harwood@cvl.UUCP (David Harwood) (07/08/85)
Comments on the problem of suffering:
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>From: paul@phs.UUCP (Paul C. Dolber)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Omnipotence, justice and suffering: a very long question.
Message-ID: <1034@phs.UUCP>
Date: 5 Jul 85 16:17:41 GMT
In Chapter VI of "The Faith of a Heretic" (Anchor [Doubleday], Garden
City, New York, 1963 [1961]), Walter Kaufmann takes up the question of
"Suffering and the Bible." In answer to the question, "Why is there
the suffering we know?"
...
To make the problem of suffering a perplexing problem, one requires very
specific presuppositions, and once those are accepted the problem
becomes not only puzzling but insoluble... The problem arises when
monotheism is enriched with -- or impoverished by -- two assumptions:
that God is omnipotent and that God is just."
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To begin with, I would say that suffering is 'the' urgent,
but perplexing, practical problem for every religion or way of life.
What is meant, perhaps, is that there is a theoretical problem of
consistently believing that our existence is creation by one God,
according to one nature, and having faith that this creation is
simply "good", as we may understand it. Nevertheless, the practical
problem of suffering is more important, since we can largely 'solve'
this on our own, while it is likely that we are forever incapable
of resolving the nature of our creation.
Generally, it is said that creation was by a perfectly free
act of God, whose nature does not fully admit rationalization. So this
divine nature is almost entirely obscure, as in a cloud, as of our
unknowing, except for flashes here and there.
In my opinion, the paradox of divine creation, whether the
"goodness" of creation reflects that of God, in the face of the
existence of suffering, is largely a semantical mistake which insists
upon inadequate egocentric notions: my experience of creation must
admit such-and-such, or else God is not so-forth. Of course, these
'necessary' conditions are no such thing, not being applicable to
what is removed from creation. If God exists, and we are a finite,
imperfect recreation of His nature, then there is absolutely no
reason that we should understand what is the "goodness" of creation,
any more than we understand His nature, or ourselves for that matter.
As a exercise of imagination, it is entirely conceivable that
God is capable of what we are not, and it is impossible to disprove
that we are not artificial intelligence created by God, even if we
are incapable of this creativity ourselves because of our lack of
self-understanding. My point is that ignorance is no basis for semantics,
and in the face of our overwhelming ignorance of creation, it is
presumptuous to deny the "goodness" of creation when we largely enjoy
being alive, even while we vainly toy with notions about 'absolute
perfection' of God.
As a mathematical analogy, it is like one's dismissing Leibniz'
infinitessimals because one insists upon standard interpretations of
theories of analysis: all the real numbers may satisfy one's notion
of Archimedean order, nevertheless there is the hyper-real extension
which does not, but which is in some ways "better", if only we can
appreciate this. Similarly, it may be that the creation of heaven and
earth is "good" (and well-ordered) in a sense which we cannot appreciate
when we consider the earth alone, but, then, we were not a consultant to
this project.
I once read WK's explanation of his conversion to Judaism,
which includes a criticism of Christianity, but I very much doubt that
he is now an atheist. Why would you presume this, even if you would
assume his argument? Would his argument be unconvincing if he was not an
atheist?
I remember that I was not impressed with his understanding,
even as a professional philosopher, of the scriptures, whether old or
new. Anyway, I'm not sure what to make of your quotation: certainly the
Torah does not suggest that there is any conflict between the justice
of God and the existence of suffering. What the book of Job calls into
question, also what Jesus denied, was the principle that the innocent
do not suffer -- for the reason that it is a prejudice that is not only
false of God, but unmerciful of man. Especially, we blame and condemn
the innocent for our moral failure, while we confuse our notion of
individual retribution with the justice of God.
Obviously, the NT does not deny that God has created existence
with suffering, also that He permits 'evil', the human intention for
suffering, although temporarily, since we are promised that it shall
be overcome in the end. There is no denial of the justice of God in
forbearing to do what we ourselves cannot do physically, or more
generally because of our merciless nature. This is the purpose of
the coming of Christ -- at once to convict mankind of wrong, and
renew a spirit of mercy.
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excerpt...
(Kaufmann then takes an excursion into the Book of Job, in which he
seeks to demonstrate that the first of these pseudo-solutions is
rejected, the second is denied consideration, and the third is
repudiated emphatically. "[Job] never questions either God's
existence or his omnipotence; but God's justice, mercy and goodness
he not only questions but denies outright... it does not occur to
anybody that God might simply be unable to prevent Job's suffering."
When God finally speaks from the whirlwind, "He says in effect:
the problem of suffering is no isolated problem; it fits a pattern;
the world is not so rational as Job's comforters suppose; it is
uncanny. God does not claim to be good and Job in his final reply
does not change his mind on this point: he reaffirms that God can
do all things." Finally, he notes that "In an age in which the
ancient sense of solidarity was crumbling and the individual
experienced his sufferings in that utter solitude which is now once
again the mark of modernity, the author of Job refused all the
comforts that go with the assurance that God is perfectly merciful
and just -- the promises that being moral pays either in this life
or the next -- and... claimed that God was neither just nor the
embodiment of mercy or perfection.")
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No matter what WK said, this account badly misrepresents
the theme of Job: the author honestly confronts the terrible fact
of suffering, which predicament causes everyone to have doubts about
the nature of God, nevertheless he does not deny the goodness of God,
but is made to understand that creation is not fully humanly compre-
hensible. But even as he complains to exhaustion against God and his
friends, Job still has underlying hope in the eventual mercy of God.
I believe the reason it is said that God belittled Job's friends in
the end, is because they presumed, against God, for their own notion
of his justice -- that the innocent do not suffer.
I have observed another time that Job did not, in fact,
suffer without benefit, since he and we who perceive his suffering
have a better understanding and sympathy.
(I would recommend Maimonides' lengthy discussion of Job
in the Guide to the Perplexed, although I do not entirely agree with
him; anyway, this gives a traditional Jewish view of the book, which
is most interesting, and far better informed than I am.)
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4. "The fourth spurious solution, which is one of the prime glories
of Christian theology, claims in effect that suffering is a
necessary adjunct of free will....
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This account of tradition seems to confuse suffering with
evil, which is the intention for suffering, also free will, so-called,
with moral being, or responsibility. I would say that suffering will
always exist, although mitigated, but that it is not evil itself.
Nevertheless, from this suffering in existence, we derive our status as
moral beings, since 'evil' is defined with it. But obviously we might
have 'free will', even most of the time, without having the intention
for suffering.
Personally, though, I am not satisfied either with the
traditional view of the relationship of 'free will' and moral being:
I agree with Einstein, quoting Schopenhauer: 'A man can do what he
wants, but he cannot want what he wants.' By this, I understand that,
while God exists absolutely free of creation, on the other hand, as
moral beings created with continuing identities, we 'freely' act as
we want, that is, according to our nature, among the percieved
physical possibilities. There is no contradiction of 'free will' and
determination with natural process, once we understand that to do what
is wanted is personally natural. Absolute 'free will', without personal
identity, is meaningless, therefore we are morally responsible only
if we may be identified with our actions, even while our identity is
represented by natural process.
(I understand this to be the real meaning of the observation
of Jesus, also of Paul, that we who sin are indeed slaves of sin: we
'freely' do what is destructive, even self-destructive, but what we
seem to want, according to our natures, of which we are mostly uncon-
scious. Therefore, Paul emphasizes the mercy and grace of God: for while
knowledge of the (natural and moral) Law can make us partly conscious
of what we are doing which may be destructive, and so mitigate sin
due to ignorance, nevertheless it is not, of itself, sufficient to
make us better men. All of us will 'violate' the Law even though we
have knowledge of what we should do. Nevertheless, the consciousness
that comes from knowledge also prepares us to understand the grace of God.)
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The following questions must
be pressed. First, if God knew that man would abuse his free
will and that this would entail cancer and Auschwitz, why then
did he give man free will?
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The real question is -- not 'why free will?', but 'why is evil
permitted?' I cannot otherwise imagine moral being, without the knowledge
or racial memory of evil, neither can I imagine human knowledge of evil
without its temporary existence. We have faith that these things shall pass,
perhaps one day becoming nearly inconceivable as we are innocent of them.
Would creation then be justified? I imagine we would then no longer vainly
toy with notions about why God created miserable and violent ancestors
if He was 'absolutely perfect'. The past is a brief moment, but as Paul
said, 'We do not yet know what we shall become, but we know that we
shall become like him (Christ).' And even if creation of mankind is yet
unfinished, there may still be an everlasting consolation when it is
fulfilled. Even now, if I suffer today, this is a consolation for me,
that I have run the race, although in a relay in which the finish line
is still distant.
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Second... is there really any
connection at all between ever so much suffering and free will?"
(Kaufmann then considers the case of a girl in West's "Miss
Lonelyhearts" who was born without a nose; one presumes that
he could have obtained a similar example from the realms of
fact.)
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I've already observed that Jesus denied that the innocent
do not suffer: cf John 9, where he says that the blind man did not sin,
neither did his parents; then he makes the paradoxical remark that
his suffering was so that the power and light of God might be revealed,
and refers to his own example. Actually, there is something similar
said concerning Paul who 'freely' suffered more even than Jesus during
his ministry: in Acts, 'I will show him (Paul) what he must suffer for
the sake of the Gospel,' also in the Letters, 'My grace is sufficient;
and my strength revealed in weakness.' The point being that God is manifest
through the lives of those who suffer.
Frankly, this insight of Jesus is incomparably more profound
than anything of WK. Partly, it means that we are children of God, not
only in nature, including our perception and motivation, but also it
means that we are dependents of providence, of which we are aware
especially when we suffer. As you cite Royce, that creation with good
striving over evil is greater than without comprehension of either --
and why? Because it is part of the eternal nature itself.
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excerpt...
...................... Royce argued that "`Your sufferings are God's
sufferings.' That is the real meaning of incarnation and crucifixion:
God did not remain a being apart from the world... God really suffers,
too; ...this suffering is necessary because the good which consists in
the overcoming of evil is greater than that which consists in the absence
of evil." In which case, Royce has effectively denied God's omnipotence.
"He also claims that the suffering of the girl born without a nose is
justified because the discovery by some future doctors of some way to
avert such mishaps makes for a better world than we should have had if
there never had been any such mishaps in the first place. That is what
the girl should have been told; also, that it hurt God as much as her."
So, finally, the question: Does anyone out there know of a genuine
solution to the question posed by Kaufmann: Can God or a god be both
omnipotent and just (including good, morally perfect, and so on) and
permit the suffering we know to exist?
Regards, Paul Dolber (...{decvax!mcnc or !decvax}!duke!phs!paul).
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If there is not the possibility of suffering, there cannot
be knowledge of good and evil, as we appreciate moral quality. And if
God predictably intervenes where we are incapable of ameliorating
suffering, for whatever reason, then we are not relatively autonomous.
I realize that this may not be very satisfactory to many,
but I am sympathetic with what I understand to be the view of the
distinguished neurophysiologist Sir John Eccles, a Christian, who has
recently written briefly about this so-called problem: if you accept
that we are to be created in the image of God, to be relatively autonomous
moral beings having something of His nature, including appreciation,
then it is logically impossible for creation to be without possibility
of evil. For God is what He is, and cannot be otherwise, according to
our imaginations.
(I've written about this before on the Net; and I really
don't have time to elaborate in response to refutations -- I'm sorry,
but there isn't time.)
David Harwood