mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (06/15/85)
In article <1079@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) writes: >> In general, I find that the strongest conclusion I can draw from the >> mystical experience is that there is some supernatural order which shows >> some unification of the natural order. The problem with trying to go >> beyond >> that is that the language appears to be stretched to the limit just to get >> that far, making it very hard to generalize across the mystics. [Charley] >Why does that sound like a conclusion you've already presumed in order to >reach that conclusion? You speak of the limits of language. "Supernatural" >is a word, a piece of language conceived and invoked by humans. What does >it mean? From the structure of the word parts, and from the nature of the >way the word is used, "beyond the natural" sounds like the intended meaning. >How do we define natural? What are the limits of what is natural? Where are >the boundaries between "natural" and "supernatural"? Are they anything more >than arbitrary demarcations that facilitate the conclusions we want to draw >about the universe and about the nature of the supernatural? Charley is not >alone is not having answered these questions. That's just the point. They aren't answerable. It should be clear that any definition of "supernatural" is essentially negative in content; the supernatural is that which exists, but not in the way nature does. I would take nature to be that which we know the quality of existence of: matter, energy, ideas, emotions, music. Out of pure serendipity, I have the March issue of _The Review of Metaphysics_, whic has a nice article about the way Moses Maimonides and Aquinas looked at knoledge of god. Consider the following statement: "(5) ... [N]o affirmative or *positive attributes of any kind* are predictable of God, that God is completely unknown and unknowable, that we can meaningfully say about God only *what he is not* (to speak of him in *negative attributes*)[.] Adhering to this principle, then, to say that God is supernatural is to say that he exists, in a manner totally unlike that of natural things; indeed, this doctrine holds that to say that "God exists in a manner" is already wrong. I ascribe to this doctrine, and I think that the Bible is not in conflict with it. As I see it, the boundary between the supernatural and nature is drawn quite precisely at the limits of knowability, which limits I don't believe are themselves knowable. Obviously I don't expect you to accept this sort of deity, Rich, because the doctrine I cite say explicitly that you cannot analyze the attributes of God in any positive way; i.e., you cannot verify their existence precisely because you can't make even a subjective statement of what the attribute is like in any positive terms. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe P.S. thanks to Isaac Franck, whose article is quoted from above.
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (06/18/85)
In article <1100@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>How do we define natural? What are the limits of what is natural? >>>Where are the boundaries between "natural" and "supernatural"? >>>Are they anything more than arbitrary demarcations that facilitate >>>the conclusions we want to draw about the universe and about the >>>nature of the supernatural? Charley is not >>>alone is not having answered these questions. [ROSEN] >> That's just the point. They aren't answerable. It should be clear >> that any definition of "supernatural" is essentially negative in >> content; the supernatural is that which exists, but not in the way >> nature does. I would take nature to be that which we know the >> quality of existence of: matter, energy, ideas, emotions, music. >"That which we know [of]". Thanks for making it very clear that you too >believe that the definition of supernatural is based on the limits of human >observation. Which change with every significant scientific advance (like >microscopes). With that in mind, what are you complaining about? My whole >point has been that certain people (yourself included) claim to "know" >(i.e., presume) >a lot about that which is beyond "that which we know of". Do they >really have this knowledge, or are they engaging in wishful thinking? Their is an obvious difference between things that we know of and the QUALITY OF EXISTENCE of the things that we know of. You are making the assumption that everything exists in ways that parallel known existence; in particular, you assume that we can know the quality of existence of anything. Very, well, if you are going to make this assumption, defend it. >> Adhering to this principle [of negative knowledge], >> then, to say that God is supernatural is to say >> that he exists, in a manner totally unlike that of natural things; indeed, >> this doctrine holds that to say that "God exists in a manner" is already >> wrong. I ascribe to this doctrine, and I think that the Bible is not in >> conflict with it. As I see it, the boundary between the supernatural and >> nature is drawn quite precisely at the limits of knowability, which >> limits I don't believe are themselves knowable. >> >> Obviously I don't expect you to accept this sort of deity, Rich, >> because the doctrine I cite say explicitly that you cannot analyze >> the attributes of God in any positive way; i.e., you cannot verify >> their existence precisely because you can't make even a subjective >> statement of what the attribute is like in any positive terms. >And yet YOU have. You have very specific ideas about what this god is >and what >it does and what it expects. Given that you've admitted that you can't know >any of that, why are you claiming knowledge of those things? Is what you >believe really "knowledge" or just what you'd like to believe? One can claim knowledge of what something DOES without being able to know what it is like; after all, this is a fundamental principle of science. And you've fallen into a classical fallacy: that, since we can't say anything positive about God, we can't say anything at all. This was debunked back in the middle ages by Maimonides. We can say plenty about God, because we can talk at length about what he is NOT. That is why I said that to say that "God exists in a manner" is wrong. To say that GOd has purpose is to say that he is not random, or inconsistent, or half a dozen other attributes. More importantly, I find that you are (once again) not arguing for your own beliefs, but for agnosticism. It is, after all, a fallacy to say that, because you cannot prove one side to be right, that it is therefore wrong. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe P.S.: The White Queen had a lot to say about running rings around people.