tfl@security.UUCP (06/05/83)
Let me offer a distinction from academic Philosophy (as distinct from net philosophy! flame off.). An often used distinction is between Materialism and Physicalism. In somewhat superficial terms, Materialism states that all that is contained in one's ontology is matter, while Physicalism states that all can be explained in terms of physical objects. This rather subtle distiction can be made clearer by pointing out that most emergent property theories are compatible with Materialism, but not Physicalism. Emergent property theories state that not all properties of material objects are explainable in terms of merely physical attributes, but that some properties emerge, gestalt-like, from certain configurations of matter. A good example is a computer program. The program itself could exist as electrons, or water (as in one of those neat hydo-computers), and resides on that media, and yet is not explainable merely in terms of the media. Emergent property theories have some interesting results. For example, it might be contended that if what we are is simply information, then we could be transferred to any media with the bandwidth and processing ability that our brains (the material object) happens to have. I find emergent property theories more interesting than either physicalism or dualism(that there are two materials: mind and matter, which are fundamentally different). The problem with physicalism is that it yet is able to cash in its promise to explain away everything (like feelings) in terms of physical objects, while dualism is unable to explain how two fundamentally different materials --- mind and matter --- actually interact (look to Descartes to see how one can swet this point). Emergent properties seem to be able to explain a wide range of things, from aesthetics to the philosophy of mind. Which of the three I agree with (as opposed to finding more *interesting* as a card-carrying philosopher left adrift in a sea of engineers), you'll never find out. (actually, my ontology contains three types of material: mind, matter, and New Jersey. Each is incompatible with the other, to whit: there are no minds in New Jersey, and it doesn't seem to matter.)
tim@unc.UUCP (06/06/83)
The problem with emergent propery explanations is that they don't really seem to explain anything. "What is mind?" "An emergent property of the nervous and endocrine systems." Great. It seems that you might as well say "It's a magic thing based on the nervous and endocrine systems." Perhaps there is something missing from my understanding here. If so, clue me in. Tim Maroney
tfl@security.UUCP (Tom Litant) (06/08/83)
Emergent Property Theories are not an attempt to explain mind so much as to explain what the substance is. Thus saying that mind is an emergent property of a certain configuration of matter is the jumping off point for discussing theories of mind, and is not intended to be a complete characterization. In summary, then, we start off by saying that "mind is an emergent property of matter, and not a different substance..." and continue by characterizing the features of this property. Joe Margolis writes extensively from this point of view, but you can see the origins of it in writings by Peter Strawson, etc. As I mentioned in my earlier submission, the attractiveness of emergent property theories (EPT)is that Physicalism (everything can be explained in terms of physical objects) and dualism (there are two diference substances: mind and matter) each have grave difficulties, which EPTs avoid. cheers.