lew@ihuxr.UUCP (07/19/83)
My favorite "Mind's I" article was "What is it like to be a bat?", by Thomas Nagel. He really put his finger on what to me is the sticking point of materialism, namely, "How can subjective experience be described objectively?" Hofstadter makes some cogent (and amusing) criticism of the title question. He points out the paradox involved in imagining oneself to be a bat, and at the same time preserving ones identity as an observer. There is another example (hardly original, of course) which I think is a better paradigm of the subjectivity-objectivity gulf. This is the subjective experience of color. I would ask, "Could we identify a particular nerve firing pattern with the experience of seeing red, and another with seeing blue?" (Presumably the answer should be yes) But further I would ask, "Could we deduce the necessity of the identification?" I think this is the nub of what Nagel is asking, the point being that we can't even imagine making such a deduction. I think Hofstadter sidesteps the major point by focusing on Nagel's example of the bat. Lew Mammel, Jr. ihuxr!lew