in the absence of evidence. That's why Occam's Razor gets applied. |I think we have shown endless times that the nature of the subjective evidence |offered in favor of religious belief is tainted: How come your subjectivity |shows a different world view than someone else's? Which one is right? WHY is |his/hers wrong and YOURS right? If he/she is being deceived, how can you be |sure it is not YOU who has been deceived? (Not to mention the way the brain |is known to impose patterns onto events/phenomena/observations that upon |closer examination are shown to be quite wrong---like "recognizing" someone at |the airport and realizing that it wasn't them after all.) > Anyway, the argument cuts both ways. All subjective evidence > is tainted. You haven't shown any advantage of your point of view over mine. > Why is my assment of the evidence tainted and yours not? Is it not just > as likely that you are being decieved as I? You seem to make demands for > evidence (events/phenomena/observations presumably) as if you expect to make > an objective asessment (at least more so than mine). Yet here you brush > aside the asessment of others on the basis of their faulty perceptions. > What makes yours more reliable than anyone else's? What makes you able to > come to more realistic conclusions about the things I experience than me? Answer: the way I restrict what I would call evidence. It is not "my" perceptions that are "better" or "worse" than others. It is the way in which those who choose scientific method come up with reliable conclusions (as opposed to those who accept less stringent methods as viable) that is better. -- Meet the new wave, same as the old wave... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (03/12/85)
}|Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a deity, one would }|normally work (in a typical analysis of a non-religious oriented phenomena) }|from the ASSUMPTION that the thing for which there is no evidence does not }|exist. Without evidence showing proof of a thing's existence, or its observed }|effect on the "physical" world, via Occam people would generally ASSUME that }|it does not exist until evidence of a viable nature presents itself. The }|*possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a possibility evinces }|itself if and only if evidence is presented to support it. [ROSEN] } }> What makes you think that evidence used to analyse non-religious phenomena }> also applies to religious phenomena? [DUBUC] } }What is the difference between "non-religious phenomena" and "religious }phenomena"? Aren't you ASSUMING a difference to exist? Aren't you assuming }your conclusion: that there is some sort of fundamental difference? I think there is a difference. Maybe I am assuming it. Aren't you assuming there isn't; assuming your conclusion? I think the concept of God we are talking about implies a difference. If we are talking about a supernatural God I wouldn't include him in the natural. If we are talking about a natural one, then let's quit here. I don't believe one exists either. You spent a lot of time GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRing at me in this article, insisting that I was wrong to say thay you were defending the assumption that there is no God. Look at the words I capitalized in your first paragraph. Sounds like you're trying to validate that assumption to me. }> The problem with your critierion for proof is that it demands that God be }> an object that is available for examination. If he isn't you assume he }> doesn't exist. [GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!!! (See what I mean?)] }> So for God to prove himself to you he would have to make himself an object; }> a type of machine that produces conclusive evidence on demand. ... Just }> about any physical proof you could name (some act for God to perform to prove }> his existence) would fall short of being conclusive for a number of reasons. }> ...It could be attributed to natural as yet unexplained causes. This happens }> alot. Some phenomena will convince some but not others. } }Important point here. Attributing something to "natural but as yet unexplained }causes" seems to be a more rational step than attributing it to god. Unless }of course you assume god in advance. I mean, who is jumping to conclusions, }the one who says "I'm not sure what the cause of that is but let's investigate" }or the one who says "I know what the cause is--it's god!!!"? It may be a more rational step to you, but it seems to involve the assumption that God wasn't the cause (because you assume he doesn't exist? GRRR! I know.) "As yet unexplained causes" is a catch-all for anything you can't explain. So what kind of evidence do you want for the existence of God that won't fit into this catch-all? }> If God is not a machine but has a will for those who beleive in him, then why }> should he be concerned about just proving the mere fact of his existence to }> everyone? [WHY, INDEED!!] If he did, what is to prevent them from saying, }> "OK, God exists. So What?". There is no gaurentee that people will follow }> the implications of his existence or even understand them. They might as }> well not believe. } }What is WRONG with their saying "OK, God exists. So what?". You seem to }be making some assumptions about precisely what the "implications" are }in advance, and about whether or not there will be any [implications]. }Why should we worry about "preventing" them? "They might as well not believe." }You are claiming some sort of knowledge of what is required of people if they }learned of the existence of god, are you not? Well, the God I believe in has implications for that beleif. I don't think I am under any constraint to support the existence of any other God. I don't believe there is any other God. }> The whole point if the previous long paragraph is that I could take }> any concieveable "evidence" that meets your criterion for viability and }> "skepticize" it. } }The whole point of most of what I've been writing on the subject is that *you* }(and others) DO accept any conceivable evidence and ignore less presumptive }(what you might call skeptical) possibilities in favor of what you choose to }believe. I don't exclude God's existence, if that's what you mean. I don't think I take any concievable evidence as being direct evidence ("hard evidence" as you say) of God's existence. The problem I'm trying to point out is that you demand evidence, but what conceivable evidence would suffice for you? }> It seems to me that by insisting that God objectify }> himself you necessarily require that he not be God at all, but a continual }> evidence producing machine or some kind of genie in a bottle. All I }> can conclude is that the existence of God (especially the Christian }> God) cannot be proven under your constraints. But I don't think that }> it compells me to assume God dosn't exist. } }(*GRRRRRRRRRRRRR*)**3!!!! I'm not "insisting" that a god be or do anything }at all. *You* are formulating criteria to decide what *you* think it would }take for me to believe in something you believe in. Not me. OK, Rich, why don't you just tell me what your criteria are so I don't have to guess? I thought you wanted some kind of physical evidence. What kind? }> You assume your own framework for interpreting evidence allows you to draw }> valid conclusions. What constitutes evidence of a "viable" nature? To me }> and you, it may be different things. ... You assume that the explanation }> that is consistent with your worldview is correct. } }The "worldview" is formed by the conclusions, not the other way around. }In religious belief, it would seem to be quite the other way around. A chicken-and-egg problem. How do you draw conclusions without an interpretive framework (worldveiw)? I think its OK to say the conclusions modify one's worldview, but I doubt whether they can be said to produce it. }> Also your position can easily be reversed and applied to those believe }> God does not exist. (1) You have different criteria than I, or (2) you }> may have a vested interest in God's non-existence, or both. } }Again, you reiterate the fact that possibility 1 above is correct. I am }claiming that because the nature of my criteria for viability is not only }stricter than yours, but also because it excludes (or attempts to do so }as much as possible) the unreliable, that my set of criteria is thus better }than yours for making such determinations. This doesn't make me somehow }*better* than you (as some would imply that I was insinuating). And, no, I }don't have a "vested interest" in god's non-existence, as my discussions on }deific possibilities attest to. I still don't see how your criteria are less presumptive. You think they are stricter. I think they are narrowed to exclude the possibility of God's existence. I've speculated on God's non-existence myself. So I guess you would have to agree that I don't have a vested interest in His existence. Actually I see a lot of advantages to his non-existence (short-term, but that's all I'd care about if God didn't exist). -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd