torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (09/17/85)
In article <5906@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc,) writes: >> Here you've implied that no a-religious moral codes can supply >>valid reasons for *why* they should be followed. Care to demonstrate that, >>and how religious moral codes *do* supply valid reasons? [Sonntag] > >[That's what bothers me about you skeptics; you always expect that >others should have to disprove the things you contend as well as >prove the things they contend. :-)] > >Yes, that's my implication. But you've shifted the burden of proof >on that. I think the burden of proof lies with those who contend that >there are sufficient, compeling reasons for morality apart from appeal >to a transcendent authority. Ahem. The reason for morality is that lack of it causes harm to individuals such as myself. I think it becomes crystal clear why the areligious person ought to support an enforced public morality. (Reasons to be moral as an individual are a little more complex, but just as explainable under areligous assumptions as under religious ones.) >Religious codes do provide the transcendent authority. Wrong! (I take you to mean that religious codes do supply valid reasons for a moral code, over and above any reasons that might be supplied without religion. If you did not mean this, your statement does not address Sonntag's point.) If there were no valid reasons for morality apart from religion, there would be no valid reasons at all; i.e. religion could not supply any. > I would contend that you can't provide sufficient reason to >compel others to obey any moral code without doing the same thing. Refuted above. --The untiring iconoclast, Paul V Torek
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) (09/19/85)
In article <233@umich.UUCP> torek@eecs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >In article <5906@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc,) writes: >>> Here you've implied that no a-religious moral codes can supply >>>valid reasons for *why* they should be followed. Care to demonstrate that, >>>and how religious moral codes *do* supply valid reasons? [Sonntag] >>... >>Yes, that's my implication. But you've shifted the burden of proof >>on that. I think the burden of proof lies with those who contend that >>there are sufficient, compeling reasons for morality apart from appeal >>to a transcendent authority. > >Ahem. The reason for morality is that lack of it causes harm to >individuals such as myself. I think it becomes crystal clear why the >areligious person ought to support an enforced public morality. (Reasons >to be moral as an individual are a little more complex, but just as >explainable under areligous assumptions as under religious ones.) OK, then explain them. Also you should give examples of what particular moral codes should be enforced and what binds the individual to obey them. It doesn't necessarily follow that I will be harmed by not obeying moral codes. How do you know I will? If some individuals can except themselves from the moral codes of society, where does that leave society? >>Religious codes do provide the transcendent authority. > >Wrong! (I take you to mean that religious codes do supply valid reasons >for a moral code, over and above any reasons that might be supplied >without religion. If you did not mean this, your statement does not >address Sonntag's point.) If there were no valid reasons for morality >apart from religion, there would be no valid reasons at all; i.e. religion >could not supply any. You are just saying I am wrong without showing me how I am wrong. Explain how a moral code that does not transcend human reason has any authority over others. >> I would contend that you can't provide sufficient reason to >>compel others to obey any moral code without doing the same thing. > >Refuted above. How, again? -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/20/85)
Paul Dubuc's discourse on his opinion of the necessity for a religious basis for morality falls flat on its face for one very good reason. If Paul claims the basis for his morality stems from god, and that we must adhere to it because a deity says this is the law, he's effectively thrown out the whole code. Why? Well, ask Paul if he can prove the existence of god. (Let alone that this god is of the form that he assumes it to be---who knows, maybe the other other Paul (Zimmerman) has a more accurate depiction!) Look at the so-called "decay of moral values" in modern society. Could it possibly be that a major part of the reason for this "decay" (often just a shirking of unnecessary restrictive values that serve no purpose, but also manifested in disrespect for other human beings) is that people no longer believe the veracity of the claims behind its "meaning" and "purpose"? "Hey, there's no god to punish me for this. Look at all the punishing god does to all those other evil people---none. And what rewards do I get from believing---zilch. Hell, might as well rip off that old woman..." Thus, just the opposite of what Paul claims is what is really true. NO morality can sustain itself claiming that "it is the will of god" as long as thinking people come to the reasonable conclusion that there is no god. So what's the solution? Force everyone to believe? Go back in time to indoctrinating the "old values" to make sure everyone believes and doesn't question that belief? Or, maybe, just maybe, build a minimal morality that restricts only from interference/harm to other people's lives in order to fill the needs of all people, and explain the reasoning behind such a morality? -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (09/20/85)
Four >'s = Sonntag, three or one = Dubuc, two = me: >>>> Here you've implied that no a-religious moral codes can supply >>>>valid reasons for *why* they should be followed. Care to demonstrate that, >>>>and how religious moral codes *do* supply valid reasons? [Sonntag] >>>... >>>Yes, that's my implication. But you've shifted the burden of proof ... >> >>Ahem. The reason for morality is that lack of it causes harm to >>individuals such as myself. I think it becomes crystal clear why the >>areligious person ought to support an enforced public morality. (Reasons >>to be moral as an individual are a little more complex, but just as >>explainable under areligous assumptions as under religious ones.) > >OK, then explain them. Also you should give examples of what particular >moral codes should be enforced and what binds the individual to obey >them. It doesn't necessarily follow that I will be harmed by not obeying >moral codes. How do you know I will? [I didn't say that; see below --pvt] Non-religious reasons to be moral derive from (a) sympathy for others as part of a normal human psyche, which can seen to be rational from the facts (a1) that humans are similar in ways relevant to concern about our own and others' welfare, and (a2) sympathy is part and parcel of a set of dispositions and affections which enrich our lives, in part by enabling us to feel joy or sadness at our own fortune or plight; (b) the way a rational being acts in accordance with norms because those norms are (believed to be) valid for all rational agents, which commits one to a certain sort of impartiality (e.g., "Everyone should serve *me* because I'm *me*" is ruled out). Whew. Now all of the above merits more detail; but I would rather recommend a few good books on the subjects than type all year. But it should at least be crystal clear that if others don't follow at least a "minimally decent" (specific examples: no rape or murder allowed) behavior-pattern toward others, you and I will suffer. That is what I meant when I said "lack of it [morality] causes harm to individuals such as [you and] myself": not that you'll be harmed by *your* immorality, but by *others'*. THE LATTER IS ALREADY SUFFICIENT REASON to compel others to obey a moral code. >>>Religious codes do provide the transcendent authority. >> >>Wrong! (I take you to mean that religious codes do supply valid reasons >>for a moral code, over and above any reasons that might be supplied >>without religion. If you did not mean this, your statement does not >>address Sonntag's point.) [...] > >You are just saying I am wrong without showing me how I am wrong. [...] To quote a famous philosopher: "Yes, that's my implication. But you've shifted the burden of proof ...". The burden's on YOU to show how religious codes "do provide the transcendent authority" i.e. provide reasons for an individual to be moral *over and above* the reasons ("if any", if you insist there are none) human reason provides. Prove that you're not "in the same boat" as we agnostics are in! But since you asked: religious codes can't supply any independent reasons because, as Socrates rhetorically queried Euthyphro: Is a thing good because the gods approve it, or do the gods approve it because it is good? Two millenia later, the score remains: Socrates 1, Euthyphro 0. --Paul V Torek torek@umich
beth@sphinx.UChicago.UUCP (Beth Christy) (09/27/85)
[Pick a nit, any nit] From: pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc), Message-ID: <5933@cbscc.UUCP>: >In article <233@umich.UUCP> torek@eecs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >>In article <5906@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc,) writes: >>>> Here you've implied that no a-religious moral codes can supply >>>>valid reasons for *why* they should be followed. Care to demonstrate that, >>>>and how religious moral codes *do* supply valid reasons? [Sonntag] >>>... >>>Yes, that's my implication. But you've shifted the burden of proof >>>on that. I think the burden of proof lies with those who contend that >>>there are sufficient, compeling reasons for morality apart from appeal >>>to a transcendent authority. >> >>Ahem. The reason for morality is that lack of it causes harm to >>individuals such as myself. I think it becomes crystal clear why the >>areligious person ought to support an enforced public morality. (Reasons >>to be moral as an individual are a little more complex, but just as >>explainable under areligous assumptions as under religious ones.) > >OK, then explain them. Also you should give examples of what particular >moral codes should be enforced and what binds the individual to obey >them. It doesn't necessarily follow that I will be harmed by not obeying >moral codes. How do you know I will? If some individuals can except >themselves from the moral codes of society, where does that leave society? "I'm not gonna prove mine til you prove yours, so There!" Swell - this is sure a fun tactic. What particular moral codes should be enforced? There's basically only one: Treat others the way you want others to treat you. It has a lot of nice ramifications: You want people to respect you and your opinions? Respect them and theirs. You want to keep your stuff? Don't take anybody elses. You wish you hadn't gotten a social disease? Don't give it to anybody else. (Note here that you still treat people the way you want/deserve to be treated, even if they don't always reciprocate.) A handy little moral code that isn't at all related to gods, eternal damnation, or eternal bliss. Why should people follow it? In the first place, just because it's a good thing. More practically, one should follow it because, in general, it breeds itself. People often do respond in kind. But note again that the rule doesn't say anything about how people actually *do* treat you, only about how you *want* them to. That makes it very different from "an eye for an eye". What compels people to follow it? Not a damn thing. But what *compels* free-willed people to do anything? Not a damn thing. There's clearly nothing that compels people to follow religious codes - if people were sufficiently compelled to follow religious codes we wouldn't be having this discussion, cause we'd all be religious and there wouldn't be anything to argue about and we'd all get bored and go home. Like this. -- --JB (Beth Christy, U. of Chicago, ..!ihnp4!gargoyle!sphinx!beth) "What if the after-effect of the terrible bomb is unusual beyond belief? Wouldn't you rather the whole population had listened to somebody like the old Indian chief?" (The Roches)
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) (09/30/85)
In article <1142@sphinx.UChicago.UUCP> beth@sphinx.UChicago.UUCP (Beth Christy) writes: >... >What particular moral codes should be enforced? There's basically only >one: Treat others the way you want others to treat you. It has a lot >of nice ramifications: You want people to respect you and your >opinions? Respect them and theirs. You want to keep your stuff? Don't >take anybody elses. You wish you hadn't gotten a social disease? Don't >give it to anybody else. (Note here that you still treat people the way >you want/deserve to be treated, even if they don't always reciprocate.) >A handy little moral code that isn't at all related to gods, eternal >damnation, or eternal bliss. > >Why should people follow it? In the first place, just because it's a >good thing. More practically, one should follow it because, in general, >it breeds itself. People often do respond in kind. But note again that >the rule doesn't say anything about how people actually *do* treat you, >only about how you *want* them to. That makes it very different from >"an eye for an eye". And since how I *want* to be treated has no necessary connection to how I *am* treated, it gives me no reason for treating others the way I would like to be treated. Neither does it give any reason for others to compel me to do so. Can I be arrested for treating others differently than I expect for myself? No, if I commit a crime that is not the basis for the charge against be. It is simply that I committed a crime that is wrong. >What compels people to follow it? Not a damn thing. But what *compels* >free-willed people to do anything? Not a damn thing. There's clearly >nothing that compels people to follow religious codes - if people were >sufficiently compelled to follow religious codes we wouldn't be having >this discussion, cause we'd all be religious and there wouldn't be >anything to argue about and we'd all get bored and go home. The enforcement of our laws compels people to obey. What is the justification for that enforcement? There is no compulsion to obey the "golden rule" "just because it's a good thing". What if someone doesn't think it is? What if they don't care whether it "breeds itself"? Why should they care? If the golden rule worked as well as you say it should, then I suppose we wouldn't have anything to argue about then, either. -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd