rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/13/85)
Even number of > = me, Odd number = Paul Torek >>>>[...] I'll reiterate my own points to give you a head start: how do >>>>babies "choose" the influences around them [...] >>> Babies don't choose such influences. Thus, if by "ULTIMATE sense" you >>> mean choosing ALL the influences on oneself throughout one's life >>> history, nobody has such choice. But that isn't necessary for one's >>> choices now to be free -- as long as those early influences lead to >>> a capacity for "rational evaluative analysis" (r-e-a) by the person. In >>> short, you seem to be arguing >>> 1. No one chooses all the influences on her development. >>> 2. [implicit] Unless one has a choice in all the influences on >>> one's development, one's later actions are not free choices. >>> 3. Therefore, no one has "free will". >>> I deny premise 2. >>Good for you!! Your denying it doesn't change its veracity one bit. Since >>free means "independent of external influences, unfettered, etc.", and since >>you now seem to at least agree that such things directly influence later >>choices, THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* *FREE*!!! > The influences of the external environment on choice aren't direct. They > operate ONLY through INTERNAL factors -- which make choices directly. So? They're not direct? The choices themselves aren't implemented "directly", by that definition, either. That seems to be just doubletalk to get around the fact that THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* FREE as I said above. What determines the configuration of the "INTERNAL factors", if not the same processes? >>... Since you cannot simply refute premise 2 by asserting its falseness, >>premise 3 does follow quite logically. You put it very well yourself: >>Unless one has a choice in ALL the influences of one's development (and >>life), which one obviously cannot, one's later actions are NOT free choices! > Freedom of choice refers mainly to PRESENT influences on one's actions; if > THOSE are INTERNAL then it's FREE. Past conditions make a choice unfree > only if they trace a completely external (to the person's volition) chain > of cause-and-effect to the time of the choice. BUT ALL THOSE PAST EXPERIENCES ARE JUST INSTANCES OF THE SAME TYPE OF PROCESS THAT OCCURRED IN THE PAST!!!! Thus those "past conditions", those states in the brain that result from past experiences, were achieved through the same process as "present" experiences! And thus, the experiences of the baby taken as an example, the baby whose experiences were not of his/her own choosing, you answer your own argument---ALL the experiences can be traced to external chains of cause-and-effect! -- Like aversion (HEY!), shocked for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rap@oliven.UUCP (Robert A. Pease) (07/19/85)
Even number of > = Rich Rosen
Odd number of > = Paul Torek
(I hope I got this right.)
>>> .... if by "ULTIMATE sense" you
>>> mean choosing ALL the influences on oneself throughout one's life
>>> history, nobody has such choice. But that isn't necessary for one's
>>> choices now to be free -- as long as those early influences lead to
>>> a capacity for "rational evaluative analysis" (r-e-a) by the person. In
>>> short, you seem to be arguing
>>> 1. No one chooses all the influences on her development.
>>> 2. [implicit] Unless one has a choice in all the influences on
>>> one's development, one's later actions are not free choices.
>>> 3. Therefore, no one has "free will".
>>> I deny premise 2.
>>Good for you!! Your denying it doesn't change its veracity one bit. Since
>>free means "independent of external influences, unfettered, etc.", and since
>>you now seem to at least agree that such things directly influence later
>>choices, THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* *FREE*!!!
First of all, if a person's development has provided the capacity for
"rational evaluative analysis" then that person has the ability to
decide HOW past influences will affect him/her now. If you don't
believe me, then just think about the last time you chose to change
the way you react to something.
--
Robert A. Pease
{hplabs|zehntel|fortune|ios|tolerant|allegra|tymix}!oliveb!oliven!raprlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/19/85)
> First of all, if a person's development has provided the capacity for > "rational evaluative analysis" then that person has the ability to > decide HOW past influences will affect him/her now. If you don't > believe me, then just think about the last time you chose to change > the way you react to something. > Robert A. Pease I'm trying to like apricots, but I find I just can't, no matter how much I try to want to... (Insert that Schopenhauer quote here.) -- "There! I've run rings 'round you logically!" "Oh, intercourse the penguin!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rap@oliven.UUCP (Robert A. Pease) (07/21/85)
> > First of all, if a person's development has provided the capacity for > > "rational evaluative analysis" then that person has the ability to > > decide HOW past influences will affect him/her now. If you don't > > believe me, then just think about the last time you chose to change > > the way you react to something. > > Robert A. Pease > > I'm trying to like apricots, but I find I just can't, no matter how much > I try to want to... (Insert that Schopenhauer quote here.) > Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr Thats okay, Rich. Its taken me 15 years to be able to eat cheese and keep it down. Just means that you have your work cut out for you :-). Seriously, though, if you are really determined to change yor reaction to something, you can. Could it be that try as you might, you really don't WANT to like apricots? You can't make changes in yourself if there is an internal conflict concerning the changes. -- Robert A. Pease {hplabs|zehntel|fortune|ios|tolerant|allegra|tymix}!oliveb!oliven!rap
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/22/85)
>>> First of all, if a person's development has provided the capacity for >>> "rational evaluative analysis" then that person has the ability to >>> decide HOW past influences will affect him/her now. If you don't >>> believe me, then just think about the last time you chose to change >>> the way you react to something. [PEASE] >>I'm trying to like apricots, but I find I just can't, no matter how much >>I try to want to... (Insert that Schopenhauer quote here.) [ROSEN] > Thats okay, Rich. Its taken me 15 years to be able to eat cheese and > keep it down. Just means that you have your work cut out for you :-). > Seriously, though, if you are really determined to change yor reaction > to something, you can. Could it be that try as you might, you really > don't WANT to like apricots? You can't make changes in yourself if > there is an internal conflict concerning the changes. [PEASE] But I *want* to want to like apricots. It would be real neat, I mean, if the corner store had only apricots on a snowy day, I wouldn't go hungry, but I can't get myself to even want to like them. If I am really determined, I suppose I could learn to want to like them, and then eventually want to like them, and then maybe even like them. But the fact that I am unable to want to want to do this thing, implies something about human brain function that seems to bode ill for any notion of free will. -- "Because love grows where my Rosemary goes and nobody knows but me." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
aeq@pucc-h (Jeff Sargent) (07/25/85)
From Rich Rosen (pyuxd!rlr): > But I *want* to want to like apricots.... If I am really determined, > I suppose I could learn to want to like them, and then eventually want to > like them, and then maybe even like them. But the fact that I am unable > to want to want to do this thing, implies something about human brain > function that seems to bode ill for any notion of free will. I think you got a bit confused on how many levels of wanting you were talking about; note that the first and last sentence contradict each other. I am only responding to this article at all because that phrase "want to want" caught my eye; it has played its part (and may well do so many times again) in my growth as a Christian (and hence, as a human being). In years past, I indeed wanted to want, say, to care about other human beings; I knew it was a good thing, but despite that, it was hard to make the emotional commitment to remove that level of indirection, i.e. to manage just to want to care, and then to manage to actually care (which I have begun to do but am certainly not expert at yet). It can be done. Of course, it is a matter of getting rid of whatever within us prevents us from doing what we want to want (i.e. really want) to do; in my experience, this is chiefly past emotional hurts and perhaps their festering consequences (e.g. resentment or guilt). It is possible that your distaste for apricots is indeed biochemical; they may in fact disagree with your body. But I doubt that the fact that years ago I was unable to care for people, and now I have begun to be able to, can be explained on strictly biochemical grounds. -- -- Jeff Sargent {decvax|harpo|ihnp4|inuxc|ucbvax}!pur-ee!pucc-h!aeq The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much. (James 5:16) The prayer of a not-so-righteous man availeth sometimes.... (Rich McDaniel)
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/26/85)
> It is possible that your distaste for apricots is indeed biochemical; they > may in fact disagree with your body. But I doubt that the fact that years ago > I was unable to care for people, and now I have begun to be able to, can be > explained on strictly biochemical grounds. [SARGENT] I didn't say it was biochemical in that sense (direct body chemistry problems). I said that my past experiences had led me to dislike apricots (e.g., I threw up while eating them as a child and associate the taste with that experience). I cannot decide to want to want to eat apricots, no more than you can decide to want to like people if you don't. New experiences might change that, but it is not a matter of "will". -- Life is complex. It has real and imaginary parts. Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rap@oliven.UUCP (Robert A. Pease) (07/26/85)
> > You can't make changes in yourself if > > there is an internal conflict concerning the changes. [PEASE] > > But I *want* to want to like apricots. It would be real neat, I mean, if > the corner store had only apricots on a snowy day, I wouldn't go hungry, > but I can't get myself to even want to like them. If I am really determined, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > I suppose I could learn to want to like them, and then eventually want to > like them, and then maybe even like them. But the fact that I am unable ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > to want to want to do this thing, implies something about human brain ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > function that seems to bode ill for any notion of free will. > -- > "Because love grows where my Rosemary goes and nobody knows but me." > Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr No, thats not true. Who's to say what the real reason is that you don't like apricots. Not me. At least not when I haven't had a chance to psycoanalyze you. And as I said above (in my previous posting), you cannot make a change in your response to something when you have an internal conflict about making that change. From your paragraph above, it sounds like you have a conflict about it. There is an old saying that applies here, "Argue for your limitations and they're yours." -- Robert A. Pease {hplabs|zehntel|fortune|ios|tolerant|allegra|tymix}!oliveb!oliven!rap
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/27/85)
>>> You can't make changes in yourself if >>> there is an internal conflict concerning the changes. [PEASE] >>But I *want* to want to like apricots. It would be real neat, I mean, if >>the corner store had only apricots on a snowy day, I wouldn't go hungry, >>but I can't get myself to even want to like them. If I am really determined, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >>I suppose I could learn to want to like them, and then eventually want to >>like them, and then maybe even like them. But the fact that I am unable ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >>to want to want to do this thing, implies something about human brain ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >>function that seems to bode ill for any notion of free will. [ROSEN] > No, thats not true. Who's to say what the real reason is that you > don't like apricots. Not me. At least not when I haven't had a > chance to psycoanalyze you. And as I said above (in my previous > posting), you cannot make a change in your response to something when > you have an internal conflict about making that change. From your > paragraph above, it sounds like you have a conflict about it. [PEASE] But what does "liking" or "not liking" something mean? Is it necessarily, as Jeff Sargent put it, a biochemical direct thing (something about my taste buds and nervous system that automatically sends the sensation of apricot chemicals to the "UGGGGHH!" center of my brain), or could it be that I associate, cognitively but subconsciously, the sensation of tasting apricots with "UGGGGHH!"? Is that what "internal conflict" means? -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
sher@rochester.UUCP (David Sher) (07/29/85)
In article <1313@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >I cannot decide to want to want to eat apricots, no more than you can decide >to want to like people if you don't. New experiences might change that, but >it is not a matter of "will". >-- > Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr Thats funny, I have decided to want things and modified my desires accordingly several times. Its easy if you know how. Does that mean that my will is more free than yours? -David Sher seismo!rochester!sher sher@rochester
rap@oliven.UUCP (Robert A. Pease) (07/30/85)
The topic has been free will. Specificly wether or not someone can change their reaction to events happening to them. (A similar discussion is going on in net.singles about "choosing" to feel pain at being turned down for a date, but I don't recall if the two are related or not.) The situation brought up is that Rich has an aversion to eating apricots and wonders if he can "choose" to change that. > > And as I said above (in my previous posting), you cannot make a change > > in your response to something when you have an internal conflict about > > making that change. [PEASE] > > But what does "liking" or "not liking" something mean? Is it necessarily, > as Jeff Sargent put it, a biochemical direct thing (something about my > taste buds and nervous system that automatically sends the sensation of > apricot chemicals to the "UGGGGHH!" center of my brain), or could it be > that I associate, cognitively but subconsciously, the sensation of tasting > apricots with "UGGGGHH!"? Is that what "internal conflict" means? [RICH] It doesn't matter what "liking" or "not liking" means. What matters is that this is a goal that you are concidering and for that goal only you can define the above terms. What I mean by "internal conflict" is that one part of you is in conflict with another part. Please don't ask me to define conflict. I think we all know what a conflict is. Now, again, I don't know what your reasons are for not liking apricots are (ignoring for the moment that they made you gag in the past). All I can do is tell you that I had the same problem with cheese for at least 15 years. I find that now I can eat most cheese's and have no problem. Just 2 days ago I had my first bleu cheese dressing on a salad. My first taste left a little to be desired, but the more I ate the easier it got. So what I am saying is that it can (and has) been overcome. > Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. > Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr There is a story that a man told that if you believed with all your heart and all your mind and all your soul that you could say to a mountain, "be thou uprooted and cast into the sea," and it would be done. How much easier, then, would it be to enjoy the flavor of one of God's fruits? But it is still your choice. -- Robert A. Pease {hplabs|zehntel|fortune|ios|tolerant|allegra|tymix}!oliveb!oliven!rap
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/31/85)
> The topic has been free will. Specificly wether or not someone can > change their reaction to events happening to them. (A similar > discussion is going on in net.singles about "choosing" to feel pain at > being turned down for a date, but I don't recall if the two are > related or not.) I think they are, very much so. > The situation brought up is that Rich has an aversion > to eating apricots and wonders if he can "choose" to change that. >>> And as I said above (in my previous posting), you cannot make a change >>> in your response to something when you have an internal conflict about >>> making that change. [PEASE] > >>But what does "liking" or "not liking" something mean? Is it necessarily, >>as Jeff Sargent put it, a biochemical direct thing (something about my >>taste buds and nervous system that automatically sends the sensation of >>apricot chemicals to the "UGGGGHH!" center of my brain), or could it be >>that I associate, cognitively but subconsciously, the sensation of tasting >>apricots with "UGGGGHH!"? Is that what "internal conflict" means? [RICH] > > It doesn't matter what "liking" or "not liking" means. [PEASE] Stop. If it "doesn't matter" what the words we are talking about mean, we're not having a conversation. Two people are just making sounds at each other. If we can't understand the meaning of what is being said, moreover, if one of us doesn't CARE to, conversation is meaningless. -- "Because love grows where my Rosemary goes and nobody knows but me." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
lip@masscomp.UUCP (John Lipinski) (08/01/85)
In article <10769@rochester.UUCP> sher@rochester.UUCP (David Sher) writes: >Thats funny, I have decided to want things and modified my desires >accordingly several times. Its easy if you know how. Does that mean >that my will is more free than yours [rosen's]? >-David Sher No, that doesn't mean that your will is more free. By saying "I have decided to want" you necessarily imply that you want to want. A decision is necessarily made by a desire. No matter what how you change your desires, you are still bound to wanting to change them. You can never free the shackle of desire. - John Lipinski {decvax,ihnp4}!masscomp!lip
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/02/85)
>>I cannot decide to want to want to eat apricots, no more than you can decide >>to want to like people if you don't. New experiences might change that, but >>it is not a matter of "will". >> Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr > Thats funny, I have decided to want things and modified my desires > accordingly several times. Its easy if you know how. Does that mean > that my will is more free than yours? > -David Sher You "decided to want" them? Or you already wanted them but had a distaste for the process of acquiring them and overcame the distaste? Examples? -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr