garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) (04/04/85)
> In article <1345@aecom.UUCP> teitz@aecom.UUCP (Eliyahu Teitz) writes: > > I really do not believe what I am reading. Was Hitler wrong? > > If he had won the war, would he be right? How can a man, for any > > twisted crazy ideal go and kill one person, let alone 6,000,000. > > What right does any person have to kill innocent people. Muffy replies: > Actually, if Hitler had won, he would indeed have been correct. Not from > *my* point of view, of course, but I would be dead. In fact, as I recall, > he wanted to kill everyone who didn't believe as he did, so the only people > left alive would be those that agreed with him, or said they did. Regard- > less of what you may believe, "right" and "wrong" are societally defined, > they are *not* inborn. Thus, if everyone in my society thinks as I do, > then I am right. If Hitler killed off all the people that didn't think as > he did, his society would have agreed with him, and he would be right. Occasionally, someone (usually not a religious person, but there are exceptions) will make the claim that there is no such thing as an absolute morality (I use the term "moral relativist" to refer to one who so believes). Then, someone else (usually a religious person, but again there are exceptions) will say that the lack of an absolute morality would mean there is no rational reason to condemn what Hitler did. The moral relativist will usually disagree with this conclusion. Now, will all the moral relativists explain why Muffy's conclusion is incorrect, or admit that moral relativism allows Nazism to be considered moral? And if moral relativism, consistently followed, would consider Nazism to be moral, if only Hitler had won the war, then I submit that moral relativsim is a dangerous philosophy. (Of course, unless all the moral relativists on the net denounce Muffy, immediately if not sooner, then the moral absolutists will justly conclude that they in fact agree with Muffy's reasoning, and by extension condone Hitler's actions.) Apologies to Muffy; I do not mean this to be a personal attack. I believe that your position is a logical conclusion of moral relativism, and am picking on you only because you are the one who happened to state that position. It is the position I take exception to. Gary Samuelson ittvax!bunker!garys
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/05/85)
In article <789@bunker.UUCP> garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) writes: >> In article <1345@aecom.UUCP> teitz@aecom.UUCP (Eliyahu Teitz) writes: >Occasionally, someone (usually not a religious person, but there are >exceptions) will make the claim that there is no such thing as an >absolute morality (I use the term "moral relativist" to refer to one >who so believes). Then, someone else (usually a religious person, >but again there are exceptions) will say that the lack of an absolute >morality would mean there is no rational reason to condemn what >Hitler did. The moral relativist will usually disagree with this >conclusion. Now, will all the moral relativists explain why Muffy's >conclusion is incorrect, or admit that moral relativism allows Nazism >to be considered moral? I'll bite. From the relativist position both morality and rationality are culturally defined. In this culture Hitler's actions must be con- sidered both irrational and immoral. Muffy, however, hypothesized a world populated by Nazis as the dominant and only culture. Under those conditions *and* *only* *under* *those* *conditions* could Hitler's acts be rationally considered moral. The twist which puts the double bind in the above paragraph is that it implies that moral relativism allows Hitler's acts to be rationally considered moral in *this* society. It does not. It merely says that social norms determine what is moral. The principle applies as well to the social reality surrounding *this* argument. >And if moral relativism, consistently followed, would consider Nazism >to be moral, if only Hitler had won the war, then I submit that >moral relativism is a dangerous philosophy. It's less a philosophy than a way of thinking. In less melodramatic situations it is often quite useful. Would you serve pork to Orthodox Jews? Why not? Would you smoke in a non-smoking restaurant? (Maybe you don't smoke, but you get the idea.) Impoliteness is a kind of low-grade immorality that most people tolerate but don't accept. Actions which are wrong in some places are not wrong in others. It is only when we consider those actions which are strongly culturally proscribed, or when individually learned values are strongly at odds with societal norms, whether hypothesized or not, that we begin to think in terms of absolute morality. >(Of course, unless all the moral relativists on the net denounce Muffy, >immediately if not sooner, then the moral absolutists will justly >conclude that they in fact agree with Muffy's reasoning, and by >extension condone Hitler's actions.) I haven't the faintest idea what you are talking about. :-) -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (04/05/85)
> > In article <1345@aecom.UUCP> teitz@aecom.UUCP (Eliyahu Teitz) writes: > > > > I really do not believe what I am reading. Was Hitler wrong? > > > If he had won the war, would he be right? How can a man, for any > > > twisted crazy ideal go and kill one person, let alone 6,000,000. > > > What right does any person have to kill innocent people. > > Muffy replies: > > > Actually, if Hitler had won, he would indeed have been correct. Not from > > *my* point of view, of course, but I would be dead. In fact, as I recall, > > he wanted to kill everyone who didn't believe as he did, so the only people > > left alive would be those that agreed with him, or said they did. Regard- > > less of what you may believe, "right" and "wrong" are societally defined, > > they are *not* inborn. Thus, if everyone in my society thinks as I do, > > then I am right. If Hitler killed off all the people that didn't think as > > he did, his society would have agreed with him, and he would be right. > > Occasionally, someone (usually not a religious person, but there are > exceptions) will make the claim that there is no such thing as an > absolute morality (I use the term "moral relativist" to refer to one > who so believes). Then, someone else (usually a religious person, > but again there are exceptions) will say that the lack of an absolute > morality would mean there is no rational reason to condemn what > Hitler did. The moral relativist will usually disagree with this > conclusion. Now, will all the moral relativists explain why Muffy's > conclusion is incorrect, or admit that moral relativism allows Nazism > to be considered moral? > Interesting point. I dont think that Muffy's point of view has to be denounced though. Basically I think the thrust of Muffy's line of reasoning is that the victors get to write the history books, and some truths can only be determined by studying history. A classic case of this is the histories on WW2 presented by western and eastern block countries. We might not like it, but it happens. The lack of a moral absolute does not mean that the moral relativist cannot condemn Hitler's actions. Without accepting an absolute, one can accept pragmatic guidelines such as things that make life miserable for segments of the population should be avoided if at all possible. That an act can not be condemned on absolute grounds doesn't automatically imply that it must be condoned. > And if moral relativism, consistently followed, would consider Nazism > to be moral, if only Hitler had won the war, then I submit that > moral relativsim is a dangerous philosophy. > > (Of course, unless all the moral relativists on the net denounce Muffy, > immediately if not sooner, then the moral absolutists will justly > conclude that they in fact agree with Muffy's reasoning, and by > extension condone Hitler's actions.) > > Gary Samuelson > ittvax!bunker!garys It is not an either/or situation. The choice is not limited to having absolute morals, or none at all. Philosophies based on "absolutes" can also be dangerous e.g. The history of europe is practically a history of religous wars; Recall the stranglehold that religion had on learning because it accepted Aristotle as being absolutely correct. Note also that absolute morality frequently goes hand in hand with absolute righteousness, and certainty, giving rise to extreme fanaticism as is evident in communistic, and islamic behaviour. Padraig Houlahan.
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (04/05/85)
Before I can answer Samuelson's questions, I first need to explain my moral relativist understanding of what morality is. Morality is a heuristic strategy that we use in our competition with others. People tend to call things that aid them moral, and things that harm them immoral. However, the strategy is more complex than that sounds. If I do something that on the surface might aid me, I might incur a reaction from another that would undo the benefit. Now let's leave the abstract and deal with Gary's questions. In article <789@bunker.UUCP> garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) writes: > Occasionally, someone (usually not a religious person, but there are > exceptions) will make the claim that there is no such thing as an > absolute morality (I use the term "moral relativist" to refer to one > who so believes). Then, someone else (usually a religious person, > but again there are exceptions) will say that the lack of an absolute > morality would mean there is no rational reason to condemn what > Hitler did. The moral relativist will usually disagree with this > conclusion. Now, will all the moral relativists explain why Muffy's > conclusion is incorrect, or admit that moral relativism allows Nazism > to be considered moral? I'm a moral relativist, so I don't believe there is any such thing as an absolute morality. Morality is in the eye of the beholder. Nazism was moral-- to some Nazis. It was and is immoral in the eyes of many beholders, including me. Simply because we perceive it as strongly dangerous to us. You see, there is no absolute morality, but we still have to have a working morality. > And if moral relativism, consistently followed, would consider Nazism > to be moral, if only Hitler had won the war, then I submit that > moral relativsim is a dangerous philosophy. You misunderstand. We can observe that it Hitler had won the war, more people would feel he was moral. But many moral relativists wouldn't consider him moral (from the standpoint of being compatable with their ideas) whether or not he won the war. (I can't speak for myself-- I might have been raised as a Hitler Youth if he had won.) > (Of course, unless all the moral relativists on the net denounce Muffy, > immediately if not sooner, then the moral absolutists will justly > conclude that they in fact agree with Muffy's reasoning, and by > extension condone Hitler's actions.) I detect well-placed sarcasm here: and I agree. Rosen is wrong to insist similarly. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (04/08/85)
Byron, I am operating under the assumption that as people have more time for leisurely thinking and reflecting and do not have to ``fight for survival'' they discover moral truths which they had hitherto not understood. This explains why people discover, quite abruptly, that actions that they had once considered moral they now consider immoral. I have no pronblem believing that in a world where Hitler won WW2, most people would consider Hitler's actions moral. I do not believe that Hitler's actions would, however, *be* moral. Is your position that there *are* no absolute morals -- or that we cannot know when we have discovered them -- or both? In any case, then, I assume that there are times when you would like to do something which you consider wrong. (If you have beaten this one, then please tech me! :-) ) At that point of conflict, why do you decide to try to not do what is wrong rather than not believe that it is wrong, or vice-versa? Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (04/08/85)
The most important problem I see with all this talk of moral relativism is that there seems to be the implication that individual standards of morality can be ignored. Let us suppose, for instance, a Nazi world government. How many dissenters does it take before Nazism becomes evil? 51%? 20%? 1? Jumping back to Martin Luther King: does a white southerner have a moral obligation to conform to the accepted views on him? According to Byron, it seems to me that he does, since dissent is viewed as socially disruptive and thus bad. I agree that there is an element of relativity inherent in moral systems. People just don't agree on the same things, although the degree of conformity is considerably higher than most tend to think (ignoring purely procedural differences). On the other hand, even people who claim to believe in relativism tend not to take it too seriously. To claim that no one has a right to force their system on another, for instance, is to deny relativity; suddenly this right has become absolute. It seems to me that most people tend to follow what I'll call a "basis" system. People by and large agree on a certain basic set of standards, which are treated as absolute. On top of this there are various regional, group, and personal standards, which are treated as being relative. Under such a system, for instance, the orthodox jew and the christian agree to forbid murder, but agree not to pressure each other to violate their private standards. U.S. law is based on just this sort of system. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
colonel@gloria.UUCP (Col. G. L. Sicherman) (04/09/85)
[Heil Hiccup] > And if moral relativism, consistently followed, would consider Nazism > to be moral, if only Hitler had won the war, then I submit that > moral relativsim is a dangerous philosophy. No, moral relativism _would_ be a dangerous philosophy if only Hitler had lost the war! -- Col. G. L. Sicherman ...{rocksvax|decvax}!sunybcs!colonel
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (04/09/85)
(Gary Samuelson:) }>Occasionally, someone (usually not a religious person, but there are }>exceptions) will make the claim that there is no such thing as an }>absolute morality (I use the term "moral relativist" to refer to one }>who so believes). Then, someone else (usually a religious person, }>but again there are exceptions) will say that the lack of an absolute }>morality would mean there is no rational reason to condemn what }>Hitler did. The moral relativist will usually disagree with this }>conclusion. Now, will all the moral relativists explain why Muffy's }>conclusion is incorrect, or admit that moral relativism allows Nazism }>to be considered moral? } (Byron Howes:) }I'll bite. From the relativist position both morality and rationality }are culturally defined. In this culture Hitler's actions must be con- }sidered both irrational and immoral. Muffy, however, hypothesized a }world populated by Nazis as the dominant and only culture. Under those }conditions *and* *only* *under* *those* *conditions* could Hitler's }acts be rationally considered moral. The twist which puts the double }bind in the above paragraph is that it implies that moral relativism }allows Hitler's acts to be rationally considered moral in *this* }society. It does not. It merely says that social norms determine }what is moral. The principle applies as well to the social reality }surrounding *this* argument. Muffy's hypothesis makes no sense to me. One only arrives at her hypothetical culture by killing off those who disagree with Nazism. So, while the killing is being done, are Hitler's actions moral or immoral? If they were moral, how would you explain it to the Jews? It seems like Muffy is saying that Hitler's extermination of the Jews and other dissenters would have to be considered moral after the fact and only after the fact, which makes no sense. When there are dissenters it is morally wrong to kill them (because the culture does not consist of all Nazis). Once the Nazis kill all the dissenters then it becomes morally right to kill dissenters, but then there are none to kill anyway, so what is the point? Once that point is reached, one might just as well to say that is moral to kill unicorns native to downtown Boston. The object or victim or the supposed moral or immoral action doesn't exist (anymore), so what is this the point? }>And if moral relativism, consistently followed, would consider Nazism }>to be moral, if only Hitler had won the war, then I submit that }>moral relativism is a dangerous philosophy. } }It's less a philosophy than a way of thinking. In less melodramatic }situations it is often quite useful. Would you serve pork to Orthodox }Jews? Why not? Would you smoke in a non-smoking restaurant? (Maybe }you don't smoke, but you get the idea.) Impoliteness is a kind of }low-grade immorality that most people tolerate but don't accept. }Actions which are wrong in some places are not wrong in others. It }is only when we consider those actions which are strongly culturally }proscribed, or when individually learned values are strongly at odds }with societal norms, whether hypothesized or not, that we begin to think }in terms of absolute morality. We tend more often to think in terms of absolute morality when considering human rights without which your less melodramatic situations couldn't even be considered. (In a predominantly Nazi society there wouldn't be any Orthodox Jews to feed pork to, would there? And if Hitler smoked, there probably would be no such thing as non-smoking restaruants.) The founders of our country and framers of our Constitution considered life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to be among these "inalienable" rights. What place do inalienable rights have in moral relativism? I agree with Gary that it is indeed a dangerous philosophy (or "way of thinking" or whatever). -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/10/85)
In article <5441@utzoo.UUCP> laura@utzoo.UUCP writes: >I am operating under the assumption that as people have more time for >leisurely thinking and reflecting and do not have to ``fight for >survival'' they discover moral truths which they had hitherto not >understood. This explains why people discover, quite abruptly, that >actions that they had once considered moral they now consider immoral. If I read this correctly, you believe in a kind of moral evolution conver- ging on an "absolute" morality. I don't buy this. First, human beings have not had to fight for survival (in a general sense) for quite some time. Second, it doesn't account for the enormous moral reversions (like Nazi Germany or Khomeni's Iran or the tail end of the Roman Empire) which history shows us. It seems equally likely that with the mutability of cultural norms people consider choices to be moral that the once thought immoral (like premarital sex.) Be aware that very few people think they perform immoral acts. >I have no problem believing that in a world where Hitler won WW2, most >people would consider Hitler's actions moral. I do not believe that >Hitler's actions would, however, *be* moral. Is your position that >there *are* no absolute morals -- or that we cannot know when we have >discovered them -- or both? In any case, then, I assume that there are >times when you would like to do something which you consider wrong. >(If you have beaten this one, then please teach me! :-) ) At that >point of conflict, why do you decide to try to not do what is wrong >rather than not believe that it is wrong, or vice-versa? My position is that there is no absolute morality. There are, however, social conventions which need to be observed for pragmatic reasons -- it's easier to get along that way! Too, one is thoroughly permeated by the norms of one's culture -- violations of those norms bring strong internal sanctions called guilt. I, like you, am a creature of my society. Activities which are strongly culturally proscribed (like making love to my sister) have no possibility of being admitted to the set of activities I'd like to engage in. Others, like driving 110 mph on the freeway or engaging in illegal betting, would simply make my life too messy. Most low-grade "wrongs" I have to meet and deal with on an individual basis. It isn't really a point of conflict, more a point of balance. Like most, I've had to change my moral precepts as the outcomes of my actions proved socially profitable or expensive. -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/10/85)
In article <4651@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: >The most important problem I see with all this talk of moral relativism is >that there seems to be the implication that individual standards of morality >can be ignored. Let us suppose, for instance, a Nazi world government. How >many dissenters does it take before Nazism becomes evil? 51%? 20%? 1? I'm not sure I follow this argument. Individual standards of morality *are* ignored. Ask the creationists, Ken Arndt or Rich Rosen :-) I would maintain that there is no such thing as an individual standard, by defi- nition. When one talks about morality one talks about values and standards shared with others. The reason Nazism is deemed evil is that its values come into sharp conflict with those values common to so many cultures that they are deemed universal or "absolute." In much earlier times where genocide was construed as a legitimate technique of war, Nazism might not have been considered as quite such an evil. (Must we bring up the Midianites again?) Percentages don't make sense in this context, it is the preponderance of shared values. >Jumping back to Martin Luther King: does a white southerner have a moral >obligation to conform to the accepted views on him? According to Byron, it >seems to me that he does, since dissent is viewed as socially disruptive and >thus bad. I don't follow this either. My point about white southerners is simply that despite the fact that many (including myself) consider racism and sexism to be inherently evil, there are others who consider segregation and traditional sexual values to be moral precepts, worth fighting for. (Note the change in words.) These people are by all objective measures very moral people -- following a set of values held strongly in this country up till the last twenty years. Those values are gradually being swept away (or broken up, depending on your point of view) This is a change in values, not a change in the people who subscribe to them. Is this progression to some absolute morality? Make a case for it. >I agree that there is an element of relativity inherent in moral systems. >People just don't agree on the same things, although the degree of >conformity is considerably higher than most tend to think (ignoring purely >procedural differences). On the other hand, even people who claim to >believe in relativism tend not to take it too seriously. To claim that no >one has a right to force their system on another, for instance, is to deny >relativity; suddenly this right has become absolute. Just because I don't believe that the rules I live by were handed down by G-d doesn't mean I don't take them seriously. Justice, fairness and equality are very serious things to me -- I believe a society which practices them is a better society because more people are able to make substantive contributions. If it's better for society, then it's better for my life as well. (Anyone who quotes the previous sentence out of context will be severely flamed.) The complaint that nobody has a right to force their system on another is an interesting one. Generally, this is said in a context where socially unimportant (read contested) areas of morality are under discussion. Society forces its morality on individuals all the time. That's why we have so many folks in prison for murder, rape, armed robbery, etc. That's also why we have an ever growing population in mental wards. Myself, I think the statement is an expression of another seeming "absolute." This is a very pluralistic society, freedom of expression and thought are valued so highly that to try to supress them is deemed immoral? What's that? Do I hear the sound of another breakdown in morality? -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/11/85)
In article <5119@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP writes: >We tend more often to think in terms of absolute morality when considering >human rights without which your less melodramatic situations couldn't even >be considered. (In a predominantly Nazi society there wouldn't be any Orthodox >Jews to feed pork to, would there? And if Hitler smoked, there probably >would be no such thing as non-smoking restaruants.) The founders of >our country and framers of our Constitution considered life, liberty >and the pursuit of happiness to be among these "inalienable" rights. What >place do inalienable rights have in moral relativism? I agree with Gary >that it is indeed a dangerous philosophy (or "way of thinking" or whatever). I'll answer your statements with a question adapted from one originally posed by Tim Maroney: Why do we consider it immoral for Hitler to have attempted genocide against the Jews while we seem to consider it moral for the Israelites to have attempted genocide against the Midianites. I submit that the morality of a particular act depends upon whether you are the actor or the one acted upon (or allies thereof.) If moral precepts were applied consistantly throughout history by those who assert an "absolute morality" I could be persuaded that such a thing exists. I do not find such evidence, hence moral relativism. I'm glad that the founders of our country declared life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to be "inalienable rights." It makes life considerably more pleasant here than it would be elsewhere. I note in passing that imprisonment, death penalties, legislated inqualities on the basis of sex, immigration restrictions etc etc suggest that our "inalienable rights" are quite abridgeable if the culture demands. (This is not a statement of approval or disapproval of death penalties or imprisonment. It is merely the observation although "inalienable" means not abridgeable, such rights may be taken away anyway.) -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (04/11/85)
I have 2 ways of explaining Hitlers. The first is that, like everything else, people can make mistakes in perceiving what is good. This is the ``most people do not think that they are doing immoral acts'' propostition -- they are just making mistakes. The other way, which I think is more applicable to Hitler, is that *some* people, while perceiving what is good, choose to do evil anyway. It does not help that a lot of things are not good or evil, but stictly neutral, but have been considered one or the other by people in the past. I think that what I am talking about is an evolution only in the very loosest sense. If you have more time to think about what is wrong, and a greater variety of events to consider for corraborative evidence it is not surprising that more wrongs are uncovered. It does not follow that someone who discovers these wrong is going to have an easy time getting his neighbours to perceive them, though, or even that his children are going to perceive them. A few weeks ago a psychiatrist on staff at the St. Michael's (Roman Catholic) hospital commented that he was upset that no abortions were being performed there. His position was that if he could get the director of the hospital and others opposed to the practice in for psychotherapy 3 days a week that in 3 years he could ``cure'' them of their ``squeamishness''. The question I have is, is ``inconvenience'' all that matters? Is that all that keeps you from getting your ``squeamishness'' cured? Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/12/85)
In article <5460@utzoo.UUCP> laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >I have 2 ways of explaining Hitlers. The first is that, like everything >else, people can make mistakes in perceiving what is good. This is >the ``most people do not think that they are doing immoral acts'' >propostition -- they are just making mistakes. The other way, which I >think is more applicable to Hitler, is that *some* people, while >perceiving what is good, choose to do evil anyway. As Laura and I are proceeding from entirely different sets of axioms, there are a limited number of ways we can communicate. I would agree with the first explanation above if "people can make mistakes in understanding the cultural definitions of 'good'" were its intended meaning. I suspect, however, that Laura has a more absolute notion of "good" in mind. Even then, I could agree with her had the statement been phrased "people make mistakes in perceiving a higher 'good'" which leads us to the next explanation... I honestly do not believe that anyone ever chooses to do evil at least without mitigation of a perceived long term higher "good" in which case the evil becomes, in effect, a good. We bar from this discussion the organically ill who believe they are controlled by voices, demons from within or rays from elsewhere -- they are not able to 'choose' in a meaningful way. Hitler, Attila the Hun, Jim Jones, Stalin, King David, John Brown, Sitting Bull, Moses, Judas Iscariot, St. Joan, etc. all acted in the service of what they perceived to be a higher "good." Sometimes this notion corresponded with what we perceive to be "good," and sometimes it did not. The evaluation is purely subjective. Objectively there is no way to tell the difference. >A few weeks ago a psychiatrist on staff at the St. Michael's (Roman >Catholic) hospital commented that he was upset that no abortions were >being performed there. His position was that if he could get the >director of the hospital and others opposed to the practice in for >psychotherapy 3 days a week that in 3 years he could ``cure'' them >of their ``squeamishness''. > >The question I have is, is ``inconvenience'' all that matters? Is >that all that keeps you from getting your ``squeamishness'' cured? Just because I do not believe in an absolute morality that will result in punishment if breached, does not mean I do not have personal principles. I suspect it would be as difficult to disabuse me of my personal notions of right and wrong as it would anyone else who posts to this group. The difference is only that I do not believe my values are eternally immutable, nor do I believe they should hold great significance to others. I do not adopt a value based on the abstract notion of an absolute morality or rule. It must have some pragmatic reason behind it insofar as I am able to determine with my built-in cultural biases. -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (04/13/85)
From Byron Howes: I don't follow this either. My point about white southerners is simply that despite the fact that many (including myself) consider racism and sexism to be inherently evil, there are others who consider segregation and traditional sexual values to be moral precepts, worth fighting for. (Note the change in words.) These people are by all objective measures very moral people -- following a set of values held strongly in this country up till the last twenty years. Those values are gradually being swept away (or broken up, depending on your point of view) This is a change in values, not a change in the people who subscribe to them. Is this progression to some absolute morality? Make a case for it. This is the great question. Since you believe that racism is inherantly evil is your problem one of ``why is it that these sincere people do not find the truth of this belief obvious'' or is it ``why do I cling to this notion of inherant evils even though there are none''? If it is the first, then I do not see how you can say that there is no absolute morality - it is what makes those things inherantly evil. If it is the second, then I do not see how you can believe that racism is inherantly evil. Whether we are progressing to a greater understanding of an absolutely existing morality is another question. It could be that we are getting less and less enlightened all the time. I tend to doubt that progress could be made in other areas (such as science) and not be made in the area of morals - given, of coruse, that an absolute morality exists. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/16/85)
In article <5472@utzoo.UUCP> laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >From Byron Howes: > I don't follow this either. My point about white southerners > is simply that despite the fact that many (including myself) > consider racism and sexism to be inherently evil, there are > others who consider segregation and traditional sexual values > to be moral precepts, worth fighting for. (Note the change in > words.) These people are by all objective measures very moral > people -- following a set of values held strongly in this > country up till the last twenty years. Those values are > gradually being swept away (or broken up, depending on your > point of view) This is a change in values, not a change in the > people who subscribe to them. Is this progression to some > absolute morality? Make a case for it. > >This is the great question. >Since you believe that racism is inherantly evil is your problem one >of ``why is it that these sincere people do not find the truth >of this belief obvious'' or is it ``why do I cling to this notion >of inherant evils even though there are none''? Neither. I'm using "evil" here in a very subjective sense, much in the same way I might use "ugly." The analogy bears drawing further. To me, the assertion of an absolute morality makes as little (or as much) sense as the assertion of an absolute aesthetic. That some people do not see racism as ugly is testimony to their lack of acculturation rather than ignorance, stupidity, or lack of morality. The legislation of the past twenty years has had the effect of acculturating people, not enlightening them. Very few former racists have "seen the light" so to speak, most have simply come to accept changed values. The fact that I believe racism to be inherently evil is irrelevant to the discussion. At a different time, in a different place, under a different set of social conditions I might think differently. I don't know. Here and now I see racism as denying society the produc- tivity of large sectors of the population. That's ugly. >Whether we are progressing to a greater understanding of an >absolutely existing morality is another question. It could be that we >are getting less and less enlightened all the time. I tend to >doubt that progress could be made in other areas (such as science) and >not be made in the area of morals - given, of coruse, that an >absolute morality exists. I don't see why values have to be considered as progressing or regressing from or toward some absolute. I view cultural change as much like biological evolution (No, I am not a sociobiologist.) Certain cultural traits or social structures increase stability and the ability of a society to "survive" so to speak. These will vary with the set of conditions under which that society exists. Such structures are passed on as long as a they remain viable. Dysfunctional traits wither and die. A change in conditions, however, may make that which was once stabilizing a destabilizing value -- the successful society must change. Todays "evils" may be yesterdays "goods" and vice-versa. -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (04/18/85)
I agree that most people are not enlightened, but merely reflect the values of the time. Most people do not understand Newtonian physics, either though - I can't see that this is evidence one way or another. I think, though that you are committed to some sort of absolute morality when you write: Certain cultural traits or social structures increase stability and the ability of a society to ``survive'' so to speak. These will vary with the set of conditions under which that society exists. Such structures are passed on as long as a they remain viable. Dysfunctional traits wither and die. Thus you have a morality based on ``the things that increase stability and the ability of a society to survive'' are good -- and (presumably) ``the things that decrease stability and decrease the ability of the society to survive'' are evil. of course, this is not so useful when you meet someone who wants ``the one permanent and absolute truth on whether Birth Control is moral'', but I think that it is an absolute moral standard. Now, if you believe in ``human nature'' (whatever that is) it follows that there are certain patterns which are never going to be anything but dysfunctional - (say a soceity where the citizens all go on rampages on fridays and kill as many citizens as they can) and these can be labelled as ``unquestionable evils''. Anything which is never going to be anything but functional will make the ``unquestionable goods'' list. Do you think that after long study of ``what is human'' and ``what doe human societies do'' that it would be impossible to develop a better understandingof what these things are -- and perhaps some basic principals which could be referred to in the field of morality? Laura Creighton utzoo!laura References: <487@lll-crg.ARPA> <789@bunker.UUCP> <453@mcnc.mcnc.UUCP> <4651@umcp-cs.UUCP> <467@mcnc.mcnc.UUCP> <Re: Hitler and Moral Relativism
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (04/21/85)
Byron Howes: }I'll answer your statements with a question adapted from one originally }posed by Tim Maroney: Why do we consider it immoral for Hitler to have }attempted genocide against the Jews while we seem to consider it moral }for the Israelites to have attempted genocide against the Midianites. I }submit that the morality of a particular act depends upon whether you }are the actor or the one acted upon (or allies thereof.) If moral precepts }were applied consistantly throughout history by those who assert an }"absolute morality" I could be persuaded that such a thing exists. I do }not find such evidence, hence moral relativism. One question you're avoiding, Byron, is whether or not Hitler's actions, were moral. Do you think they were, while they were actually going on? Do you agree that to consider them moral after the fact (as in Muffy's hypothetical situation) does not make sense? If so, then the contention stands that moral relativism makes no binding judgement against a Hitler in any society. You say the morality of an act depends on who is doing it. What about the *reasons* for doing each? Moral absolutes imply a common standard by which to judge each act. What common standard would you propose for considering whether each of these acts is moral or not? Do you pass judgement on either of them? How do you answer your own question? If you think both acts are immoral, what is the basis for that view, and what gives your view any real meaning? If you think the two acts are inconsistent you must be judgeing them so by a common standard. Does it make sense for a moral relativist to do that? If we adopt the position that you propose, by what standard are the two acts inconistent? Is it always wrong to kill anyone for any reason? Then you have an absolute and not a relativistic standard. Is the position inconsistent by the standard of Ancient Israel? In that time God destroyed peoples for the sin that pervaded their society. That standard was the same both for the peoples surrounding Israel and Israel herself. Scripture records countless judgments against Israel for their sin and yet they did not consider these judgements against them to be unjust. It seems consistent to me. To Israel, their moral standard did not depend on whether it faulted them or others. The judgements against Israel, recorded in their own Scriptures, are far more numerous and severe than any inflicted on other peoples. Yet in those same Scriptures, God's judgements are many times extolled as being righteous. How do your statements explain that? You may reject Israel's standard, but it is not true that that standard was different for Israel than others. They recognised that. Do you think that there is no one who would view his punishment by his own moral standard as being just? You need to use some standard of judgement that encompasses more than just your own actions in order to even consider the question. If you use Israel's standard, then what sin (based on that standard) can be laid to the charge of the Jews so as to be able to justify Hitler's holocaust as the judgement of God, as was the case with the Midianites? (If you accomplish that, then you could show that Hitler's persecution of the Jews may fall into the same category as when God used foreign nations to punish Ancient Israel; so they might be wrong [by their own standard] to hate what Hitler did to them.) If you use Hitler's point of view, of course you couldn't find fault with anything he wanted to do. (You would die for it, if you weren't able or justified [by whose morality?] in killing him first.) If you use your own standard, then you are using it to judge actions in another moral context (Hitler's Germany) and presuming them to transcend that context; your moral standard ceases to be relative (at least with regard to Hitler). }I'm glad that the founders of our country declared life, liberty and the }pursuit of happiness to be "inalienable rights." It makes life considerably }more pleasant here than it would be elsewhere. I note in passing that }imprisonment, death penalties, legislated inqualities on the basis of sex, }immigration restrictions etc etc suggest that our "inalienable rights" are }quite abridgeable if the culture demands. (This is not a statement of }approval or disapproval of death penalties or imprisonment. It is merely }the observation although "inalienable" means not abridgeable, such rights }may be taken away anyway.) Or they may be forfeited (such is the nature of penalties, isn't it?). You seem to be implying that absolute moral standards must not be absolute if they don't, in themselves, prevent people from actually transgressing them and, though they are recognized, if they are not always lived up to they cease to be absolute. Is this necessarily so? I don't see why. Any moral standard implies a sense of what *ought* to be, not necessarily what *is*. If this were not the case how would we be aware of morals as such and when they are transgressed? In another article you seemed to imply that American chattel slavery became wrong when it became unprofitable. Wasn't there some moral reproach involved at the time? I have a hard time figuring out why the Civil War was fought if only to convice the South that slavery was unprofitable to them. One has only to read "Uncle Tom's Cabin" to get a feel for the moral currents that contributed strongly to the anti-slavery movement. The main thrust of that book was that slaves were as much human as their masters, so they should be treated according to the same moral standard (their "inalienable rights" were not being honored). When the northern states passed laws like the Fugitive Slave Act, northerners could no longer pass off slavery as a sin of the South. Their own laws were supporting the system. Many of them felt guilty by their by their own moral standard and, rather than change the standard, they did something about it. -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (04/21/85)
Byron Howes: }I'll answer your statements with a question adapted from one originally }posed by Tim Maroney: Why do we consider it immoral for Hitler to have }attempted genocide against the Jews while we seem to consider it moral }for the Israelites to have attempted genocide against the Midianites. I }submit that the morality of a particular act depends upon whether you }are the actor or the one acted upon (or allies thereof.) If moral precepts }were applied consistantly throughout history by those who assert an }"absolute morality" I could be persuaded that such a thing exists. I do }not find such evidence, hence moral relativism. One question you're avoiding, Byron, is whether or not Hitler's actions, were moral. Do you think they were, while they were actually going on? Do you agree that to consider them moral after the fact (as in Muffy's hypothetical situation) does not make sense? If so, then the contention stands that moral relativism makes no binding judgement against a Hitler in any society. You say the morality of an act depends on who is doing it. What about the *reasons* for doing each? Moral absolutes imply a common standard by which to judge each act. What common standard would you propose for considering whether each of these acts is moral or not? Do you pass judgement on either of them? How do you answer your own question? If you think both acts are immoral, what is the basis for that view, and what gives your view any real meaning? If you think the two acts are inconsistent you must be judging them so by a common standard. Does it make sense for a moral relativist to do that? If we adopt the position that you propose, by what standard are the two acts inconsistent? Is it always wrong to kill anyone for any reason? Then you have an absolute and not a relativistic standard. Is the position inconsistent by the standard of Ancient Israel? In that time God destroyed peoples for the sin that pervaded their society. That standard was the same both for the peoples surrounding Israel and Israel herself. Scripture records countless judgments against Israel for their sin and yet they did not consider these judgements against them to be unjust. It seems consistent to me. To Israel, their moral standard did not depend on whether it faulted them or others. The judgements against Israel, recorded in their own Scriptures, are far more numerous and severe than any inflicted on other peoples. Yet in those same Scriptures, God's judgements are many times extolled as being righteous. How do your statements explain that? You may reject Israel's standard, but it is not true that that standard was different for Israel than others. They recognized that. Do you think that there is no one who would view his punishment by his own moral standard as being just? You need to use some standard of judgement that encompasses more than just your own actions in order to even consider the question. If you use Israel's standard, then what sin (based on that standard) can be laid to the charge of the Jews so as to be able to justify Hitler's holocaust as the judgement of God, as was the case with the Midianites? (If you accomplish that, then you could show that Hitler's persecution of the Jews may fall into the same category as when God used foreign nations to punish Ancient Israel; so they might be wrong [by their own standard] to hate what Hitler did to them.) If you use Hitler's point of view, of course you couldn't find fault with anything he wanted to do. (You would die for it, if you weren't able or justified [by whose morality?] in killing him first.) If you use your own standard, then you are using it to judge actions in another moral context (Hitler's Germany) and presuming them to transcend that context; your moral standard ceases to be relative (at least with regard to Hitler). }I'm glad that the founders of our country declared life, liberty and the }pursuit of happiness to be "inalienable rights." It makes life considerably }more pleasant here than it would be elsewhere. I note in passing that }imprisonment, death penalties, legislated inqualities on the basis of sex, }immigration restrictions etc etc suggest that our "inalienable rights" are }quite abridgeable if the culture demands. (This is not a statement of }approval or disapproval of death penalties or imprisonment. It is merely }the observation although "inalienable" means not abridgeable, such rights }may be taken away anyway.) You are glad that we consider certain rights inalienable because it makes your life pleasant. Is that a reason why they should be considered as such? If not, can you give a reason? Members of the KKK and certain Neo-Nazi groups apparently don't think the inalienable rights we accord to certain groups make life pleasant. Wouldn't you have to see things from their point of view? If it turns out that we shouldn't consider these rights inalienable where do we stand? What gives us any right to draw the line of the KKK and the Nazis in *this* society? Charley Wingate's remark about moral relativists not taking moral relativism seriously seems to be generally true. (There are those who have, I suppose. Sartre, Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche come to mind.) In order to get along it seems we must consider some moral values as being absolute. But is seems to me that the moral relativist can give no binding reason for doing so. You seem to be implying that absolute moral standards must not be absolute if they don't, in themselves, prevent people from actually transgressing them and, though they are recognized, if they are not always lived up to they cease to be absolute. Is this necessarily so? I don't see why. Any moral standard implies a sense of what *ought* to be, not necessarily what *is*. If this were not the case how would we be aware of morals as such and when they are transgressed? You seem to be saying that the lack of observable "evolution" in moral standards toward a system that recognizes moral absolutes makes a case against the existence of absolutes. How is this so? In another article you seemed to imply that American chattel slavery became wrong when it became unprofitable. Wasn't there some moral reproach involved at the time? I have a hard time figuring out why the Civil War was fought if only to convince the South that slavery was unprofitable to them. One has only to read "Uncle Tom's Cabin" to get a feel for the moral currents that contributed strongly to the anti-slavery movement. The main thrust of that book was that slaves were as much human as their masters, so they should be treated according to the same moral standard (their "inalienable rights" were not being honored). When the northern states passed laws like the Fugitive Slave Act, northerners could no longer pass off slavery as a sin of the South. Their own laws were supporting the system. Many of them felt guilty by their own moral standard and, rather than change the standard, they did something about it. Your main point seems to be that you find no evidence that those who hold to certain moral absolutes also recognize when their own actions fall short of that standard as well as when those of others do. This is not true, I think (except if you look among those who are already moral relativists). -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (04/23/85)
> > Byron Howes: > }I'll answer your statements with a question adapted from one originally > }posed by Tim Maroney: Why do we consider it immoral for Hitler to have > }attempted genocide against the Jews while we seem to consider it moral > }for the Israelites to have attempted genocide against the Midianites. I > }submit that the morality of a particular act depends upon whether you > }are the actor or the one acted upon (or allies thereof.) If moral precepts > }were applied consistantly throughout history by those who assert an > }"absolute morality" I could be persuaded that such a thing exists. I do > }not find such evidence, hence moral relativism. > > One question you're avoiding, Byron, is whether or not Hitler's actions, > were moral. Do you think they were, while they were actually going on? I think that it is implied in Byron's answer that Hitler's actions were wrong. This follows from the way he posed the question. > You say the morality of an act depends on who is doing it. What about the > *reasons* for doing each? Moral absolutes imply a common standard > by which to judge each act. What common standard would you propose for > considering whether each of these acts is moral or not? Do you pass > judgement on either of them? How do you answer your own question? If > you think both acts are immoral, what is the basis for that view, and > what gives your view any real meaning? > If you think the two acts are inconsistent you must be judging them > so by a common standard. Does it make sense for a moral relativist > to do that? I would propose as a measure of their morality, the amount of pain, misery, suffering, and needless discomfort inflicted. Generally this is just a way of maximizing the stability, and harmony in society. I see no problems with the moral relativist doing this and using it as his standard. > ... Is it always wrong to kill anyone for > any reason? Then you have an absolute and not a relativistic standard. No, it is not always wrong to kill. One can kill in self defense. How much misery would have been avoided if Hitler had been assinated? > Is the position inconsistent by the standard of Ancient Israel? In > that time God destroyed peoples for the sin that pervaded their society. > That standard was the same both for the peoples surrounding Israel > and Israel herself. Scripture records countless judgments against > Israel for their sin and yet they did not consider these judgements > against them to be unjust. It seems consistent to me. To Israel, > their moral standard did not depend on whether it faulted them or others. > The judgements against Israel, recorded in their own Scriptures, are > far more numerous and severe than any inflicted on other peoples. Yet > in those same Scriptures, God's judgements are many times extolled as being > righteous. How do your statements explain that? All of this assumes the existence of a god of course. Personally I don't have to explain it then since I don't recognize the existence of a deity.. One can quite comfortably adopt a pragmatic standard as outlined above. This standard is not absolute in itself, but suffices to compare acts of genocide with one another. > }I'm glad that the founders of our country declared life, liberty and the > }pursuit of happiness to be "inalienable rights." It makes life considerably > }more pleasant here than it would be elsewhere. I note in passing that > }imprisonment, death penalties, legislated inqualities on the basis of sex, > }immigration restrictions etc etc suggest that our "inalienable rights" are > }quite abridgeable if the culture demands. (This is not a statement of > }approval or disapproval of death penalties or imprisonment. It is merely > }the observation although "inalienable" means not abridgeable, such rights > }may be taken away anyway.) > > You are glad that we consider certain rights inalienable because it makes > your life pleasant. Is that a reason why they should be considered as > such? Yes, if in the process of doing so they will tend to make everyone's life more pleasant. > If not, can you give a reason? Members of the KKK and certain Neo-Nazi > groups apparently don't think the inalienable rights we accord to certain > groups make life pleasant. Wouldn't you have to see things from their > point of view? If it turns out that we shouldn't consider these rights > inalienable where do we stand? What gives us any right to draw the line > of the KKK and the Nazis in *this* society? Living in a democracy, the majority view holds. This is what keeps extremist groups in check. The rights of the KKK have to be balanced against the rights of their targets. The "greater good" standard described above is all that is required in order to do the balancing act. > Charley Wingate's remark about moral relativists not taking moral relativism > seriously seems to be generally true. (There are those who have, I suppose. > Sartre, Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche come to mind.) Sounds like an ad hominem argument to me. > In order to get > along it seems we must consider some moral values as being absolute. This is not necessarily the case, as shown above. > But > is seems to me that the moral relativist can give no binding reason for > doing so. It's as binding as "absolute morality" was on Hitler. Padraig Houlahan.
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/23/85)
In article <5504@utzoo.UUCP> laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >I think, though that you are committed to some sort of absolute >morality when you write: > > Certain cultural traits or social structures increase stability and > the ability of a society to ``survive'' so to speak. These will vary > with the set of conditions under which that society exists. Such > structures are passed on as long as a they remain viable. > Dysfunctional traits wither and die. > >Thus you have a morality based on ``the things that increase stability and >the ability of a society to survive'' are good -- and (presumably) ``the >things that decrease stability and decrease the ability of the society to >survive'' are evil. Not so, or at least not *absolutely* so. If functional traits can be deemed "good," they can only be classified that way from within the society under scrutiny at a particular point in time. The same holds for dysfunc- tional traits being labelled as "evil." Personally, I do not see the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini as a "good" thing, though it stabilizes Islamic Iranian Society. I'm looking at it from a particular cultural bias, however. >of course, this is not so useful when you meet someone who wants ``the one >permanent and absolute truth on whether Birth Control is moral'', but I think >that it is an absolute moral standard. Now, if you believe in ``human nature'' >(whatever that is) it follows that there are certain patterns which are >never going to be anything but dysfunctional - (say a soceity where the >citizens all go on rampages on fridays and kill as many citizens as they can) >and these can be labelled as ``unquestionable evils''. Anything which is >never going to be anything but functional will make the ``unquestionable >goods'' list. Do you think that after long study of ``what is human'' and >``what doe human societies do'' that it would be impossible to develop a >better understandingof what these things are -- and perhaps some basic >principals which could be referred to in the field of morality? When I was much younger (in the days when we called moral relativism "situational ethics") I used to engage in thought experiments where I would envision social/cultural systems wherein things thought of as "moral" could be considered "immoral" and vice-versa. Something very close to the situation you describe (random murder) is hypothesizeable in a society very overpopulated with respect to available resources -- your own lifeboat situation! Remember, too, that any "absolute" morality must apply to non-human societies and cultures as well as to human ones. An analysis of human nature is, at best, "insufficient data" for the divi- nation of an "absolute" morality -- what we would find is morality relative to being a member of the human species. -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
bch@mcnc.UUCP (Byron Howes) (04/24/85)
In article <5178@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) writes: >One question you're avoiding, Byron, is whether or not Hitler's actions, >were moral. Do you think they were, while they were actually going on? >Do you agree that to consider them moral after the fact (as in Muffy's >hypothetical situation) does not make sense? If so, then the contention >stands that moral relativism makes no binding judgement against a Hitler >in any society. I wasn't aware that I was avoiding the question. For the record, I believe Adolph Hitler's actions and policies to be anything but moral. I qualify that by saying my judgement of what is moral and immoral is done on the basis of cultural precepts I have internalized from living 40+ years in this society. Without that (or some other) cultural envelope there is simply no basis for judgement. Culture provides the filter through which history is viewed. As culture changes, so perceptions of the "morality" or "immorality" of an act changes. Consider the Hiroshima nuclear attack. In its time it was considered a moral act. Today, among many in the U.S., there is considerable doubt as to its morality. (Among Japanese, there is little doubt as to its immorality.) I submit there are no binding judgements as to any event, ever. As culture changes the definition of morality changes. At the risk of getting into a Rich Rosen-like argument I am not weighing the comparative virtues of "absolute" vs. "relative" morality. I am simply saying the former does not exists despite protestations to the contrary. This is demonstrated by inconsistencies in the way similar historical events are viewed within the same moral framework. >You say the morality of an act depends on who is doing it. What about the >*reasons* for doing each? Moral absolutes imply a common standard >by which to judge each act. What common standard would you propose for >considering whether each of these acts is moral or not? Do you pass >judgement on either of them? How do you answer your own question? If >you think both acts are immoral, what is the basis for that view, and >what gives your view any real meaning? If you've been following my argument you know that I cannot propose a standard for evaluation that is binding for all across time. I simply took, for example, two cases of attempted genocide and asked why is one of them considered moral and the other immoral? What *I* think is irrelevant. I am asking *you* to show *me* the common standard. You are the absolutist, remember, I am the relativist. >You are glad that we consider certain rights inalienable because it makes >your life pleasant. Is that a reason why they should be considered as >such? If not, can you give a reason? Members of the KKK and certain Neo-Nazi >groups apparently don't think the inalienable rights we accord to certain >groups make life pleasant. Wouldn't you have to see things from their >point of view? If it turns out that we shouldn't consider these rights >inalienable where do we stand? What gives us any right to draw the line >of the KKK and the Nazis in *this* society? Paul, you are making the general mistake of believing that moral relativists have no morality. I'll guarantee you I have a set of principles that I hold absolutely as firmly as do you. If you have been following this discussion you know that as well. The difference would seem to be that I do not believe my standards apply to everyone, of every species, at every place and every time. I do not believe my standards to be Gd-given, but derived from my culture and my experience. In another place and time they might well be different (but held absolutely as firmly.) We abridge rights regularly in this society. The culture provides rules under which such sanctions can be invoked. These rules aren't always clear and are often in flux, but they are there. The rights you speak of aren't considered inalienable, even though the boilerplate says they are. The notions of whether they should or shouldn't be are up for debate. That I may be able to see things from the Nazi or the KKK point of view does not mean I am compelled to agree with those points of view. Moral relativism does *not* mean amorality. How many times do I have to repeat this? >You seem to be implying that absolute moral standards must not be absolute if >they don't, in themselves, prevent people from actually transgressing them >and, though they are recognized, if they are not always lived up to they >cease to be absolute. Is this necessarily so? I don't see why. Any moral >standard implies a sense of what *ought* to be, not necessarily what *is*. >If this were not the case how would we be aware of morals as such and when >they are transgressed? You seem to be saying that the lack of observable >"evolution" in moral standards toward a system that recognizes moral absolutes >makes a case against the existence of absolutes. How is this so? No. I agree with you that a moral standard, relative or absolute, describes what ought to be within a given domain. The inconsistancies in the way various historical events are viewed indicate, to me, that there are not absolute principles of morality (please name some that are demonstrable!) This does not deny the possibility of moral judgement within some more restricted domain. >In another article you seemed to imply that American chattel slavery became >wrong when it became unprofitable. Wasn't there some moral reproach >involved at the time? I have a hard time figuring out why the Civil War >was fought if only to convince the South that slavery was unprofitable to them. >One has only to read "Uncle Tom's Cabin" to get a feel for the moral currents >that contributed strongly to the anti-slavery movement. The main thrust >of that book was that slaves were as much human as their masters, so they >should be treated according to the same moral standard (their "inalienable >rights" were not being honored). When the northern states passed laws like >the Fugitive Slave Act, northerners could no longer pass off slavery as a >sin of the South. Their own laws were supporting the system. Many of them >felt guilty by their own moral standard and, rather than change the standard, >they did something about it. I hate to disillusion you, but the Civil War was fought over taxation, not slavery. Slavery proved to be a good call to arms for northerners but to be truthful it had begun to die of its own weight well before the Civil War. This is more properly discussed in net.politics. >Your main point seems to be that you find no evidence that those who hold >to certain moral absolutes also recognize when their own actions fall short >of that standard as well as when those of others do. This is not true, I >think (except if you look among those who are already moral relativists). Not at all. I simply see no evidence for an absolute morality, but rather I see the belief in an absolute morality allows people to believe the world will not shortly become unhinged. -- Byron C. Howes ...!{decvax,akgua}!mcnc!ecsvax!bch
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (04/25/85)
Another response to Byron (probably my last on this topic): >>One question you're avoiding, Byron, is whether or not Hitler's actions, >>were moral. Do you think they were, while they were actually going on? >>Do you agree that to consider them moral after the fact (as in Muffy's >>hypothetical situation) does not make sense? If so, then the contention >>stands that moral relativism makes no binding judgement against a Hitler >>in any society. > >I wasn't aware that I was avoiding the question. For the record, I believe >Adolph Hitler's actions and policies to be anything but moral. I qualify >that by saying my judgement of what is moral and immoral is done on the >basis of cultural precepts I have internalized from living 40+ years in this >society. Without that (or some other) cultural envelope there is simply >no basis for judgement. OK, let me clarify. Can you make a binding judgement on Nazis or KKK members in *this* society? That is, apart from what you believe, do you have justification for saying that holding their racist ideologies and acting according to them is wrong? If you saw one of these folks about to kill a Black person, you would object according to your own culturally defined beliefs and say that you believe that the would be killer is wrong. Fine. My point is that would that person then be able to snuff out your objection simply by saying, "That's just what you believe. Your culture has conditioned you that way and I don't particularly agree with the cultural morality. In fact, I'm in the process of redefining that morality so that it will accept what I believe to be right."? If your answer is "yes" then my last sentence in the first paragraph above still holds. If it is no, then I suggest that you are backing off from moral relativism. >Culture provides the filter through which history is viewed. As >culture changes, so perceptions of the "morality" or "immorality" of an >act changes. Consider the Hiroshima nuclear attack. In its time it >was considered a moral act. Today, among many in the U.S., there is >considerable doubt as to its morality. (Among Japanese, there is little >doubt as to its immorality.) I submit there are no binding judgements as >to any event, ever. As culture changes the definition of morality changes. In this example you're leaving out hindsight. We have that today. The U.S. didn't then. In fact, most people in the U.S. didn't know what an atomic bomb was, let alone the extent of what it could do. I don't even think that those who developed it and dropped it knew the full extent of what they were doing. To say that our culture approved of dropping the Bomb then, is misleading. >>You say the morality of an act depends on who is doing it. What about the >>*reasons* for doing each? Moral absolutes imply a common standard >>by which to judge each act. What common standard would you propose for >>considering whether each of these acts is moral or not? Do you pass >>judgement on either of them? How do you answer your own question? If >>you think both acts are immoral, what is the basis for that view, and >>what gives your view any real meaning? > >If you've been following my argument you know that I cannot propose a >standard for evaluation that is binding for all across time. I simply >took, for example, two cases of attempted genocide and asked why is one >of them considered moral and the other immoral? What *I* think is >irrelevant. I am asking *you* to show *me* the common standard. You >are the absolutist, remember, I am the relativist. And you have ignored what I said in the following paragraphs of that article. What is your basis of asking the question? You are implying a comparison of the two events and also that they are inconsistent. If you don't have a basis for that comparison than your question is meaningless. As a relativist you have no grounds for asking it. You asked why one is considered moral and the other immoral. Considered so by whom? Whose moral standard is contradicted here. I offered you three possible ones that I could think of. What you think must be relevant or your question is irrelevant. >>You are glad that we consider certain rights inalienable because it makes >>your life pleasant. Is that a reason why they should be considered as >>such? If not, can you give a reason? Members of the KKK and certain Neo-Nazi >>groups apparently don't think the inalienable rights we accord to certain >>groups make life pleasant. Wouldn't you have to see things from their >>point of view? If it turns out that we shouldn't consider these rights >>inalienable where do we stand? What gives us any right to draw the line >>of the KKK and the Nazis in *this* society? > >Paul, you are making the general mistake of believing that moral relativists >have no morality. I'll guarantee you I have a set of principles that I hold >absolutely as firmly as do you. If you have been following this discussion >you know that as well. No, I know you have a morality. >The difference would seem to be that I do not believe my standards apply to >everyone, of every species, at every place and every time. I do not believe >my standards to be Gd-given, but derived from my culture and my experience. >In another place and time they might well be different (but held absolutely >as firmly.) But I am talking about *this* culture, Byron. >We abridge rights regularly in this society. The culture provides rules >under which such sanctions can be invoked. These rules aren't always clear >and are often in flux, but they are there. The rights you speak of aren't >considered inalienable, even though the boilerplate says they are. The >notions of whether they should or shouldn't be are up for debate. That I >may be able to see things from the Nazi or the KKK point of view does not >mean I am compelled to agree with those points of view. Moral relativism >does *not* mean amorality. How many times do I have to repeat this? No, it doesn't mean the individual moral relativist is amoral, but I think it does have implications of amorality for society (even this one; right here and now). The KKK are not amoral either. You have your morality and they have theirs. If moral relativism were held to consistently, we could not justify preventing the KKK from carrying our their agenda in whatever way they see fit. I also feel like I've been repeating myself, Byron. >I agree with you that a moral standard, relative or absolute, describes >what ought to be within a given domain. The inconsistencies in the way >various historical events are viewed indicate, to me, that there are not >absolute principles of morality (please name some that are demonstrable!) >This does not deny the possibility of moral judgement within some more >restricted domain. In my last article I asked you what your basis for viewing these examples as inconsistent. If you don't have one then even your question is meaningless. How else is consistency supposed to be "demonstrable". It seems that you basis for moral relativism is in itself relative, which seems to me to make it meaningless. What domain can you consistently restrict your relative moral judgments to? Do they extend beyond yourself? >I hate to disillusion you, but the Civil War was fought over taxation, not >slavery. Slavery proved to be a good call to arms for northerners but to >be truthful it had begun to die of its own weight well before the Civil War. >This is more properly discussed in net.politics. Whose reason was taxation? If the slavery issue was needed as a call to arms, then taxation was not a sufficient reason to draw the states into conflict. Even the fact that slavery served as a good call to arms supports my point that there was moral reproach involved. If there wasn't the call to arms wouldn't have worked. >>Your main point seems to be that you find no evidence that those who hold >>to certain moral absolutes also recognize when their own actions fall short >>of that standard as well as when those of others do. This is not true, I >>think (except if you look among those who are already moral relativists). > >Not at all. I simply see no evidence for an absolute morality, but rather >I see the belief in an absolute morality allows people to believe the world >will not shortly become unhinged. In a previous article, you said: I submit that the morality of a particular act depends upon whether you are the actor or the one acted upon (or allies thereof.) If moral precepts were applied consistently throughout history by those who assert an "absolute morality" I could be persuaded that such a thing exists. I do not find such evidence, hence moral relativism. I have been trying to follow your argument, Byron. I'll have to admit it has not been easy. If your are going to talk about what is "consistent" you have to provide a basis by which you would consider things as such. I've been trying to get you to do that with the examples you have brought up. Your answer to that is to throw it back in my lap and say "I'm the moral relativist". Well, you point to certain perceived inconsistencies as evidence against moral absolutes, hence you are a moral relativist. When I ask "inconsistent with what?", you act like that question is irrelevant to you since you are a moral relativist. I give up. (It's getting late, anyway). -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
cja@lzwi.UUCP (C.E.JACKSON) (05/09/85)
> In article <5504@utzoo.UUCP> laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: > >Thus you have a morality based on ``the things that increase stability and > >the ability of a society to survive'' are good -- and (presumably) ``the > >things that decrease stability and decrease the ability of the society to > >survive'' are evil. > Not so, or at least not *absolutely* so. If functional traits can be > deemed "good," they can only be classified that way from within the society > under scrutiny at a particular point in time. The same holds for dysfunc- > tional traits being labelled as "evil." Personally, I do not see the > charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini as a "good" thing, though it > stabilizes Islamic Iranian Society. I'm looking at it from a particular > cultural bias, however. Stablizes Iranian society? How? An entire generation of Iranian young men, most of the educated middle class and virtually all educated women are being either killed or oppressed. I think Laura is talking about survival over the long term, & 6 or 7 years is hardly the long term. > When I was much younger (in the days when we called moral relativism > "situational ethics") I used to engage in thought experiments where I > would envision social/cultural systems wherein things thought of as "moral" > could be considered "immoral" and vice-versa. Something very close to > the situation you describe (random murder) is hypothesizeable in a > society very overpopulated with respect to available resources -- your own > lifeboat situation! Random murder? No, I don't think any society would find that functional over the long run. In most societies where the resources are limited, those who are very young, disabled, old or women/girls are either killed or left to die--think of some Eskimo populations, China or ancient Sparta. > Byron C. Howes C. E. Jackson ...ihnp4!lznv!cja (for reasons too silly to explain,the address above [lzwi] is incorrect--don't use it)