esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (04/19/85)
Even number of >'s = me, Odd = Rich Rosen (ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr) > Long ago, I stated that I agreed with you about your notions of > rational evaluative analysis, but that I felt you were erroneously using > the label "free will" to describe them. Without giving any argument *why* except the bald assertion that "free will implies supernatural". > I also asked whether your distinction between organisms having what you > call free will and those that don't have it was the notion of utilizing > stored knowledge constructs in the course of the determination of its > subsequent actions. You haven't yet responded to either point. I must have missed that question. Yes, stored knowledge constructs are the key (but perhaps I interpret "stored knowledge constructs" as being something more elaborate than your interpretation; as far as I can see, knowledge implies certain functional relationships at least. Stored data in this (non-artificially-intelligent) computer which I am using do not count as knowledge in my book.) > The actual flow of reasoning is that the definition of free will (that > humans can make decisions independent of their current physical state > and surrounding environment) directly implies that the decision making > process MUST be externalized from the physical world of cause and effect. > You have yet to explain what the problem is with what I've just said. > I give a definition as stated not only in the dictionary but in common > usage (in terms of "do humans have free will?"), and I state the > implications of it. The dictionary -- oh really? You haven't quoted one lately (try the OED if available). Your "MUST", and your parenthesized comment, are mistaken. I've already explained two problems; here they are again. 1) Your criteria make "free will" out to be a *self-contradictory* notion (as you yourself admitted, when I asked about a non-physical mechanism), which it definitely is not. 2) Your "MUST ..." condition fails to explain why people suppose that free will is something worth wanting. There is no reason to want that one's control should necessarily be via a *non-physical* mechanism. If you insist on defining "free will" your way, I will just invent a new term -- "free choice", say -- and define it as free will MINUS THE ASSUMPTION that the mechanism of choice need be non-physical. And note that "free choice" is what people are interested in when they talk about free will -- they have ASSUMED (due to church influence, most likely) that freedom needs a nonphysical origin, but they're wrong. ---------------------------------- [On "fearful thinking":] > To summarize: Paul's notion of fearful thinking, the belief that those > who question wishful thinking beliefs out of "fear" that they might be > right, is [...] --is NOT my notion of "fearful thinking". Go back and read the original article... >> [...] Rich's rabid (eliminative) reductionism. [me] > When I showed that you use reductionism when it suits you, you say "oh, > that's OK". [Rich] Please note the distinction between *eliminative* reductionism -- where a phenomenon is (allegedly!) explained *away* -- and non-eliminative reductionism, where a phenomenon is understood and not dismissed. > Best explanations. Like some other "best explanations" of the world we've > seen throughout the ages. Like that of the sun travelling across the sky Be serious. How do you come up with these wild misinterpretations? > After all, why use explanations that describe what actually happens when > you can talk in metaphors based on how some cursory observation > describes an event? Cursory my posterior. We're talking about the use of mental terms -- those terms have withstood detailed inquiry (take a look at the school of psychology known as cognitive psychology -- which is superceding behaviorism -- which richly deserves to be superceded). > Neurons? Chemicals? They get in the way of notions like "religious > experience". Or "free will". No THEY DON'T. And that's been one of my main points all along! > What are beliefs but catalogues of stored information on which decisions > are based? I went through this before, with no response from you. But > in any case, "beliefs" is just a name we give to the information constructs > in "thinking" brains (as opposed to information constructs in basic not > necessarily living things[...] Or perhaps "belief" is a name we give to information constructs in *sentient* (look it up) brains. Which would make a very useful concept in discussing freedom. Freedom is something that is relevant to us *qua* beings with a mental life; with experiences. -------------------------------------- [On logic:] >> [...] Rules of inference, like any rules, can not be >> true or false (they can be "valid" or "invalid", though). [me] > Then prove that they are valid. And remember, saying "they preserve > truth" is not enough when the terms themselves define truth. [Rich] In *your* sense of "proof", I don't think I could. But then, I don't think it's necessary either. Understanding the language of logical connectives (like "if...then...") is enough to see the validity of the relevant rules of inference, I think. -- Paul V. Torek, Iconbuster-In-Chief