dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (07/31/83)
Response to Tom Craver on reasons for caring: From: trc@houti.UUCP You asked "Objectivism says (doesn't it?) that the ONLY REASON to care for others is to get benefits for oneself"? again, so I will address it here. Objectivism states that the only *purpose* in doing anything is to achieve rational benefits for oneself. Instead of simply answering yes, you emphasize the word purpose where I used the word reason. I take it that means that you see an important difference between these two ways of putting it. The only difference I can see is that "reason" refers to justification, whereas "purpose" is more neutral, simply describing why a person does something. So whereas I thought Objectivism was making a normative statement -- namely, that one should not care about others for any reason other than one's selfish benefit -- you seem to be saying that Objectivism is making a descriptive statement. But WHOSE purpose does this statement describe? Everyone's? If so, that seems to imply that there are no practicing True Altruists. In addition, it seems even to imply that there are no (what *you* would call) watered-down altruists of my type (Utilitarians, for example). But then WHO is it that you're arguing against? Furthermore, if Objectivism's statement IS descriptive, it would seem to lack normative force. Why should I care what "the only *purpose* in [as opposed to *reason* for] doing anything" is? But perhaps you meant your statement to be normative. In that case, A) I fail to see the slightest justification for it, and B) I see at least one good argument against it, which follows. I find it extremely hard to believe that I SHOULD NOT, i.e. it is wrong for me to, care about others. Tom would say that Objectivism does not require me to not care about others. But I say that it does so require, indirectly. The reason is that it says (remember, I am construing it normatively here) that I should always look to my own benefit when I do anything, including care about another. But it is IMPOSSIBLE to care about another while looking only to my own benefit! I repeat: not *wrong*, but *impossible*. I said this in my article of July 18, and I quote: "I claim that loving (ONLY) in order to get that good feeling is not wrong, but impossible." The following remarks of yours all misinterpret me (rather, they ignore what I say!): In your original note, you were "emphatically" sure that good feelings *should have* [emphasis added] nothing to do with your reasons. In your second note you allow that it is *alright* [emphasis added]... Why would it be *wrong* [emphasis added] to seek to love others just for the good feelings it gives one? It is not wrong, because only possible actions can be right or wrong. -------------------- On the middle ground, you say In effect, you are making the positive statement that there is something redeeming about altruism, that makes it worthy of mixing with selfishness. Equivalently, you are claiming that there is something wrong with selfishness, that requires a mixing in of altruism. Not exactly. There are three possible positions worth considering. One, selfishness is the only sensible thing (you hold this, I take it). Two, humanitarianism is the only fully reasonable thing (I hold this). Three, either of these two is acceptable; both are optional (my friend George holds this). Now, I want to defend positions two and three against position one. Therefore, I am making a negative statement that there is nothing *wrong* with not being selfish-Rand-style. When and if I feel like arguing against position three, I will indeed claim that there is something wrong with selfishness. But please understand that you must argue against George's position as well as mine. -------------------- On Utilitarianism, you ask Valuable to whom? Values do not arise without a valuer. Only individuals can value something. What and how can a society or species value that its members do not? Valuable for each and every sentient being. I guess I have to explain the meaning of the verb "to value" and the adjective "valuable" again. The verb "to value" means to think valuable, where as the adjective "valuable" means *worthy* of being thought to be valuable. The noun "values" is one of those wonderful slick words which can be interpreted more than one way. It can mean *valueds* (to coin a word), OR it can mean *valuables*. Whereas *valueds* can not arise without a valuer, *valuables* CAN exist without anyone thinking them valuable (i.e., valuing them). Furthermore, even if it were the case that valuable things could not exist without a valuer, it would still be open to the Utilitarian to "value" whatever anyone (himself and others) "valued". In short, how do you justify the leap to your next assertion that "the right thing to do is to try to maximize the total happiness or welfare of all beings" - which I presume implicitly means "on the average", and at very best would include "within a certain standard deviation"? (Unless you would accept that it is reasonable for a few to benefit tremendously at the modest expense of the majority.) I wasn't trying to justify that assertion, just to present the idea so as to give you an example of a middle-ground position! No, it doesn't mean on average; yes, I do accept a few benefiting tremendously at a small expense to each other person. For example, if a few people could be saved from death if everyone else donated a small amount of money, I think that would be wonderful! Your suggestion that if a selfish person knew that he would live all other lives, he would act like a Utilitarian, is very revealing. First, it is a simple fact that that is not so - one lives only one's own life. With this statement, you actually provide an argument *against* Utilitarianism. Secondly, it reveals the basically collectivist nature of the system - despite its paying lip service to individual benefit. Finally, it declares that the best justification for Utilitarianism is mysticism - a mystical belief that one may be infinitely reincarnated (which I doubt you seriously believe, but that *is* the implication of your statement). You assume that selfishness is already justified! That's exactly what I deny! Consider the converse: a Utilitarian who knew that he was the only person in the universe, would act just like a selfish person. First, it is a simple fact that that is not so ... With this statement, I actually provide an argument *against* selfishness. (:-)) Second, it reveals the basically solipsistic and atomistic nature of the system ... (:-)) Finally, it declares that the best justification for selfishness is solipsism. (:-)) :-) :-) :-) Paul Torek, U of MD College Park