[net.religion] Rosen on reason, etc.

esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (02/13/85)

[Will the real Humpty Dumpty please sit down]

From:    Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
> Again, you assume that because you use the rational path (e.g., rather than
> the biochemically instinctive path), employing what you call rational
> evaluation, you are engaging in acts of "free will".  But you are no freer
> to "choose" a rational path than you are to "choose" a biochemically
> "instinctive" path:  whatever path of "reasoning" (or non-reasoning) that is
> taken is based on your chemical makeup. 

You *are* freer to choose a rational path (given that you do choose one) than
those who take an instinctive path are to "choose" that path, because you can
represent the options and evaluate them.  Simply put:  rational actions are
chosen; instinctive ones aren't (unless part of a larger context in which
rationality operates:  I rationally choose to "let myself go" sometimes).

> You make a distinction between them (and there IS a difference in the
> methods AND [sometimes] the results), but they are functionally equivalent.

What you say in the parentheses, amounts to an admission that they are NOT
functionally equivalent!

> they are BOTH chemical methods that produce (hopefully) optimum survival
> results.  You choose to make a black-and-white distinction.  It is more
> of a continuous spectrum.  Some organisms have minimal (even biochemical)
> means of making decisions.  Some have more.  Supposedly, we have the most
> advanced decision making mechanism.  But that's not the same as free will
> just because you say it is.

No, it's the same as free will just because the term means "having a certain
type of advanced decision making mechanism".  I do think that human reason
has qualitiative advantages over most other animals', but if not, the 
difference of free will between us and them is just one of degree.

>> Apparently you and Sargent are suffering from attachment to a paradigm (in
>> the ordinary sense, not T.S. Kuhn's) of free will as some mysterious "ghost
>> in the machine" with the ability to make decisions ex nihilo.  

> But the very notion of free will implies freedom to choose a decision path
> regardless of one's surroundings, one's chemical make-up, etc.  
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^			    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
BULL MANURE!!  The "very notion" implies no such thing.  Your paradigm of
free will does, and you are confusing your paradigm with the "very notion".

Compare your statement above with: "But the very notion of free will 
implies an ability to choose regardless of any ghost-in-the-machine".
What makes your statement any more plausible than this?  Is it because
the whole idea of the "ghost in the machine" is that the ghost is
supposed to be *you*?  Ah, but -- you and I agree -- there is no ghost,
and -- I contend -- the chemicals ARE *you*; to say "there's the chemicals
of Rosen's brain" and to say "there's Rosen" are two ways of describing
the same thing.  Free will definitely does NOT mean an ability to choose
regardless of the way one is, for then, who would be doing the choosing?
Therefore, IF the chemicals are all there is to *you*, then your chemical
make-up is NOT one of the things to include in your "regardless of" list.

> Which, of necessity REQUIRES the "ghost in the machine", the external 
> agent.  It is not a part of the definition, it is a consequence of it.  

Challenge:  find an ordinary language user (not a philosopher, theologian,
or such) whose use of the term 'free will' *logically implies* this
"consequence".

> I guess my "mistake" here is that I don't equivalence rational evaluative
> capabilities with free will.  Your argument has still given me no reason
> to do so.  Are you simply using a word or term the way you like ...

Here's my argument again:
>> Agency (having free will) consists in being able to choose among
>> alternatives -- which raises the question how one chooses, and the
>> answer is by evaluating alternatives.  This in turn involves the use
>> of reason, of having a conception of a norm and being disposed to
>> adopt a consistent, best justified set of norms.
Where's the hole in the argument?

Is the problem that my definition does not capture all the connotations of
the term?  Probably not, but no helpful definition of a vague concept could.
My definition *does* capture what's important about it -- the varieties of
free will worth wanting.  [Aside: _The varieties of free will worth wanting_
is the subtitle of Daniel Dennett's book _Elbow Room_ .]  As Dennett points 
out, the concept of free will is "essentially" one we care about, i.e. it
is something that is (supposed to be) worth wanting.

> Rationality is a human-made description of a process.  One can just as easily
> say that rivers and rocks also behave rationally, though their mechanism for
> "decision-making" is less elaborate than our own.  

No you can't.  "Rational" has a narrower meaning than that.  It may be a vague
word, but you can't stretch it that far -- talk about Humpty-Dumpty-ism.

> It seems ironic, Paul, that you, who castigated me for looking "too deep
> to the root cause", now claim that it's invalid to say that things are the
> same "at a very general level of description".

You're misreading me on purpose, right?  I did NOT castigate you for looking
"too deep to the root cause", but rather for looking ONLY at the "root
cause" when both high-level (macroscopic) and microscopic descriptions are
accurate.  I did NOT claim it's invalid to say things are the same at a very
general level of description; I implied that it's wrong to *stop* there.
If you want to reject a distinction -- as you wanted to reject my distinction
of rationality between the processes in human brains and processes in rivers,
etc. -- you must examine *all* levels of description.  A distinction is
valid if it is valid on *at least one.*

> You cannot justify logic with logic.

Yes you can.  (By showing, e.g., that it is truth-preserving.)

> ... You can only prove to them that they are wrong if 1) they accept
> the foundations of logic, and 2) they accept the possibility that their
> conclusions might be wrong, or erroneous, or based on faulty premises.  

Prove it "TO THEM"!  If by that you mean "so that they accept it", then
the fact that we can't prove anything to someone who doesn't use logic,
doesn't show that we can't prove it.  I can't prove anything "to" the
severely brain-damaged either, but that's THEIR problem, not a problem
with using logic to justify anything.

> You cannot seem to look at a possibility of a system of belief outside 
> of reason and logic.  

If someone could reject reason completely, there would remain nothing
answering the label "system of belief".  There might remain at best a
bare, structureless consciousness.

> You are imputing quite a lot into Carroll's intentions
> there: [he was] not trying to show that use of reason was not circular.  

Read again what I said (edited, but meaning unchanged):
>> Carroll ... shows *not* that reason justifying reason is circular, but
>> that reason is not a premise but rather the way of getting from premises
>> to conclusions. 
My claim that he has not shown circularity is not equivalent to saying that
he has shown absence of circularity.  Absence of circularity can, however,
be concluded from what he did show, by further (valid) argument.

	-- Occam's Razor: I traded it in for a Norelco.  No more "gotcha"!
				Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
Don't hit that 'r' key!  Send any mail to this address, not the sender's.

laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (02/13/85)

I am going to try a simpler version of Paul's argument. Rich can try to
find the problem with this one.

What is logically wrong wiht the assumption that ``free will'' [defined
as the ability to make choices and thus self-determine certain events
which have an effect on one's life] like ``language ability'' is a
``power'' that manifests itself in human beings during their lifetime?

Why does there have to be a ``ghost in the machine'', or, alternately,
no ability to effect changes by choice in one's life? That I started
out as an undifferentiated cell zygote that did not have language ability
does not mean that I had to stay that way -- why is ``free will'' any
different?

Laura Creighton
utzoo!laura

laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/24/85)

From Rich Rosen:

	Gee, this is funny.  Am I assuming that "all things are
	knowable" (I never said that) when I refer to things we don't
	have enough information about?  

No, when you are referring to those things, you are not (necessarily)
assuming that. What I am assuming is that there are certain things which
are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant
*this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is
there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions
whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable.
There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all
of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't
ever know it.

	Or are YOU assuming something
	when you *assert* that there ARE (!!!) some things that it IS
	simply IMPOSSIBLE to ever know?  I don't know if that's true,
	so I keep seeking and learning.  You assume that it is true, so
	what do you do? 

Ah, I get to stop wasting my time with a certain class of questions.

	Do you stop at a certain point and say "the
	rest I will picture the way I like because we can NEVER know
	this?" 

Sure I do. All the time. The thing to remember is that I have yet to
meet a single person who does not do this. What I do not ever lose track
of is that these things are things that I have modelled, rather than things
that I know are true. So far I haven't needed to build a model of why
there is gravity at all -- but I have had to build models of other things.

	It's funny because you're doing exactly what I've been
	accusing so many others of doing.  Looks like you're not that
	different, and perhaps your belief systems should be classified
	with the same name.  :-?

Looks like you are back to being omniscient and knowing what I am doing again.
Before you go out and claim this again, I think that you had better get a
better understanding of what it is that I am doing. I am not claiming that
any models I build are true in some absolute sense. I don't even have any
firm opinions about the existence of ``absolute truth''. What I do claim is
that my models are useful for getting something done. Almost all of the
time this implies that my models have to be consistent with reality as I
perceive it. There are times, though, when even that does not apply. If
I am debugging circuit boards I catch myself thinking that ``the current
goes along here, and then down there'' and so on and so forth. Thinking that
``the electrons vibrate'' is more consistent with reality as I perceive it,
but even that is a model. Electrons aren't things. Shall I try to think of
them as locuses for particular behaviour? Better, but shucks, it just
isn't incredibly useful. I am willing to put up with inaccuracies for the
sake of utility.

This brings one back to Byron Howes on religion. Suppose you consider all
religions as models of reality which people use to get things done. The
question then is, why do  people pick different religions? Presumably
because they want to get different things done -- or the same thing done in
different ways. Inherant in certain religions is the belief that ``This is
the ONE and ONLY religion which is TRUE in the ABSOLUTE SENSE''. Other
religions do not have this belief. I do not think that you have ever
grasped the implications of this, or you would not be asking me if I go
out and ``believe whatever I would like'' -- because in a very real sense
I have been claiming that *everybody* does this *all* of the time.

This is another aspect of the Christian/Materialist debates which
others (including Christians such as Byron Howes) may find ludicrous.
Certain Christians are claiming the absolute truth of the existence
of God and the Bible. You deny the absolute truth of this (or at least,
that they have demonstrated this to be the absolute truth). But you are
*both* wedded to your idea of an absolute truth -- there is one, and it is
important to know whether God is a part of it or not. Since this is one
assumption that I do not make except when it suits me (rememeber your
search for assumptions, Rich) I find the whole thing rather unusual.

	The answer does not only wash, it cleans and brightens and
	softens as well.  I'm not seeking a justification or reason for
	the way the universe is, precisely because I don't assume that
	it was designed to be that way.  We have no reason to speculate
	on design plans or reasons here.  Unless we assume a designer.

Rich, you lose. I can speculate on anything I like without assuming a
designer. Why does my cat have blue eyes? Getting an answer to that
does not necessarily assume a designer -- to understand that one requires
knowledge of genetics. We have wonderful reasons to speculate reasons for why
the universe is a certain way -- this is exactly how one goes about
learning anything. What you are saying is ``unless oen assumes a designer,
one is not likely to get any answer to such questions''. Right. The
answers to such questions are unknowable. There may even *be* no answers
to such a question. Now you have contradicted yourself. 

Laura Creighton
utzoo!laura

	if you only believe in things that you understand, you'll *still*
	suffer -- and get killed by the first dangerous thing that you
	refuse to believe in becuse you don't understand it (yet).

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/26/85)

>> Gee, this is funny.  Am I assuming that "all things are
>> knowable" (I never said that) when I refer to things we don't
>> have enough information about?  

> No, when you are referring to those things, you are not (necessarily)
> assuming that. What I am assuming is that there are certain things which
> are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant
> *this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is
> there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions
> whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable.
> There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all
> of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't
> ever know it.

"Seems clear" is an assumption, too.  But remember that there is no answer
to a "why" in the absence of a directed causative will.  Thus to ask and
to expect a certain answer is to be presumptive in the extreme.

>> Or are YOU assuming something
>> when you *assert* that there ARE (!!!) some things that it IS
>> simply IMPOSSIBLE to ever know?  I don't know if that's true,
>> so I keep seeking and learning.  You assume that it is true, so
>> what do you do? 

> Ah, I get to stop wasting my time with a certain class of questions.

You mean the "why" questions I was referring to above?  For the same reasons?

>> It's funny because you're doing exactly what I've been
>> accusing so many others of doing.  Looks like you're not that
>> different, and perhaps your belief systems should be classified
>> with the same name.  :-?

> Looks like you are back to being omniscient and knowing what I am doing again.
> Before you go out and claim this again, I think that you had better get a
> better understanding of what it is that I am doing. I am not claiming that
> any models I build are true in some absolute sense. I don't even have any
> firm opinions about the existence of ``absolute truth''. What I do claim is
> that my models are useful for getting something done. Almost all of the
> time this implies that my models have to be consistent with reality as I
> perceive it. There are times, though, when even that does not apply. If
> I am debugging circuit boards I catch myself thinking that ``the current
> goes along here, and then down there'' and so on and so forth. Thinking that
> ``the electrons vibrate'' is more consistent with reality as I perceive it,
> but even that is a model. Electrons aren't things. Shall I try to think of
> them as locuses for particular behaviour? Better, but shucks, it just
> isn't incredibly useful. I am willing to put up with inaccuracies for the
> sake of utility.

"Camelot!"  "It's only a model."  You make a valid distinction here, but
all words are just sounds and etchings that represent models of reality.
Do they do so accurately or not is the question?  Are they used erroneously?

> This brings one back to Byron Howes on religion. Suppose you consider all
> religions as models of reality which people use to get things done. The
> question then is, why do  people pick different religions? Presumably
> because they want to get different things done -- or the same thing done in
> different ways. Inherant in certain religions is the belief that ``This is
> the ONE and ONLY religion which is TRUE in the ABSOLUTE SENSE''. Other
> religions do not have this belief. I do not think that you have ever
> grasped the implications of this, or you would not be asking me if I go
> out and ``believe whatever I would like'' -- because in a very real sense
> I have been claiming that *everybody* does this *all* of the time.

Interesting notion about models.  The questions then revolve around the
erroneousness of certain dogmatic models.

> This is another aspect of the Christian/Materialist debates which
> others (including Christians such as Byron Howes) may find ludicrous.
> Certain Christians are claiming the absolute truth of the existence
> of God and the Bible. You deny the absolute truth of this (or at least,
> that they have demonstrated this to be the absolute truth). But you are
> *both* wedded to your idea of an absolute truth -- there is one, and it is
> important to know whether God is a part of it or not. Since this is one
> assumption that I do not make except when it suits me (rememeber your
> search for assumptions, Rich) I find the whole thing rather unusual.

There is a difference between the absolute truth and words we use to
represent the absolute truth.  By modeling our words and concepts more closely
to reality instead of dogmatic assertion, by being flexible in receiving
new hard information and acting on it, we achieve a better picture.  By
the way, is it an absolute truth that there's not absolute truth, Laura?

>> The answer does not only wash, it cleans and brightens and
>> softens as well.  I'm not seeking a justification or reason for
>> the way the universe is, precisely because I don't assume that
>> it was designed to be that way.  We have no reason to speculate
>> on design plans or reasons here.  Unless we assume a designer.

> Rich, you lose. I can speculate on anything I like without assuming a
> designer. Why does my cat have blue eyes? Getting an answer to that
> does not necessarily assume a designer -- to understand that one requires
> knowledge of genetics. We have wonderful reasons to speculate reasons for why
> the universe is a certain way -- this is exactly how one goes about
> learning anything. What you are saying is ``unless oen assumes a designer,
> one is not likely to get any answer to such questions''. Right. The
> answers to such questions are unknowable. There may even *be* no answers
> to such a question. Now you have contradicted yourself. 

Laura, I win.  Early in this whole discussion, the difference between how
and why was discussed.  The genetics you mention is a "how", not a why,
as someone else pointed out.  A "why" assumes a reason as chosen by a
causative will of a designer.  Only in the context of a universe assumed
to have such a designer does such a question even mean anything.  The "why"
is not just "unknowable" in the absence of a designer, it's non-existent.
All you'll get are "how"s.
-- 
Life is complex.  It has real and imaginary parts.
					Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

brian@digi-g.UUCP (Brian Westley) (03/27/85)

In article <5332@utzoo.UUCP> laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>...What I am assuming is that there are certain things which
>are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant
>*this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is
>there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions
>whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable.
>There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all
>of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't
>ever know it.
>
>Laura Creighton

'They' used to say "We will never know what the surface of the moon is
like" or "what the stars are made of" or "Man will never fly".
And sure enough, the people who said these things never did.
They never tried.

Merlyn Leroy
"...a dimension between stupidity and substance, between science and
superficiality, a place we call...The Usenet Zone"

laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/28/85)

	"Seems clear" is an assumption, too.  But remember that there
	is no answer to a "why" in the absence of a directed causative
	will.  Thus to ask and to expect a certain answer is to be
	presumptive in the extreme.

I don't think that a direct causitive will is implied. If somebody came
up with a unified field theory, a fair number of ``whys'' could be
answered.  If the mechanics of universe creation were known, the answer
to that ``why'' could be known as well, even if there is no directed
causative will. There may be a reason for all of these but  I just
can't go off to a lab and build a few universes to test out any of my
theories. This is too bad.

Note that saying that these are ``hows'' doesn't change the problem.
There are some ``hows'' which I can't know either. Again, this is
too bad, but I am not going to lose sleep over it...


		 Ah, I get to stop wasting my time with a certain class
		 of questions.

	You mean the "why" questions I was referring to above?  For the
	same reasons?

I mean the why questions I brought up above, yes. But I don't think
that I am not spending time on them for the same reasons. I don't care
how presumptuous I am -- I just care about whether I can get any
results.

	"Camelot!"  "It's only a model."  You make a valid distinction
	here, but all words are just sounds and etchings that represent
	models of reality.  Do they do so accurately or not is the
	question?  Are they used erroneously?

Ah, ``erroneously'' is a funny word. Do you mean ``are they used to
represent things that have no basis in reality''? I think not, or else
you would have to reject ``the current goes down here'' as being
erroneous. Do you mean that they ``are used in ways that are not
useful?'' The problem with this definition is that what you find useful
and what other people find useful may be entirely different. Do you
mean ``are used by people who forget that they are models of reality
and confuse them with reality itself?''

Gee, that is my position, but I brought this one up weeks ago and you
were real upset when I accused you of mistaking your concepts with
reality. What do you mean?

	Interesting notion about models.  The questions then revolve
	around the erroneousness of certain dogmatic models.

Again, what is ``erroneousness''? The confusion of a concept with
reality again?

		 This is another aspect of the Christian/Materialist
		 debates which others (including Christians such as
		 Byron Howes) may find ludicrous.  Certain Christians
		 are claiming the absolute truth of the existence of
		 God and the Bible. You deny the absolute truth of this
		 (or at least, that they have demonstrated this to be
		 the absolute truth). But you are *both* wedded to your
		 idea of an absolute truth -- there is one, and it is
		 important to know whether God is a part of it or not.
		 Since this is one assumption that I do not make except
		 when it suits me (rememeber your search for
		 assumptions, Rich) I find the whole thing rather
		 unusual.

	There is a difference between the absolute truth and words we
	use to represent the absolute truth.  By modeling our words and
	concepts more closely to reality instead of dogmatic assertion,
	by being flexible in receiving new hard information and acting
	on it, we achieve a better picture.  By the way, is it an
	absolute truth that there's not absolute truth, Laura?

Rich, go back and read. I did not say that there is no absolute truth.
I did not say that there is one either. I hold no opinions on the
subject. I use the notion of absolute truth when it suits me and I
don't when it does not.  The concept of absolute truth is another
concept, and, as such I use it when I find it useful.

Laura Creighton
utzoo!laura

js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) (03/29/85)

> What I am assuming is that there are certain things which
> are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant
> *this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is
> there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions
> whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable.
> There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all
> of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't
> ever know it.
> Laura Creighton

     Just how do you decide if a given thing is unknowable?  If you
didn't know that it came out of a solution to Maxwell's equations, would
you see "Why is the speed of light *this* value and not *that* one?" as
another 'unknowable' question?  How do you know that further advances
in science won't answer questions which you now consider unknowable?
-- 
Jeff Sonntag
ihnp4!mhuxt!js2j
    "Parts is parts."-Jack the Ripper

friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (04/03/85)

In article <721@mhuxt.UUCP> js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) writes:
>> What I am assuming is that there are certain things which
>> are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant
>> *this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is
>> there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions
>> whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable.
>> There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all
>> of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't
>> ever know it.
>> Laura Creighton
>
>     Just how do you decide if a given thing is unknowable?  If you
>didn't know that it came out of a solution to Maxwell's equations, would
>you see "Why is the speed of light *this* value and not *that* one?" as
>another 'unknowable' question?  How do you know that further advances
>in science won't answer questions which you now consider unknowable?

	Part of the problem here is that two *different* meanings
of the question "why" are being used.  The form used by scientists
essentially asks "what set of circumstances caused/causes this?".
The philosophical question is harder to paraphrase, at least without
using the word "why", since it is questioning the inner meaning of
the Universe.
	So the speed of light is "determined" by Maxwells equations,
this is only the "scientific" why. It only moves the problem back step.
Why are the parameters of Maxwell's equations what they are and not
something else?  Why do they take te form they do and not some other?
In short you have *not* answered the *real* question being asked.
It is *this* sort of why question that Laura is claiming is
unanswerable, at least from the perspective of science. And she
is right, because science has outlawed such questions.
-- 

				Sarima (Stanley Friesen)

{trwrb|allegra|cbosgd|hplabs|ihnp4|aero!uscvax!akgua}!sdcrdcf!psivax!friesen
or {ttdica|quad1|bellcore|scgvaxd}!psivax!friesen