rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/13/85)
Even no. of >'s = me, Odd no. = Paul Torek >>[...] I'll reiterate my own points to give you a head start: how do >>babies "choose" the influences around them that formulate and mold their >>mindset that lead them to the personalities and outlooks they will have as >>they grow older into childhood (when they acquire the most amount of >>knowledge and patterning) and adulthood (when they act on the influences >>surrounding them all those years---actually they do that all their lives, >>but you know what I mean)? Can you show how a person has a choice in the >>formation of his/her own patternings, starting from infancy through adult- >>hood, in the ULTIMATE sense? (I know how you claim you don't mind looking >>at things both in the overall and at the root, so please do so now.) >>Remember how the patterns and mindsets formed in infancy cascadingly >>influence one's >actions/decisions/learning in later life. > Babies don't choose such influences. Thus, if by "ULTIMATE sense" you > mean choosing ALL the influences on oneself throughout one's life > history, nobody has such choice. But that isn't necessary for one's > choices now to be free -- as long as those early influences lead to > a capacity for "rational evaluative analysis" (r-e-a) by the person. In > short, you seem to be arguing > 1. No one chooses all the influences on her development. > 2. [implicit] Unless one has a choice in all the influences on > one's development, one's later actions are not free choices. > 3. Therefore, no one has "free will". > I deny premise 2. Good for you!! Your denying it doesn't change its veracity one bit. Since free means "independent of external influences, unfettered, etc.", and since you now seem to at least agree that such things directly influence later choices, THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* *FREE*!!! It's that simple. No matter how much you choose to use the word "free" to describe them. Since you cannot simply refute premise 2 by asserting its falseness, premise 3 does follow quite logically. You put it very well yourself: Unless one has a choice in ALL the influences of one's development (and life), which one obviously cannot, one's later actions are NOT free choices! -- Like a bourbon? (HIC!) Drunk for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (07/17/85)
Even no. of >'s = Paul Torek, Odd no. = Rich Rosen: >> 1. No one chooses all the influences on her development. >> 2. [implicit] Unless one has a choice in all the influences on >> one's development, one's later actions are not free choices. >> 3. Therefore, no one has "free will". >> I deny premise 2. > >Good for you!! Your denying it doesn't change its veracity one bit. Since >free means "independent of external influences, unfettered, etc.", and since >you now seem to at least agree that such things directly influence later >choices, THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* *FREE*!!! It's that simple. No matter >how much you choose to use the word "free" to describe them. Since you >cannot simply refute premise 2 by asserting its falseness, premise 3 does >follow quite logically. You put it very well yourself: Unless one has a >choice in ALL the influences of one's development (and life), which one >obviously cannot, one's later actions are NOT free choices! 'Scuse me for butting in, but I think I see the seeds of agreement between the two of you in the above quote. If disagreement over premise "2" is all that separates you, then perhaps I can help. Rich, you seem to define "free" the way I'd define "absolutely free" - i.e., if there are *any* constraints limiting one's choices in any way, then that choice is not "free", by your definition. Paul, you seem to consider a choice "free" as long as there is any element of the choice that is not completely constrained by external factors. Up 'til now, I had understood Rich to be arguing that there are *no* elements of choice in any decision, that constraint was complete. If this *is* your position, Rich, then never mind; your disagreement with Paul is real, and I can't settle it, though I'd take Paul's side in the debate. But by contesting Paul's rejection of premise "2" above, I infer that you concede that there can be undetermined factors in a choice, but disagree that this is sufficient cause to use the label "free will" to characterize such choices. Only complete freedom from constraint will satisfy your definition of "free will". If so, then it seems to me your only disagreement is over the proper definition of "free will", not its existence. Using Paul's definition, you'd both agree it exists; using Rich's, you'd both agree it doesn't. So, where's the beef? I can't resist adding that your definition of free will seems unduly restrictive, Rich. Were I to use an analogous definition of "random", I would have to conclude that an honest roulette wheel is *not* random, since it is constrained to come up with one of the numbers inscribed on the wheel, and no other. In any case, I can't see the point of debating free will ad infinitum if the only difference of opinion between you is what the correct use of the term is. - From the Crow's Nest - Kenn Barry NASA-Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- USENET: {ihnp4,vortex,dual,nsc,hao,hplabs}!ames!barry
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (07/17/85)
[Avast ye scurvy dogs ...] In article <1208@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> 1. No one chooses all the influences on her development. >> 2. [implicit] Unless one has a choice in all the influences on >> one's development, one's later actions are not free choices. >> 3. Therefore, no one has "free will". [Paul Torek denies premise 2] >Good for you!! Your denying it doesn't change its veracity one bit. Since >free means "independent of external influences, unfettered, etc.", and since >you now seem to at least agree that such things directly influence later >choices, THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* *FREE*!!! It's that simple. No matter >how much you choose to use the word "free" to describe them. Since you >cannot simply refute premise 2 by asserting its falseness, premise 3 does >follow quite logically. You put it very well yourself: Unless one has a >choice in ALL the influences of one's development (and life), which one >obviously cannot, one's later actions are NOT free choices! Maybe what is need here is a time frame. The definition of free given above doesn't deal with this issue and two such definitions will make either argument correct. If the definition means independent of external influences at the present [def 1], then argument 3 doesn't follow because past influences don't influence the FREE will of a present choice. If the definition means independent of external influences at all times, then the argument follows. We should next abolish the term 'free will' and replace it with a phrase which carries the meaning that everyone associates with it anyways. I myself feel that either definition may be applicable, depending on the discussion. It seems unnecessary though to prove one correct and the other false. Chris Warack warack@aero.UUCP warack@aerospace.ARPA
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/18/85)
>>> 1. No one chooses all the influences on her development. >>> 2. [implicit] Unless one has a choice in all the influences on >>> one's development, one's later actions are not free choices. >>> 3. Therefore, no one has "free will". >>> I deny premise 2. [TOREK] >>Good for you!! Your denying it doesn't change its veracity one bit. Since >>free means "independent of external influences, unfettered, etc.", and since >>you now seem to at least agree that such things directly influence later >>choices, THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* *FREE*!!! It's that simple. No matter >>how much you choose to use the word "free" to describe them. You put it >>very well yourself: Unless one has a choice in ALL the influences of one's >>development (and life), which one obviously cannot, one's later actions are >>NOT free choices! [ROSEN] > 'Scuse me for butting in, but I think I see the seeds of agreement > between the two of you in the above quote. If disagreement over premise > "2" is all that separates you, then perhaps I can help. > Rich, you seem to define "free" the way I'd define "absolutely > free" - i.e., if there are *any* constraints limiting one's choices in > any way, then that choice is not "free", by your definition. [BARRY] That's the definition. Any good dictionary will vouch for that. > Paul, you seem to consider a choice "free" as long as there is > any element of the choice that is not completely constrained by external > factors. Which elements might THEY be? The whole argument talks about how ALL the elements in the choices are (at the very least) indirectly constrained by their original external causes and influences! > Up 'til now, I had understood Rich to be arguing that there are > *no* elements of choice in any decision, that constraint was complete. > If this *is* your position, Rich, then never mind; your disagreement > with Paul is real, and I can't settle it, though I'd take Paul's side > in the debate. > But by contesting Paul's rejection of premise "2" above, I infer > that you concede that there can be undetermined factors in a choice, > but disagree that this is sufficient cause to use the label "free will" > to characterize such choices. Only complete freedom from constraint will > satisfy your definition of "free will". If so, then it seems to me your only > disagreement is over the proper definition of "free will", not its existence. > Using Paul's definition, you'd both agree it exists; using Rich's, you'd > both agree it doesn't. So, where's the beef? "My" definition is not "mine", as so many people seem to want to call it. It is the definition found in the dictionary, and it is also the definition about which philosophers have debated free will for centuries. If you want to change it to mean something else (say, Paul's definition), then that's a different story. I can get god to exist by changing the definition of god to "a VAX 11/780 computer system". (Or can I?) Furthermore, as I described above, the other so-called internal factors had been internalized through a non-free process: their incorporation of external information and experience into the brain, compounded AGAIN by the fact that the state of the brain AT THAT TIME influences the way in which the incorporation takes place. None of that qualifies as "free". > I can't resist adding that your definition of free will seems > unduly restrictive, Rich. Sorry. Tell that to those people thousands of years ago who defined the notion. The fact that the restrictiveness of a definition causes it not to represent a real thing doesn't mean you change the definition to "mean" a new thing so that you can claim that the term represents a real thing. It just means you accept the fact that the term does NOT represent a real thing AS IT HAD BEEN DEFINED, and you go on to something else, perhaps using a new term (like "rational evaluative analysis") that DOES describe something that DOES happen. > Were I to use an analogous definition of "random", > I would have to conclude that an honest roulette wheel is *not* random, > since it is constrained to come up with one of the numbers inscribed > on the wheel, and no other. If you had the ability to monitor all the conditions in the room, the starting point and speed of the wheel, the angle and position of the deposit of the ball, etc., it most certainly would not be "random", and in fact it is not. It is determined by a whole bunch of factors. We may be unable to use all those factors to analyze and make a determination, but that's rather anthropocentric to claim that because WE can't do it, it's "random". > In any case, I can't see the point of debating > free will ad infinitum if the only difference of opinion between you > is what the correct use of the term is. That's what I said six months ago. The debate since then has really revolved around Paul's new definitions of "free", which were discussed at length in other articles. It seems Paul equivalences "free" with "the ability to make rational decisions", and I honestly have no idea where that notion comes from, other than perhaps a desire to have free will exist at all cost. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (07/20/85)
[]
"'When *I* use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more
nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you *can* make words
mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master
- that's all.'"
"Definitions, contrary to popular opinion, tell us nothing about
things. They only describe people's linguistic habits; that is, they
tell us what noises people make under what conditions. Definitions
should be understood as *statements about language*."
- S. I. Hayakawa
This meta-discussion is inspired by the current debate over free will
between Rosen and Torek, et. al., and indirectly by a previous debate between
Rosen and others (Laura Creighton and Tim Maroney come to mind) about whether
"religion" necessarily implied belief in a supreme being. In both cases, what
began as a philosophical debate ended up getting bogged down in semantics.
First, a concession to Rich: for what it's worth, I'd have to agree
with you about the traditional formulation of the question of "free will".
Historically, belief in free will has implied a belief in a mysterious
something, "will", which was both non-random and acausal. For reasons which
Rich has covered thoroughly (and repeatedly :-), belief in this kind of free
will has become unpopular. It is not dead, but it runs afoul of the generally
materialist and empirical temper of our times. Many of us at least suspect, as
Rich insists, that this whole formulation of the question of free will is
paradoxical, and content-free.
What I fail to see, is why we are constrained to continue the debate
using this traditional formulation. Must we completely reinvent the vocabulary
of the debate to discuss it meaningfully? What Torek and others are saying (I
think) is that we can discard the non-material implications of free will, and
still leave the term with a meaning that corresponds pretty closely with
common-sense notions of what "free" means.
I'm sure we would all agree that there's a real difference between
being on an airplane that's hijacked to Havana, and choosing to take a Cuban
holiday. I think what we're all after is getting a better handle on that word,
"choose". If someone's ideas about that don't fit neatly into the traditional
pigeonholes, I don't see the point of requiring them to invent a whole new
vocabulary to explain their thoughts. All that's required is that they make
clear the novel job they're giving to an old word. Torek et. al. have done so,
as even you, Rich, concede. You seem clear enough on what they're saying; why
this schoolmasterish insistence that they say it *your* way? When you insist
that the old sense of "free will" is devoid of meaning, why aren't you willing
to let that poor abused phrase find a better roost, aboard a sensible idea?
As Humpty Dumpty said, the question is who is to be the master. I'd
like to see some more meaningful debate on what this "novel" definition of
free will really says, and less use of dictionaries for brickbats.
- From the Crow's Nest - Kenn Barry
NASA-Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USENET: {ihnp4,vortex,dual,hao,menlo70,hplabs}!ames!barryrlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/21/85)
> This meta-discussion is inspired by the current debate over free will > between Rosen and Torek, et. al., and indirectly by a previous debate between > Rosen and others (Laura Creighton and Tim Maroney come to mind) about whether > "religion" necessarily implied belief in a supreme being. In both cases, what > began as a philosophical debate ended up getting bogged down in semantics. > First, a concession to Rich: for what it's worth, I'd have to agree > with you about the traditional formulation of the question of "free will". > Historically, belief in free will has implied a belief in a mysterious > something, "will", which was both non-random and acausal. For reasons which > Rich has covered thoroughly (and repeatedly :-), belief in this kind of free > will has become unpopular. It is not dead, but it runs afoul of the generally > materialist and empirical temper of our times. Many of us at least suspect, as > Rich insists, that this whole formulation of the question of free will is > paradoxical, and content-free. [BARRY] Exactly. Thank you for making clear what I've been trying to say (repeatedly) for months. > What I fail to see, is why we are constrained to continue the debate > using this traditional formulation. Must we completely reinvent the vocabulary > of the debate to discuss it meaningfully? To answer this, I'll excerpt from the first part of your own article, Kenn: > "'When *I* use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather > scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more > nor less.' > 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you *can* make words > mean so many different things.' > 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master > - that's all.'" > > "Definitions, contrary to popular opinion, tell us nothing about > things. They only describe people's linguistic habits; that is, they > tell us what noises people make under what conditions. Definitions > should be understood as *statements about language*." Hayakawa Yes, indeed. Definitions tell us the way in which people use sounds and semiartistic scrawls to describe something. The definitions in the dictionary are (supposed to be) the indications of what particular sounds/scrawls mean when humans use them. The reason we can communicate is that we have (to a degree) a consensus about what the sounds/scrawls mean. If a word has a particular definition (as "free will" does), then to go outside of that definition (as Humpty Dumpty does by taking on his own) is to violate the consensus, to make communication and discussion meaningless. It's like what Steve Martin noted when he went to France: "Fromage means cheese, chapeau means hat, it's like those French have a different word for EVERYTHING!" Likewise, to do the opposite, to take existing words in a given language and simply alter their meanings, is to make communication impossible (unless you know the new language that results!). Now, new meanings for words do crop up. But if there's one thing scientific endeavot has taught us, it is to be precise about definitions and not to frivolously throw words and meanings. It's one thing to take the word "bull" and have it mean other things (like a "bull" market, or a description of the content of a Rich Rosen article), but if you were to use the word "bull" to refer to another part of the animal kingdom, you'd be introducing inconsistency and miscommunication and a good deal of misinformation. To call a dog a "bulldog" is to say it is a dog that looks like a bull (or something like that) but it distinguishes it from it being mistaken for a "bull". You wouldn't call it a "bull", but you might call an edict by the Pope a "Papal Bull". (The very fact that words do mean different things in different realms is a strategy of humor: imagine Guido Sarducci in the Vatican showing us the Papal Bull.) But to use the same word to mean two different things in the same realm is to invite confusion and misinformation. > What Torek and others are saying (I > think) is that we can discard the non-material implications of free will, and > still leave the term with a meaning that corresponds pretty closely with > common-sense notions of what "free" means. That's what the argument has dissolved into, and at root level one finds that the word free does not apply there, and that that lack of freeness percolates through to all levels. > I'm sure we would all agree that there's a real difference between > being on an airplane that's hijacked to Havana, and choosing to take a Cuban > holiday. I think what we're all after is getting a better handle on that word, > "choose". If someone's ideas about that don't fit neatly into the traditional > pigeonholes, I don't see the point of requiring them to invent a whole new > vocabulary to explain their thoughts. I do, for the reasons above. > All that's required is that they make > clear the novel job they're giving to an old word. Torek et. al. have done so, > as even you, Rich, concede. You seem clear enough on what they're saying; why > this schoolmasterish insistence that they say it *your* way? Why the schoolBOYish insistence on calling it MY way? (Not singling you out here.) As I say above, it's not so simple as to say "I'm using this word differently than it has been used in this context before." To do that is the same as to say what Mr. Dumpty said above, no? > When you insist > that the old sense of "free will" is devoid of meaning, why aren't you willing > to let that poor abused phrase find a better roost, aboard a sensible idea? "When I say 'free will', it means whatever I choose it to mean, and not what the consensus of definition has always considered it to mean..." > As Humpty Dumpty said, the question is who is to be the master. I'd > like to see some more meaningful debate on what this "novel" definition of > free will really says, and less use of dictionaries for brickbats. The words I've been using are "rational evaluative analysis" to describe what Paul has called free will, and I'm beginning to see holes in the use of those words, too. (Perhaps a phrase meaning "decision making based on stored knowledge constructs acquired through life experience" is more appropriate, because "rational" and "evaluative" may not really be applicable. If you are to communicate with other people, saying that YOU are the master over words may be fun, but nobody will understand what you're saying. It is all of us together as speakers of a language that must be the master over words, not each of us individually, otherwise frigbottin druvis smengle engernaub. And feet nose face will free over time shoelaces. -- Providing the mininum daily adult requirement of sacrilege... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/23/85)
In article <1048@ames.UUCP> barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) writes: >[...] What Torek and others are saying (I think) is that we can discard >the non-material implications of free will, and still leave the term with >a meaning that corresponds pretty closely with common-sense notions of >what "free" means. EXACTAMOONDO! I couldn't have said it better (or even as well) myself. --Paul V Torek, aspiring language reformer
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/24/85)
>>[...] What Torek and others are saying (I think) is that we can discard >>the non-material implications of free will, and still leave the term with >>a meaning that corresponds pretty closely with common-sense notions of >>what "free" means. > EXACTAMOONDO! I couldn't have said it better (or even as well) myself. If only we were dealing with common-sense definitions here. :-) > --Paul V Torek, aspiring language reformer Next task for Paul: change the meaning of unicorn to horse so that unicorns can exist. Language reform (the way you seem to go about it) is a tough job, but nobody should be doing it. (At least not that way.) -- "There! I've run rings 'round you logically!" "Oh, intercourse the penguin!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr