rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Dr. Emmanuel Wu) (04/19/85)
>>Long ago, I stated that I agreed with you about your notions of >>rational evaluative analysis, but that I felt you were erroneously using >>the label "free will" to describe them. [ROSEN] > Without giving any argument *why* except the bald assertion that "free > will implies supernatural". [TOREK] Bald, my ass, Paul. I explained rather thoroughly what the implications of the notion were. You just didn't like the fact that I did. Why is it that you'd rather argue even on points where we apparently agree? >>I also asked whether your distinction between organisms having what you >>call free will and those that don't have it was the notion of utilizing >>stored knowledge constructs in the course of the determination of its >>subsequent actions. You haven't yet responded to either point. > I must have missed that question. Yes, stored knowledge constructs are > the key (but perhaps I interpret "stored knowledge constructs" as being > something more elaborate than your interpretation; as far as I can see, > knowledge implies certain functional relationships at least. Stored > data in this (non-artificially-intelligent) computer which I am using do > not count as knowledge in my book.) I see it as being an important distinction in decision making. In so-called lower animals, the decisions are made and "predetermined" by the make-up of the organism. (I'm talking REALLY low animals. No I won't mention names. :-) The higher you go, the more ability certain organisms have to rely, not just on some "innate" chemical pre-programming, but on the catalogue of their experiences and observations which are retained in the brain as a basis for making decisions. I see this as a crucial distinction, though it is hardly a black-and-white situation, it is more of a continuum through a variety of organisms. >>The actual flow of reasoning is that the definition of free will (that >>humans can make decisions independent of their current physical state >>and surrounding environment) directly implies that the decision making >>process MUST be externalized from the physical world of cause and effect. >>You have yet to explain what the problem is with what I've just said. >>I give a definition as stated not only in the dictionary but in common >>usage (in terms of "do humans have free will?"), and I state the >>implications of it. > The dictionary -- oh really? You haven't quoted one lately (try the OED > if available). Your "MUST", and your parenthesized comment, are mistaken. > I've already explained two problems; here they are again. 1) Your > criteria make "free will" out to be a *self-contradictory* notion (as > you yourself admitted, when I asked about a non-physical mechanism), > which it definitely is not. Sorry, Paul, that's not a problem. If there's a word in the dictionary which has a blatantly self-contradictory definition that cannot exist in reality, e.g., a Dodgsonesque word like "voomsquoll" which means "a stationary thing that moves about", do you REDEFINE THE WORD so that it means something you LIKE that can exist, or do you accept the fact that the word, as used, implies a notion that cannot exist in reality? No problem at all, except for those who would force fit their beliefs into models of reality. > 2) Your "MUST ..." condition fails to > explain why people suppose that free will is something worth wanting. > There is no reason to want that one's control should necessarily be > via a *non-physical* mechanism. A "voomsquoll" might be something "worth wanting" (I'd like to have some things around my house that move about while sitting still), but that has no relevancy whatever on its existence/non-existence. If you wish to redefine the term to mean something that is both "worth wanting" and "existing", let's go back to hot fudge sauce, which I had suggested before. It's worth wanting, and I've observed it (objectively?) to exist on ice cream sundaes. What I'm doing by redefining free will to mean hot fudge sauce is not different from what you're doing. > If you insist on defining "free will" your way, I will just invent a > new term -- "free choice", say -- and define it as free will MINUS > THE ASSUMPTION that the mechanism of choice need be non-physical. > And note that "free choice" is what people are interested in when they > talk about free will -- they have ASSUMED (due to church influence, most > likely) that freedom needs a nonphysical origin, but they're wrong. If you want to believe that it's *me* who's redefining, I won't stop you. Agreed, free choice is exactly what people are concerned about in the notion of free will. Now, demonstrate to all that what you describe as free choice (again, I assume you continue using "rational evaluative analysis") is an example of actual freedom. Can you? I doubt it. Note the dependencies of the actions leading to r-e-a. You can only make such r-e-a if your experience up to that point has not been fraught with inhibitive preconceptions that impede the incorporation of useful knowledge into your "stored constructs". Could you have chosen not to have had a traumatic experience as a child that tainted the way you look at the world and incorporate knowledge about it? Could you have had the choice to have ignored that experience and not fomented the preconceptions that would lay dormant in your brain throughout your life? With this in mind, one cannot have free choice in any sense of the word, no matter what words you choose to use. UNLESS, you are referring to some agent not influenced by such forces that would make such decisions *independent* of your physical body and brain. Which you say you are not. Mind you, the degree to which one can circumvent preconceptions/ihnibitions is in fact the degree of one's freedom. -- "It's a lot like life..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr