pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (03/11/85)
[Paul Torek:] > My disposal of Occam's Razor was not intended as a denial >that the Occam fans are onto something about the need for evidence. I didn't mean to imply otherwise. I don't deny the need for evidence per se either. But I question the criteria some use to contend that certain evidence is conclusive. >Paul Dubuc suggests that God is the best explanation of certain >metaphysical questions (and perhaps he would also include subjective >experiences as indicating God as explanation, too). Including God in the picture seems best to me. I am not implying that they are the best explanations or the only ones. The point of my article is that my acceptance of the proposition that God exists is not more presumptive than the denial of that proposition. >I think that >is an interesting suggestion, but there is only metaphysical question >I see him discussing, and it won't do the job. > I have jotted down a few passages from his article and hope >I'm not taking them out of context. Dubuc says > "perceptions ... are ... [in Rich Rosen's world-view] > 'caused' in the natural flow ... But to be caused is not > to be proven. ... Cause does not imply proof... > ...Objective judgements require some measure of transcendance > over what is being judged ..." >The point seems to be that if Naturalism is[were] true, all our >perceptions and judgements about reality are *caused* -- sound >familiar? It should, since C.S. Lewis tried to make a *reductio >ad absurdum* out of this point. Lewis stated, and Dubuc is hinting, >that if our perceptions/judgements are caused then they can't be >trusted. WRONG. Cause does not imply proof, *but it doesn't rule >it out either*. Obviously a caused result doesn't rule out the possibility that it is proven. But what insures that they are? I don't see any necessary connection between cause and proof? Causing a certain number to appear on my calculator by pushing buttons at random does not exclude the posibility that that number is the correct answer to a particular problem. A stopped clock gives the correct time twice a day. What elevates the level of trust in our own caused judgements above the trust we would place in these examples? >Yes, our perceptions are caused, but they are accurate anyway (at least >most of the time). Is the judgement that our perceptions are accurate most of the time also caused? Do valid perceptions imply accurate judgements or conclusions about them? It seems to me that this statement is a judgement that presumes for itself a measure of independance (where cause is concerned) from the caused perceptions themselves. >Furthermore, there is >a good Naturalistic explanation (based on the evolutionary advantage >of accurate perceivers) of this fact -- *of course* our perceptions >are mostly trustworthy: if not, we wouldn't have survived. I don't see how survival is necessarily linked to accurate perceptions. Not all inaccurate perceptions ensure death, and neither would all accurate perceptions insure survival. Also, you treat accurate perception as an ability. Does the accuracy of my perception in one instance imply that I generally make accurate perceptions? Again this ability seems independant of "natural flow". How many instances of accurate perception does it take to make me an accurate perceiver? I don't see any necessary connection between instances of accurate perception and the ability to perceive accurately. -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/12/85)
>>Paul Dubuc suggests that God is the best explanation of certain >>metaphysical questions (and perhaps he would also include subjective >>experiences as indicating God as explanation, too). [TOREK] > Including God in the picture seems best to me. I am not implying that > they are the best explanations or the only ones. The point of my article > is that my acceptance of the proposition that God exists is not more > presumptive than the denial of that proposition. [DUBUC] What I have trying to show is that the reason including god in the picture seems "best" to you is PRECISELY because of the unwarranted assumptions you make a priori regarding the requirement of a controlling will in the universe. You may claim otherwise, but your writings have shown that you assume the existence of an entity whose will controls the universe as a stepping stone to reaching your further conclusions. Moreover, it has been seen in the writings of many Christians in this newsgroup (I don't recall whether you were one of them explicitly) that the reason for making that initial assumption about the universe having a directed purpose because of this entity is based on wanting for their to be such a directed purpose---my old standby of wishful thinking! > Obviously a caused result doesn't rule out the possibility that it > is proven. But what insures that they are? I don't see any necessary > connection between cause and proof? Causing a certain number to appear on my > calculator by pushing buttons at random does not exclude the posibility > that that number is the correct answer to a particular problem. A stopped > clock gives the correct time twice a day. What elevates the level of > trust in our own caused judgements above the trust we would place in these > examples? It is the very fact that the reliability can be verified independent of our interpretations and masking of our perceptions that makes conclusions drawn through such analysis trustworthy. Of course, a deity could be running around saying "Oh, dear, he's just pressed 2 + 2 on his calculator: better make sure 4 comes up as the answer, and oh, dear, there's a rock at the edge of a cliff in Brazil, better make sure it starts falling and with the proper acceleration towards the earth, and oh, dear..." Causing everything. I doubt that if such a deity existed it would not be quite so stupid. (or would it?) I'd venture that it would create a universe that worked of its own accord without meddling interference. That, in either case, is the reliability we have seen. If it wasn't reliable, we wouldn't be capable of talking about it. >>Yes, our perceptions are caused, but they are accurate anyway (at least >>most of the time). Furthermore, there is >>a good Naturalistic explanation (based on the evolutionary advantage >>of accurate perceivers) of this fact -- *of course* our perceptions >>are mostly trustworthy: if not, we wouldn't have survived. > I don't see how survival is necessarily linked to accurate perceptions. Perhaps because of an anti-evolutionist bent? :-? If you can't see, hear or otherwise perceive correctly the tiger coming at you, you're going to be eaten!!! Those organisms with incredibly faulty perceptions don't seem to survive. The ones with the keenest perceptive accuracy, if combined with other abilities, be the most likely to survive. > Also, you treat accurate perception as > an ability. Does the accuracy of my perception in one instance imply > that I generally make accurate perceptions? Again this ability seems > independant of "natural flow". How so? On the contrary, it is very much inextricably linked to the "natural flow", whether that flow has an intent or not. It is a part of it. You seem to be bogged down in assuming things about this flow vis a vis intent and directed purpose, which was my point earlier in the article.
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (03/12/85)
}> Obviously a caused result doesn't rule out the possibility that it }> is proven. But what insures that they are? I don't see any necessary }> connection between cause and proof? Causing a certain number to appear on my }> calculator by pushing buttons at random does not exclude the posibility }> that that number is the correct answer to a particular problem. A stopped }> clock gives the correct time twice a day. What elevates the level of }> trust in our own caused judgements above the trust we would place in these }> examples? [DUBUC] } }It is the very fact that the reliability can be verified independent of our }interpretations and masking of our perceptions that makes conclusions drawn }through such analysis trustworthy. Of course, a deity could be running around }saying "Oh, dear, he's just pressed 2 + 2 on his calculator: better make sure }4 comes up as the answer, and oh, dear, there's a rock at the edge of a cliff }in Brazil, better make sure it starts falling and with the proper acceleration }towards the earth, and oh, dear..." Causing everything. I doubt that if }such a deity existed it would not be quite so stupid. (or would it?) I'd }venture that it would create a universe that worked of its own accord without }meddling interference. That, in either case, is the reliability we have }seen. If it wasn't reliable, we wouldn't be capable of talking about it. }[Rich Rosen] I am asking *how* the reliability can be verified independant of our interpretations. I am not inferring that an deity must be around to make things work. I am asking how your caused "natural flow" judgements jump the gap to being "proven" judgements in the sense that they are not only caused but true. It's hard to beleive you are misunderstanding me without trying. It's this kind of evasion that is the source of my complaints about discussing things with you, Rich. }>>Yes, our perceptions are caused, but they are accurate anyway (at least }>>most of the time). Furthermore, there is }>>a good Naturalistic explanation (based on the evolutionary advantage }>>of accurate perceivers) of this fact -- *of course* our perceptions }>>are mostly trustworthy: if not, we wouldn't have survived. } }> I don't see how survival is necessarily linked to accurate perceptions. } }Perhaps because of an anti-evolutionist bent? :-? If you can't see, hear }or otherwise perceive correctly the tiger coming at you, you're going to }be eaten!!! Those organisms with incredibly faulty perceptions don't seem }to survive. The ones with the keenest perceptive accuracy, if combined with }other abilities, be the most likely to survive. All perceptions are not directly related to survival. I may percieve that I will die if a tiger is chasing me and run, but that does not prevent some other unrelated event from doing me in (e.g. diving into a lake full piranha to get away from the tiger). Perceiving one thing correctly and drawing the right conclusion, does not mean I will perceive things correctly in general. How do instances of correct perception give one the ability to perceive correctly? Also, I could think of example where incorrect perceptions result in survival. If I had incorrectly perceived that it was raining outside, I may never have taken a walk in jungle in the first place where I met the tiger. }> Also, you treat accurate perception as }> an ability. Does the accuracy of my perception in one instance imply }> that I generally make accurate perceptions? Again this ability seems }> independant of "natural flow". } }How so? On the contrary, it is very much inextricably linked to the "natural }flow", whether that flow has an intent or not. It is a part of it. You seem }to be bogged down in assuming things about this flow vis a vis intent and }directed purpose, which was my point earlier in the article. And you seem hard pressed to give me a good explanation of how something that is caused by natural flow can make perceptions about itself in any detached manner. -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/26/85)
> I am asking *how* the reliability can be verified independant of our > interpretations. I am not inferring that an deity must be around to make > things work. I am asking how your caused "natural flow" judgements jump > the gap to being "proven" judgements in the sense that they are not only > caused but true. It's hard to beleive you are misunderstanding me without > trying. It's this kind of evasion that is the source of my complaints > about discussing things with you, Rich. [DUBUC] Interpretations and objective observations are two different things. The realization of how our interpretations interfere with and influence our observations is precisely the thing which must be eliminated in order to achieve a better view (and not a clouded one) of reality. (I thought we were far past the "this kind of evasion" crap. If I'm misunderstanding whbat you're saying, clarify it more carefully rather than accusing me of evasion.) > All perceptions are not directly related to survival. I may percieve > that I will die if a tiger is chasing me and run, but that does not prevent > some other unrelated event from doing me in (e.g. diving into a lake full > piranha to get away from the tiger). Perceiving one thing correctly and > drawing the right conclusion, does not mean I will perceive things correctly > in general. How do instances of correct perception give one the ability > to perceive correctly? Also, I could think of example where incorrect > perceptions result in survival. If I had incorrectly perceived that > it was raining outside, I may never have taken a walk in jungle in the > first place where I met the tiger. That's called coincidence. The fact that you were influenced not to go outside by a misconception does not make the misconception a cause of your "correct" decision. (I only say this because some would actually assume some source of directed deliberate causation.) Moreover, we are talking about perceptive ability as related to survival, and irrelevant of your statement about their "not being directly related to survival", it is preposterous to claim that perceptive ability has no bearing on survival. If you can't perceive what's around you in an accurate enough way, you WILL make errors that lead to your demise. Thus, it is fair to say that either the perceptive abilities used by animals (including us) ARE at least marginally accurate (with our own more powerful brains often "interpreting", as we discussed above), or, as some might say, it's ALL an "illusion". If you're not claiming that, what are you claiming? }How so? On the contrary, it is very much inextricably linked to the "natural }flow", whether that flow has an intent or not. It is a part of it. You seem }to be bogged down in assuming things about this flow vis a vis intent and }directed purpose, which was my point earlier in the article. > And you seem hard pressed to give me a good explanation of how something > that is caused by natural flow can make perceptions about itself in > any detached manner. Hard pressed? To show what? What is this "detached manner" you speak of? Is it that difficult to conceive of a part of the natural flow making perceptions about that flow and about the world? (P.S. to Paul: haven't heard any responses from you of late. Admittedly this one is late, too, but others that preceded it are unanswered. Did I miss them?) -- Otology recapitulates phonology. Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr