[net.philosophy] Kant, first in a potential series

wex@ittvax.UUCP (Alan Wexelblat) (07/25/83)

An answer to Paul Torek, and an introduction to Kant:

For openers (this one's going to be long, gang), let me request that we
keep this to net.philosophy.  Paul is currently posting to net.politics
as well, which I would like to avoid.  Second, I would like to hear his 
reviews of the Kant books he mentioned since I have not read them.  The
texts used in my classes were all essays written by Kant himself (with
various translators).

Kant sets himself the goal of constructing a "rational" system of morality.
This is his answer to the 'intuitionalist' systems of morality that preceded
him.  He beleived (as do most moral philosphers) that a system of morality
must be universally applicable.  In order to do this, he attempted to base
his system on a sense of duty (action governed by a principle).

The principle on which he wished to base morality was stated thus:

	"Maxims of conduct are such that they can be willed
	 to be universal laws."

In order to determine if a principle or act you are considering is a 'maxim of
conduct,' apply the "universal laws test."  If your principle passes the
test, it can be considered a maxim.  (Kant also raises issues of freedom and
rationality -- he implies that rationality is necessary for freedom, and says
that freedom is necessary for morality.  I do not want to tackle these thorny
questions here.  They are not crucial to my arguments against Kant.)

The universal laws test is a four step process.  It involves asking yourself
four questions.  To each, an affirmitive answer must be given (we assume that 
the test-taker is not fooling himself).  If a single negative is encountered,
the principle or act is not a maxim of conduct.  The questions are:

	1) if I desire X*, does everyone desire X?

	2) Does everyone want X?

	3) Does everyone always want X?

	4) What if this were a law of nature?

{* footnote:
to say "I desire X" is to say the following:  if X is a material good,
then I wish to possess it.  If X is a possible situation, then I desire that
that situation should come to pass.  If X is an action, then I desire to 
perform that action.  If X is a boolean, then I desire X to be true.
end footnote}

Kant, of course, has a great deal more to say on the subject.  However, all
his positions stem from this one bit of philosophy, and I shall concentrate
on it.

Several questions arise at this point:  Even if the universality test works,
does it provide a necessary and sufficient basis for morality?  Kant assumes
that principles guide all actions; is this so?  Even if one passes the first
three parts of the test, one may not want everyone to act on this principle.

Let us consider a plausible example (call it example 1):  
	- I want a limited good X.
	- My reasons for wanting X are logical and moral.
	- I cannot criticize others for wanting X.
	- But since the supply of X is limited, I do not want others to 
	  desire it.  Therefore, I will fail step four of the test,
	  even though my desire is perfectly moral (by my intuition).

This leads us to a questioning of the fourth step of the test:  Why should 
anyone worry about the application of a maxim as a universal law?  In other
words, why should my morality be determined by considerations of a Utopian
world?

Kant attempts to justify step four by claiming that only by adherence to it 
can one live up to one's obligations as a rational and free person.  He does
not provide any logical basis for this step, merely a claim.

But step four can lead to irrational results, directly contradicting Kant.
Look at the community of altruists; they pass the test with flying colors,
yet in implementation, they are ludicrous!

Let us take up another challenge to Kant (call it example 2):

	You are the captain of a rescue boat.  Because of 
	circumstances, you are faced with a choice of rescuing
	only one of two people.  There is not time to rescue
	both, and neither rescue poses any dangers for anyone.
	You have no responsibilities other than the ones detailed
	above.  One of the people whom you can rescue is a
	person you love, the other is a total stranger.  Whom do
	you save?

Posed this question, people will automatically answer "the loved one." 
It seems to be common sense, and you would think less of the person who 
rescued the stranger.  This is a concept which is strongly embedded in 
what is called intuitive morality*.  Yet there is no way to capture this 
in the Kantian system.  

In actuality, one could construct a maxim which says that "In situations
like the above, one should save the loved one."  But this is clearly ludicrous!
If your loved one said that s/he rescued you because of a rational principle 
you would be upset.  You expect him/her to say that s/he rescued you because 
of who you are!  But Kant explicitly ignores this facet of morality.

Now we come to an interesting point:  What are the possible consequences of 
running the world in a Kantian way?  I will use one final example to make
this point (call it example 3):

	Let us suppose that I have a large sum of money, and that I 
	will shortly die.  I have no living relatives.  Now, the world
	being what it is, I see two things I would like to do with my 
	money:  I could donate it to CARE to help alleviate third world 
	starvation, or I could use it to build a new facility onto the 
	library to help them preserve old books which are decaying.

	Now I apply the Kantian test to each of the principles to see 
	which one I should do, and I discover that it would be a wonderful 
	thing if everyone gave money to alleviate starvation, and a 
	really useless thing to have lots of old-book-preservation 
	facilities.  So the books rot.

Now, how many of you are going to give all your money to CARE when you die?
Very few, I'll bet.  (If you are giving it to your children, Paul, see example
2, above.)  Do you consider yourself immoral for not doing so?  Obviously not.
Kant fails completely to capture peoples' intuitions on topics like this.  Yet
he claims that his moral system is a "rational" one.

I beleive that I have demonstrated clearly that it is not.

--Alan Wexelblat
decvax!ittvax!wex