chris@umcp-cs.UUCP (07/05/83)
From: wex@ittvax
Lorenzo makes the claim that the "joy, pain, and intelligent
achievement" of life are the most fundamental items (discussed
so far). That's all well and good, except for one thing: I
(and all other humans besides yourself) haven't the foggiest
idea what you are \actually/ feeling. All we can do is get a
distorted impression from your words and actions.
The mental world is (at least for the moment) a completely
private one; it would seem, therefore, to be difficult to judge
the quality/worth of ANY life on something that is not even
observable, let alone measurable.
Wexelblat's complaint here is suggestive of solipsism. Perhaps I'm the
only sentient being in the world and the rest of you are mindless
automata (AI people, please forgive this colloquial expression), but I
do not (and can not) believe it. Similarly, perhaps the rest of you
are lying when you (for example) tell me you're happy. That such
deception is possible is the point, I take it, of Wexelblat's emphasis
on what you \actually/ feel VS. my impression based on your words and
actions. Such systematic deception is almost as hard to believe in as
the solipsistic thesis was. Like solipsism, the proposition that
others are deceiving me about their joys and pains is hard to reconcile
with other beliefs of mine (some of which are based on observation and
measurement).
Even in the case of any individual (politicians and salesmen excepted),
the hypothesis that s/he is constantly deceiving me runs aground on the
probability that s/he has no motive for doing so. Therefore, I see no
obstacle to my reasonably believing that someone's life is valuable
(valuable according to Sadun's criteria).
"[Nobody besides yourself has] the foggiest idea what you are
\actually/ feeling." This is either false or irrelevant. If the word
\actually/ is merely for emphasis, such that it does not affect the
reference of the phrase it is in, then the statement is relevant but
false. Suppose I believe that you are happy (only) on the basis of
your actions. That doesn't show that I should be skeptical about
whether you are happy, any more than the fact that I believe there's a
chair here (only) on the basis of certain of my sensations shows that I
should be skeptical about whether there's a chair here.
On the other hand, if the word \actually/ is crucial in the statement
(for example, if it means "what you are actually feeling, apart from
what you act and talk like you're feeling"), then the statement is true
but irrelevant. As I have argued, what people act and talk like
they're feeling is usually the same as what they're feeling. Sometimes
not -- our evidence about other minds can be misleading, and our
judgements fallible. But the same applies to our beliefs about reality.
--Paul Torek U of MD, College Park
P.S. Mail to me will not go anywhere: as a 'guest', I can't receive
mail. Some kind of hospitality around here, eh?
--
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