rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) (05/30/85)
> The problem is that Bill is failing to acknowledge that the Biblical > language is, by the nature of it being religious language, necessarily > different in form from the language of science or history. I wish Charles, who has made this statement before, would explain what the hell it means. In what way is it "necessarly different" other than that you've already assumed a set of conclusions in using such "language". A good example of such language is: > Now we have arrived at the heart of the problem. Why is the bible inerrant? > It is the absolute word of God. And what do you mean by that? Let me quote > the Episcopal catechism: > > Q. Why do we call the Holy Scriptures the Word of God? > A. We call them the Word of God because God inspired their human > authors and because God still speaks to us through the Bible. If this translates into anything other than the famous Circularist catacombism: Q: Why is the Bible the Word of God? A: Because it says so in the Bible. then I would greatly appreciate such a translation. -- "There! I've run rings 'round you logically!" "Oh, intercourse the penguin!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (06/04/85)
In article <1009@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >A good example of such [religious] language is: > >> Now we have arrived at the heart of the problem. Why is the bible >> inerrant? It is the absolute word of God. And what do you mean by >> that? Let me quote the Episcopal catechism: >> >> Q. Why do we call the Holy Scriptures the Word of God? >> A. We call them the Word of God because God inspired their human >> authors and because God still speaks to us through the Bible. > >If this translates into anything other than the famous Circularist >catacombism: > > Q: Why is the Bible the Word of God? > A: Because it says so in the Bible. > >then I would greatly appreciate such a translation. Well, there are two different answers to this; the first, direct, (and somewhat wrong) answer is that one can readily see that the Episcopal catachism does not refer to any claim in the Bible. The response is an elaboration on the phrase "Word of God". We are claiming that we see in the Bible the "voice" of God. The question of what we base that claim upon is totally separate. The second, unsatisfying (but more correct) answer is that a demand for a translation misses the point. There would be no need for religious language if the things could be talked about directly. Religious language is much more strongly metaphorical than, say, scientific language; when one attempts to say something about God that is definite, the language of direct discourse breaks down. It's not clear how one compares the "Word of God" with the "Word of Arthur Pewtey"; a moment's thought should make it clear that the phrase is really an anthropomorphism, and thus a metaphor. The phrase is attempt to describe a relationship between God and the Bible; but it's not clear (to me at any rate) that the phrase implies divine dictation, or any other means of transmission. Again, look at that word "inspired". It is very indefinite about what is "transmitted" between God and the author. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe "For the mouse is a creature of great personal valour." C. Swift
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (06/05/85)
In article <6261@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: > > There would be no need for religious language if the things could be > talked about directly... "There would be no need for jabberwocky if Wonderland could be talked about directly." In other words (less sarcasm) you still retain the problem of whether the language conceals that its subject is nonexistent. You still have no non-circular reason for assuming the things exist and that the language is necessary. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (06/06/85)
In article <568@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes: >> There would be no need for religious language if the things could be >> talked about directly... >"There would be no need for jabberwocky if Wonderland could be talked >about directly." > >In other words (less sarcasm) you still retain the problem of whether >the language conceals that its subject is nonexistent. You still have no >non-circular reason for assuming the things exist and that the language >is necessary. Turn the problem around. If the things do exist and the direct language is inadequate, then insistence upon direct language will necessarily lead to the conclusion that the things cannot be sufficiently demonstrated to exist. People do have "mystical experiences". (I use quotes because I don't mean to imply anything about the "true nature" of them; there is, however, a class of experiences which can be directly characterized.) Uniformly it is insisted that the experience cannot be related in words, and I can attest to this through personal witness, having had (in a limited fashion) this sort of experience myself. Now, to the best of my knowledge, no one has come up with an explanation of this events which appeals to purely natural causes AND which has been subjected to experimental verification. These phenomena represent (if the claims of the mystics are true) our most direct contact with the supernatural, as we all seem to agree that miracles, which are the next most direct testimony, are necessarily weak as testimony. Central to the claims of the mystics is ineffability, that the phenomena are not expressible in language. I first must point out that this is not necessarily in and of itself a claim to a supernatural experience, since (conceivably) some mental processes have the same property. Likewise, it is possible that the person is mistaken, that the experience could be described in words adequately. It seems to me therefore that the questions of existence and language are separate. Given that people in general are cut off from sharing the mystic's experience, it seems to me that from a practical point of view, we have to assume that whatever language the mystic IS using is inadequate; but this does not cut us off from an examination of the possible sources of the experience. It may be demonstrable that the experience has certain physical causes, at which point it may be possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the language. But I think that demanding direct language is fruitless, if only because it eliminates the possibility of determining that direct language is not adequate. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (06/06/85)
In article <6319@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: > In article <568@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes: > > >> There would be no need for religious language if the things could be > >> talked about directly... > > >"There would be no need for jabberwocky if Wonderland could be talked > >about directly." > > > >In other words (less sarcasm) you still retain the problem of whether > >the language conceals that its subject is nonexistent. You still have no > >non-circular reason for assuming the things exist and that the language > >is necessary. > > Turn the problem around. If the things do exist and the direct language is > inadequate, then insistence upon direct language will necessarily lead to > the conclusion that the things cannot be sufficiently demonstrated to exist. You assume a possibly null set of things for which direct language is inadequate. However, religious language is inadequate nor the only possible route for demonstration of a non-nuill set. > People do have "mystical experiences". (I use quotes because I don't mean to > imply anything about the "true nature" of them; there is, however, a class of > experiences which can be directly characterized.) Uniformly it is insisted > that the experience cannot be related in words, and I can attest to this > through personal witness, having had (in a limited fashion) this sort of > experience myself. I've had experiences I'd characterize as mystical. However I think the experiences are just as relatable in words as "love" or "seeing a tree". The question is whether your communicant can remember comparable experiences well enough that you can communicate the analogy by words. > Now, to the best of my knowledge, no one has come up > with an explanation of this events which appeals to purely natural causes > AND which has been subjected to experimental verification. These phenomena > represent (if the claims of the mystics are true) our most direct contact > with the supernatural, as we all seem to agree that miracles, which are the > next most direct testimony, are necessarily weak as testimony. Central to > the claims of the mystics is ineffability, that the phenomena are not > expressible in language. I first must point out that this is not > necessarily in and of itself a claim to a supernatural experience, since > (conceivably) some mental processes have the same property. Likewise, it is > possible that the person is mistaken, that the experience could be described > in words adequately. It seems to me therefore that the questions of > existence and language are separate. That last sentence explicitly cedes my point. > Given that people in general are cut > off from sharing the mystic's experience, it seems to me that from a > practical point of view, we have to assume that whatever language the mystic > IS using is inadequate; Or that the listener or reader hasn't an experiential reference, or doesn't recognize that he had an experience just like it, or.... > but this does not cut us off from an examination of > the possible sources of the experience. It may be demonstrable that the > experience has certain physical causes, at which point it may be possible to > evaluate the effectiveness of the language. But I think that demanding > direct language is fruitless, if only because it eliminates the possibility > of determining that direct language is not adequate. Specialized language is needed for specialized subjects: but unless the subject can be shown to exist, the language is unnecessary and should be discarded as obfuscatory. The scientific literature is full of discarded nomenclatures. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (06/08/85)
>> There would be no need for religious language if the things could be >> talked about directly... - Charley Wingate >"There would be no need for jabberwocky if Wonderland could be talked >about directly." >.. >In other words (less sarcasm) you still retain the problem of whether >the language conceals that its subject is nonexistent. You still have no >non-circular reason for assuming the things exist and that the language >is necessary. >.. >Specialized language is needed for specialized subjects: but unless the >subject can be shown to exist, the language is unnecessary and should be >discarded as obfuscatory. The scientific literature is full of discarded > nomenclatures -- Mike Huybensz Unfortunately, there are MANY phenomena, whether virtual or real, for which useful language has evolved. For instance, do subjective mental states exist? I cannot scientifically `prove' that I am imagining a frog right now. Nor can I demonstrate the reality of my own consciousness. Our scientific knowledge concerning the brain may progress to the point that such entities are shown to have no objective existence whatsoever -- that words like {dream, aware, hallucination, mind, thought, love..} have no more reality than `God' or `spirit' do to Mike Huybensz. Why should that stop me from using words that describe subjective phenomena that are most certainly `real' to me? Would you would discard most of poetry, psychology, fiction, metaphysics, etc. and ANY KIND of emotional interaction with friends/lovers/family? Furthermore, your statement: > but unless the subject can be shown to exist, the language is unnecessary > and should be discarded as obfuscatory. ..is inimical to science itself. Apparently you've forgotten that the a great deal of scientific progress began as unjustified metaphysical speculation that was totally at variance with the best scientific knowledge of the day. Consider the ancient study of Geometry. Do real points, lines, etc., exist, at least as envisioned by geometry? It seems not. Yet until Descartes and Newton, classical geometry was little more than a metaphysical pursuit. Even now, General Relativity notwithstanding, we use Euclidean Geometry with great utility, even though we KNOW it describes things that do not really exist. How complex is the real world in comparison to our capability to understand it? Since ANYTHING we can conceive is at best an illusion we should, by your criterion, say nothing at all. I suspect that Mike's intolerance for `obfuscatory language' derives from the current glut of overbearing, intolerant Fundamentalism. Religious and Metaphysical modes of thought have huge potential value, especially in problems where Science IN PRINCIPLE can offer no help whatsoever. SMASH CAUSALITY!! -michael