[net.philosophy] Immortality

faustus (02/12/83)

	Think of it this way: the only important thing that determines
what you really are is the pattern of molecules and brain cells that 
make you up.  So if you were disintegrated and reformed elsewhere by
a transporter (a la Star Trek) you would not know the
difference. You would still have the same memories, and the same
body (or at least an identical one), so you would be the same
person. But then, if you were to die normally, say, it is
possible, given the laws of statistical mechanics, that a
collection of molecules could randomly form an exact duplicate
of you on the day that you died. So you would once again live. And
given an infinity of time, this incredibly unlikely event
will take place sometime. So you are immortal. I know, this is a
silly argument, but for a bunch of similar and less far fetched
examples of the strange ways that the phenomenon of
consciousness works, and the paradoxes that you run into with
it, read The Mind's I, edited by D. Hofstadter. Like, if you
remove somebody's brain and put it into a tank, and then wire it
to his body via radio links so that he experiences all of the
sense perceptions that he would otherwise, where is he really?
This is a very ambiguous question but still one that demands an
answer. Say, what does everybody out there think of either of
these propositions? I would be interested in what people have to
say about what consciousness really is and how is works.

	I think that I am, therefore something thinks
	it thinks that I am,

	Wayne Christopher
	faustus@berkeley
	ucbvax!faustus