[net.religion] Fearful thinking and proving logic

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Dr. Emmanuel Wu) (04/19/85)

>>To summarize:  Paul's notion of fearful thinking, the belief that those
>>who question wishful thinking beliefs out of "fear" that they might be
>>right, is [...]

> --is NOT my notion of "fearful thinking".  Go back and read the original
> article...

*You're* the one who put it forth.  If you have free choice, take some
responsibility for your choices. :-)  I still contend that "fearful thinking",
the notion that those who proclaim wishful thinking beliefs as such are doing
so out of "fear" that the beliefs just might be true, is just another example
of that ole standby wishful thinking itself.

>>>[...] Rich's rabid (eliminative) reductionism. 

>>When I showed that you use reductionism when it suits you, you say "oh,
>>that's OK". [Rich]

> Please note the distinction between *eliminative* reductionism -- where
> a phenomenon is (allegedly!) explained *away* -- and non-eliminative
> reductionism, where a phenomenon is understood and not dismissed.

Where a phenomenon is shown by analysis not to in fact exist, or when the
basis and foundation of it is shown to be erroneous, it SHOULD be dismissed.

>>Best explanations.  Like some other "best explanations" of the world we've
>>seen throughout the ages.  Like that of the sun travelling across the sky

> Be serious.  How do you come up with these wild misinterpretations?

Not a misinterpretation at all.  Your "best explanation", avoiding what 
may actually go on in favor of preconception imposed on observation without
thorough analysis, is no different from ancient (and modern) people believing
that the sun "travels across the sky".

>>After all, why use explanations that describe what actually happens when
>>you can talk in metaphors based on how some cursory observation
>>describes an event?  

> Cursory my posterior.  We're talking about the use of mental terms -- 
> those terms have withstood detailed inquiry (take a look at the school
> of psychology known as cognitive psychology -- which is superceding
> behaviorism -- which richly deserves to be superceded).

Your hero, Daniel Dennett, in an interview in "States of Mind" (Jonathan
Miller) said that the top-down approach to analysis WORKS better than the
bottom-up approach ONLY because the bottom-up approach is more tedious and
takes more time to achieve significant results.  Cognitive psychology is
such a top down approach.  Eventually it will reach the middle point where
"both meet" at some point of understanding.  (Hopefully)  Dennett ignores
the fact that top down approaches may be laden with preconceptions (like
that of "the sun travelling across the sky") that may APPEAR true in the
gestalt but which are not actually happening internally.  The top down
approach is only an (albeit better) approach to acquiring knowledge, but
there are traps within it, among them the preconceptions interfering with
the underlying reality.

>>Neurons?  Chemicals?  They get in the way of notions like "religious
>>experience".  Or "free will".  (I had added "or the sun rising and setting")

> No THEY DON'T.  And that's been one of my main points all along!

Yet you say "don't bother discussing such things, look at it in an holistic
way".  Precisely because they get in the way of your presumptive notions.

>>What are beliefs but catalogues of stored information on which decisions
>>are based?  I went through this before, with no response from you.  But
>>in any case, "beliefs" is just a name we give to the information constructs
>>in "thinking" brains (as opposed to information constructs in basic not
>>necessarily living things[...]

> Or perhaps "belief" is a name we give to information constructs in
> *sentient* (look it up) brains.  Which would make a very useful concept
> in discussing freedom.  Freedom is something that is relevant to us
> *qua* beings with a mental life; with experiences.

Yeah, look it up.  Like the word "cult", its meaning depends on who's saying
it.  I already discussed how the formation of such beliefs is not necessarily
within the realm of free choice, and thus, how totally free choice cannot
exist where there are beliefs that are not necessarily formulated by choice.

>>>[...]  Rules of inference, like any rules, can not be
>>>true or false (they can be "valid" or "invalid", though). [me]

>>Then prove that they are valid.  And remember, saying "they preserve 
>>truth" is not enough when the terms themselves define truth. [Rich]

> In *your* sense of "proof", I don't think I could.  But then, I don't
> think it's necessary either.  Understanding the language of logical
> connectives (like "if...then...") is enough to see the validity of
> the relevant rules of inference, I think.

Then explain it in such a way that anyone can understand the language and
recognize the validity.  Don't get me wrong, Paul, this is Rich Rosen playing
devil's advocate here.  As you probably know.  The point is that what proof
can you give to someone who does not believe in the veracity of logic about
logic's veracity.
-- 
"It's a lot like life..."			 Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr