flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) (05/30/85)
Even no. of >'s = me, Odd no. = Rich Rosen >>>To summarize: Paul's notion of fearful thinking, the belief that those >>>who question wishful thinking beliefs out of "fear" that they might be >>>right, is [...] >> --is NOT my notion of "fearful thinking". Go back and read the original >> article... > *You're* the one who put it forth. If you have free choice, take some > responsibility for your choices. :-) I still contend that "fearful > thinking", the notion that those who proclaim wishful thinking beliefs as > such are doing so out of "fear" that the beliefs just might be true, [...] AAAIIIIIIEEEEEEEEEE!!!!!!! YES!, I'm the one who put the notion "fearful thinking" forth, I'm the one who coined and defined the term, SO WHY DON'T YOU LISTEN WHEN I SAY THAT'S **NOT** THE WAY I DEFINED IT??!! TO REPEAT my definition: "Fearful thinking" == automatically believing the opposite of whatever the wishful thinkers believe, as if the fact that something is believed on fallacious (in this case, wishful) grounds proves that it is false. Now, you can argue that "fearful thinking" is something that you have never done, but you CAN'T give the term ANOTHER definition and then attribute that definition to me!!! >> Please note the distinction between *eliminative* reductionism -- where >> a phenomenon is (allegedly!) explained *away* -- and non-eliminative >> reductionism, where a phenomenon is understood and not dismissed. > Where a phenomenon is shown by analysis not to in fact exist, or when the > basis and foundation of it is shown to be erroneous, it SHOULD be dismissed. That's nice. And where it has been shown to exist, it SHOULD NOT be dismissed. >>>Best explanations. Like some other "best explanations" of the world we've >>>seen throughout the ages. Like that of the sun travelling across the sky >> Be serious. How do you come up with these wild misinterpretations? > Not a misinterpretation at all. Oh, a mindreader eh?!! Well guess again. It is a misinterpretation. > Your "best explanation", avoiding what may actually go on in favor of > preconception imposed on observation without thorough analysis [...] Please quote the passage where I define "best explanation" as "avoiding what may actually go on ..." (etc.). You can't, because I neither said nor implied anything of the sort. But rather than argue against me -- too tough, apparently -- you set up a straw man. ------------------------------ >.... Cognitive psychology is such a top down approach. Eventually it > will reach the middle point where "both meet" at some point of > understanding. (Hopefully) Dennett ignores the fact that top down > approaches may be laden with preconceptions (like that of "the sun > travelling across the sky") that may APPEAR true in the gestalt but > which are not actually happening internally. But, in point of fact, mental terms are not generally such preconceptions. The fact that further analysis is possible does not negate the validity of "top-level" terms. Take heat transfer, for example. The fact that there is a heat transfer of (e.g.) 1 watt from my legs to the metal rim of my chair is still a fact, even though a rabid reductionist would say "but there's really JUST a bunch of molecules moving around, colliding, etc." Yes, there's really a bunch of molecules moving around, Yes, there is nothing to the heat transfer above and beyond this fact, BUT, the heat transfer is still real. Now, substitue "mental process" for "heat transfer", "neurons firing" for "molecules moving", and repeat the last 2 sentences. >>Neurons? Chemicals? They get in the way of notions like [...]"free will". >> No THEY DON'T. And that's been one of my main points all along! > Yet you say "don't bother discussing such things, look at it in an holistic > way". Precisely because they get in the way of your presumptive notions. No, for the Nth time, I don't say "don't discuss such things", I don't say "don't look at it that way" -- I say "look at it BOTH ways." Precisely because they DON'T get in the way of my notions! >> Or perhaps "belief" is a name we give to information constructs in >> *sentient* (look it up) brains. [...] Freedom is something that is >> relevant to us *qua* beings with a mental life; with experiences. > Yeah, look it up. Like the word "cult", its meaning depends on who's > saying it. Not at all. > I already discussed how the formation of such beliefs is not necessarily > within the realm of free choice, and thus, how totally free choice cannot > exist where there are beliefs that are not necessarily formulated by choice. And I already refuted that argument. ---------------------------------------- >>[...] Understanding the language of logical >> connectives (like "if...then...") is enough to see the validity of >> the relevant rules of inference, I think. > Then explain it in such a way that anyone can understand the language and > recognize the validity. Don't get me wrong, Paul, this is Rich Rosen playing > devil's advocate here. [...] The point is that what proof can you give to > someone who does not believe in the veracity of logic about logic's veracity. You can't prove something TO someone like that, but that doesn't mean you can't prove it. As for explaining the language, that would only be necessary or useful when the person was first learning the language (i.e., as a child). If someone rejected logic, there would probably be no way to rescue him. But that'd be *his* problem, not logic's. --The blooming iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, (soon at) umcp-cs!flink
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) (06/02/85)
Even no. of >'s = me, Odd no. = Paul Torek >>>>To summarize: Paul's notion of fearful thinking, the belief that those >>>>who question wishful thinking beliefs out of "fear" that they might be >>>>right, is [...] >>> --is NOT my notion of "fearful thinking". Go back and read the original >>> article... >> *You're* the one who put it forth. If you have free choice, take some >> responsibility for your choices. :-) I still contend that "fearful >> thinking", the notion that those who proclaim wishful thinking beliefs as >> such are doing so out of "fear" that the beliefs just might be true, [...] > AAAIIIIIIEEEEEEEEEE!!!!!!! > YES!, I'm the one who put the notion "fearful thinking" forth, I'm the one > who coined and defined the term, SO WHY DON'T YOU LISTEN WHEN I SAY > THAT'S **NOT** THE WAY I DEFINED IT??!! > TO REPEAT my definition: "Fearful thinking" == automatically believing the > opposite of whatever the wishful thinkers believe, as if the fact that > something is believed on fallacious (in this case, wishful) grounds proves > that it is false. Now, you can argue that "fearful thinking" is something > that you have never done, but you CAN'T give the term ANOTHER definition > and then attribute that definition to me!!! Then why did you use the term "fearful" unless there was an element of a connotation of fear in the term????? Don't pussyfoot with me, Torek. Your use of words in your as you like it fashion makes it clear which of us is Humpty Dumpty. Don't "AAAIIIEEE" me! >>> Please note the distinction between *eliminative* reductionism -- where >>> a phenomenon is (allegedly!) explained *away* -- and non-eliminative >>> reductionism, where a phenomenon is understood and not dismissed. >> Where a phenomenon is shown by analysis not to in fact exist, or when the >> basis and foundation of it is shown to be erroneous, it SHOULD be dismissed. > That's nice. And where it has been shown to exist, it SHOULD NOT be > dismissed. Care to show us where the phenomenon has been shown to exist, rather than just asserting that it does? (If I recall, we were still on the topic of free will, it's been so long...) >>>>Best explanations. Like some other "best explanations" of the world we've >>>>seen throughout the ages. Like that of the sun travelling across the sky >>> Be serious. How do you come up with these wild misinterpretations? >> Not a misinterpretation at all. > Oh, a mindreader eh?!! Well guess again. It is a misinterpretation. Now this I do remember. This related to your assertion that explanations that relate closely to overall perceptions are more useful than explaining what happens at the root level. To which I retorted, "thus it's better to use the explanation of the sun 'rising' and 'falling' than the actual occurrence. All you can say in response is "that's a misinterpretation". Your avoidance tactics are beginning to grate. >> Your "best explanation", avoiding what may actually go on in favor of >> preconception imposed on observation without thorough analysis [...] > Please quote the passage where I define "best explanation" as "avoiding > what may actually go on ..." (etc.). You can't, because I neither said > nor implied anything of the sort. But rather than argue against me -- > too tough, apparently -- you set up a straw man. Oh come off it. You wait n + 4 weeks to respond and expect ME to reproduce the original example? Clever foreplay technique you use there. What I recall you saying (and I *will* attempt to retrieve the exact phrase if possible) is your consistent assertion that "it is not necessary to go down to the base level and seek an 'ultimate' cause", and your only reasoning to support that has always been nothing other than because you prefer certain explanations. Unless you finally would care to provide substantive reasoning for doing so. You prefer the overall perceived picture that (to you) allows an explanation of "free will" (analogous to the sun "rising"/"falling") instead of examining what is actually going on at the "neuron" level. >>.... Cognitive psychology is such a top down approach. Eventually it >> will reach the middle point where "both meet" at some point of >> understanding. (Hopefully) Dennett ignores the fact that top down >> approaches may be laden with preconceptions (like that of "the sun >> travelling across the sky") that may APPEAR true in the gestalt but >> which are not actually happening internally. > But, in point of fact, mental terms are not generally such preconceptions. Is this anything more than your assertion. If you believe this a priori, of course your conclusions about things like free will will be "valid". > The fact that further analysis is possible does not negate the validity of > "top-level" terms. Take heat transfer, for example. The fact that there > is a heat transfer of (e.g.) 1 watt from my legs to the metal rim > of my chair is still a fact, even though a rabid reductionist would say "but > there's really JUST a bunch of molecules moving around, colliding, etc." > Yes, there's really a bunch of molecules moving around, Yes, there is nothing > to the heat transfer above and beyond this fact, BUT, the heat transfer is > still real. Now, substitue "mental process" for "heat transfer", "neurons > firing" for "molecules moving", and repeat the last 2 sentences. You have chosen a case in which the top down view accurately portrays what goes on at the base (?) level. If I did substitute "mental process" and "neurons firing", I would indeed still have an accurate portrayal. If I substituted "free will" or some other presumptive term as a specific instance of "mental process", I would be in error. >>>>Neurons? Chemicals? They get in the way of notions like [...]"free will". >>> No THEY DON'T. And that's been one of my main points all along! >> Yet you say "don't bother discussing such things, look at it in an holistic >> way". Precisely because they get in the way of your presumptive notions. > No, for the Nth time, I don't say "don't discuss such things", I don't say > "don't look at it that way" -- I say "look at it BOTH ways." Precisely > because they DON'T get in the way of my notions! Ah, but they do, and I've shown repeatedly that they do, and every time I do you say "AAAIIIEEE!". It seems you only are willing to "look at it both ways" when doing so reinforces your opinions, and saying "AAAIIIEEE!" when it doesn't. >>> Or perhaps "belief" is a name we give to information constructs in >>> *sentient* (look it up) brains. [...] Freedom is something that is >>> relevant to us *qua* beings with a mental life; with experiences. >> Yeah, look it up. Like the word "cult", its meaning depends on who's >> saying it. > Not at all. The section you extracted of your own writing (>>>) had nothing to do with what I said that follows above. Months later, I don't recall what I was actually referring to. Probably the section now labelled "[...]". I know the difficulty in engaging in timely fashion, but you appear to using that extended interval of time to your advantage, unfairly, especially when you extract the way you do and expect me to provide the facts. >>I already discussed how the formation of such beliefs is not necessarily >>within the realm of free choice, and thus, how totally free choice cannot >>exist where there are beliefs that are not necessarily formulated by choice. > And I already refuted that argument. Well, please reiterate your refutation, because I recall no such refutation on your part. I'll reiterate my own points to give you a head start: how do babies "choose" the influences around them that formulate and mold their mindset that lead them to the personalities and outlooks they will have as they grow older into childhood (when they acquire the most amount of knowledge and patterning) and adulthood (when they act on the influences surrounding them all those years---actually they do that all their lives, but you know what I mean)? Can you show how a person has a choice in the formation of his/her own patternings, starting from infancy through adulthood, in the ULTIMATE sense? (I know how you claim you don't mind looking at things both in the overall and at the root, so please do so now.) Remember how the patterns and mindsets formed in infancy cascadingly influence one's actions/decisions/learning in later life. >>>[...] Understanding the language of logical >>> connectives (like "if...then...") is enough to see the validity of >>> the relevant rules of inference, I think. >> Then explain it in such a way that anyone can understand the language and >> recognize the validity. Don't get me wrong, Paul, this is Rich Rosen playing >> devil's advocate here. [...] The point is that what proof can you give to >> someone who does not believe in the veracity of logic about logic's veracity. > You can't prove something TO someone like that, but that doesn't mean you > can't prove it. Then whom are you proving it TO? Proof in the abstract, based on the rules themselves (how self-referential), shows nothing. > As for explaining the language, that would only be necessary > or useful when the person was first learning the language (i.e., as a child). > If someone rejected logic, there would probably be no way to rescue him. But > that'd be *his* problem, not logic's. If you reject Christianity, there would probably be no way to rescue you. But that's your problem, not Christianity's. To say what you've said gives equal validity to any nonsensical system of belief whatever that would assert the same thing you have. Russell spent a good deal of time discussing the nature of logic and proof. It can't be dismissed as easily as "it's so". -- "Now, go away or I shall taunt you a second time!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (06/07/85)
Even no. of >'s = me, Odd no. = Rich Rosen >> TO REPEAT my definition: "Fearful thinking" == automatically believing the >> opposite of whatever the wishful thinkers believe, as if the fact that >> something is believed on fallacious (in this case, wishful) grounds proves >> that it is false. Now, you can argue that "fearful thinking" is something >> that you have never done, but you CAN'T give the term ANOTHER definition >> and then attribute that definition to me!!! > >Then why did you use the term "fearful" unless there was an element of a >connotation of fear in the term????? Don't pussyfoot with me, Torek. Because "fearful" is the closest I could come to an opposite of "wishful", and "fearful" thinking is the opposite (in a way) of "wishful" thinking. As I admitted before, "fearful" is sort of a misnomer -- I did not mean to say you believe anything because you fear it's true. However, the word "fearful" is not a complete misnomer -- the "fearful thinker" believes whatever his OPPONENTS fear the truth of! (Get it?) >>> Where a phenomenon is shown by analysis not to in fact exist, or when the >>>basis and foundation of it is shown to be erroneous, it SHOULD be dismissed. >> That's nice. And where it has been shown to exist, it SHOULD NOT be >> dismissed. >Care to show us where the phenomenon has been shown to exist, rather than >just asserting that it does? (If I recall, we were still on the topic of >free will, it's been so long...) Care to show us where the phenomenon has been shown NOT to exist? My rather smartass reply was meant to dispute your apparent implication that it has been shown not to exist. (At this point the topic was mental processes.) >>>>>Best explanations. Like some other "best explanations" of the world we've >>>>>seen throughout the ages. Like that of the sun travelling across the sky [>>>> misinterpretation! >>> No it's not! >>Yes it is!] --brief version :-) >Now this I do remember. This related to your assertion that explanations that >relate closely to overall perceptions are more useful than explaining what >happens at the root level. To which I retorted, "thus it's better to use the >explanation of the sun 'rising' and 'falling' than the actual occurrence." I don't think I said quite that, though I would basically agree with it. "High-level" explanations (like heat transfer--see below) are more useful most of the time. I do agree with you however that sometimes "root level" examinations show that we should change the way we interpret our "overall perceptions". "Best explanations" as I use the term INCLUDES any such evidence from "root level" examination. Now, you would probably argue that "root level" examinations show that we should ABANDON our concept of free will; I disagree -- what's your evidence? > Your avoidance tactics are beginning to grate. "Never attribute to malice what can be explained by stupidity" (-- Jeffreys?) >> Please quote the passage where I define "best explanation" as "avoiding >> what may actually go on ..." (etc.). You can't, because I neither said >Oh come off it. You wait n + 4 weeks to respond and expect ME to reproduce >the original example? I'll send you printed copies of every relevant article I've posted since 1/1/85 (or name a date) via USPS if you want. >What I recall you saying (and I *will* attempt to retrieve the exact >phrase if possible) is your consistent assertion that "it is not necessary >to go down to the base level and seek an 'ultimate' cause", and your only >reasoning to support that [...is] you prefer certain explanations. I'm not sure I said that, but I would agree with it. The reason is that we have plenty of evidence at a "high level" of description for the reality of (e.g.) free choice. Namely, that we do choose things, for intelligent reasons, etc. We don't NEED to look at the neuron level to know that we make many free choices, although it would be nice to have a neurobiological explanation, and we might have to revise some of our ideas about HOW choice works. >>> [...] Dennett ignores the fact that top down >>> approaches may be laden with preconceptions (like that of "the sun >>> travelling across the sky") that may APPEAR true in the gestalt but >>> which are not actually happening internally. > >> But, in point of fact, mental terms are not generally such preconceptions. > >Is this anything more than your assertion. Sure; take the mental process "seeing red" for example. Though I'm no expert on brain biology, as far as I know this mental process is caused rather straightforwardly by certain neural impulses, which would seem to be good evidence that it IS "actually happening internally". >> The fact that further analysis is possible does not negate the validity of >> "top-level" terms. Take heat transfer, for example. The fact that there >> is a heat transfer of (e.g.) 1 watt from my legs to the metal rim >> of my chair is still a fact, even though a rabid reductionist would say >> "but there's really JUST a bunch of molecules moving around, colliding, >> etc." Yes, there's really a bunch of molecules moving around, Yes, there >> is nothing to the heat transfer above and beyond this fact, BUT, the heat >> transfer is still real. Now, substitue "mental process" for "heat >> transfer", "neurons firing" for "molecules moving", and repeat the >> last 2 sentences. > >You have chosen a case in which the top down view accurately portrays what >goes on at the base (?) level. If I did substitute "mental process" and >"neurons firing", I would indeed still have an accurate portrayal. If I >substituted "free will" or some other presumptive term as a specific >instance of "mental process", I would be in error. Well I'm glad you at least agree about mental processes in general. >>>>>Neurons? Chemicals? They get in the way of notions like [...]"free will" >>>> No THEY DON'T. And that's been one of my main points all along! >>> Yet you say "don't bother discussing such things, look at it in an holistic >>> way". Precisely because they get in the way of your presumptive notions. >> No, for the Nth time, I don't say "don't discuss such things", I don't say >> "don't look at it that way" -- I say "look at it BOTH ways." Precisely >> because they DON'T get in the way of my notions! > > Ah, but they do[...] It seems you only are willing to "look at it both > ways" when doing so reinforces your opinions[...] No, every time you claim(ed) that "they get in the way" I've argued that they don't; I've never said "yes they do but don't look at it that way". >>>> Or perhaps "belief" is a name we give to information constructs in >>>> *sentient* (look it up) brains. [...] Freedom is something that is >>>> relevant to us *qua* beings with a mental life; with experiences. > >>> Yeah, look it up. Like the word "cult", its meaning depends on who's >>> saying it. > >> Not at all. > >The section you extracted of your own writing >>>> had nothing to do with >what I said that follows above. Months later, I don't recall what I was >actually referring to. Probably the section now labelled "[...]". Huh? Look at the grammar of your sentences in the lines marked >>>. The 'its' in the second sentence would refer back to the 'it' in "Yeah, look it up." Now, that seems clearly to refer to my "(look it up)", which in turn refers to "*sentient*". So, by the grammar of it, it seems that in the lines marked >>> you were referring to the word "sentient", and saying that its meaning depends on who's saying it. I don't think I quoted you out of context, or if I did, I was misled by your grammar. >[...] I'll reiterate my own points to give you a head start: how do >babies "choose" the influences around them that formulate and mold their >mindset that lead them to the personalities and outlooks they will have as >they grow older into childhood (when they acquire the most amount of >knowledge and patterning) and adulthood (when they act on the influences >surrounding them all those years---actually they do that all their lives, >but you know what I mean)? Can you show how a person has a choice in the >formation of his/her own patternings, starting from infancy through adult- >hood, in the ULTIMATE sense? (I know how you claim you don't mind looking >at things both in the overall and at the root, so please do so now.) >Remember how the patterns and mindsets formed in infancy cascadingly >influence one's >actions/decisions/learning in later life. Babies don't choose such influences. Thus, if by "ULTIMATE sense" you mean choosing ALL the influences on oneself throughout one's life history, nobody has such choice. But that isn't necessary for one's choices now to be free -- as long as those early influences lead to a capacity for "rational evaluative analysis" (r-e-a) by the person. In short, you seem to be arguing 1. No one chooses all the influences on her development. 2. [implicit] Unless one has a choice in all the influences on one's development, one's later actions are not free choices. 3. Therefore, no one has "free will". I deny premise 2. I know you don't agree that r-e-a is sufficient for free choice; I'll argue that point in another article. --------------------------------- >> You can't prove something TO someone like that (who "rejects logic"), >> but that doesn't mean you can't prove it. > >Then whom are you proving it TO? Proof in the abstract, based on the rules >themselves (how self-referential), shows nothing. I don't think "proof" has to be "proof TO" someone. I agree, it doesn't show anything, except maybe to us accepters of logic (for example, I seem to recall that truth-functional logic can be proven consistent and complete, which, of course, is a distinction mathematics can't claim). >> If someone rejected logic, there would probably be no way to rescue him. >> But that'd be *his* problem, not logic's. > >If you reject Christianity, there would probably be no way to rescue you. >But that's your problem, not Christianity's. To say what you've said gives >equal validity to any nonsensical system of belief[...] > Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr Granted. I meant my stmt not as a justification of logic. I meant to rebut any argument that because it can't win everyone over, logic is not universally a good thing to use. --the aspiring iconcolast, Paul Torek
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/13/85)
Even no. of >'s = me, Odd no. = Paul Torek >>>TO REPEAT my definition: "Fearful thinking" == automatically believing the >>>opposite of whatever the wishful thinkers believe, as if the fact that >>>something is believed on fallacious (in this case, wishful) grounds proves >>>that it is false. Now, you can argue that "fearful thinking" is something >>>that you have never done, but you CAN'T give the term ANOTHER definition >>>and then attribute that definition to me!!! >>Then why did you use the term "fearful" unless there was an element of a >>connotation of fear in the term????? Don't pussyfoot with me, Torek. > Because "fearful" is the closest I could come to an opposite of "wishful", > and "fearful" thinking is the opposite (in a way) of "wishful" thinking. > As I admitted before, "fearful" is sort of a misnomer -- I did not mean > to say you believe anything because you fear it's true. However, the > word "fearful" is not a complete misnomer -- the "fearful thinker" believes > whatever his OPPONENTS fear the truth of! (Get it?) Not at all. You said quite clearly "fearful thinking is *not* *believing* something because one fears its truth". That directly contradicts what you said above. "Fearful" doesn't strike me at all as an opposite of "wishful", except in the sense I just described. >>>>Where a phenomenon is shown by analysis not to in fact exist, or when the >>>>basis and foundation of it is shown to be erroneous, it SHOULD be dismissed. >>>That's nice. And where it has been shown to exist, it SHOULD NOT be >>>dismissed. >>Care to show us where the phenomenon has been shown to exist, rather than >>just asserting that it does? (If I recall, we were still on the topic of >>free will, it's been so long...) > Care to show us where the phenomenon has been shown NOT to exist? My rather > smartass reply was meant to dispute your apparent implication that it has > been shown not to exist. (At this point the topic was mental processes.) Cut it out! What is this, net.religion? Prove to me that god doesn't exist first, otherwise it does? Let's get some priorities straight: you're tagged with the responsibility of proof that the phenomenon does exist, not the other way around. -- Like a sturgeon (GLURG!), caught for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr