trc@houti.UUCP (08/02/83)
Response to Paul Torek on the middle ground: First, read my recent submission on the definition of altruism and selfishness. I claim that that note removes any strong probability of there being a worthwhile "middle ground". Even if there is, it is only because we have *both* been addressing the wrong question. I dont think that that is the case. Purpose means "object, aim, or intention". Reason means "cause for a belief, act, etc." (This is from my American Loose Leaf Dictionary.) They are related, but not the same. The purpose is that of the individual. No, there probably are no practicing "True Altruists". You did not provide any support for the claim that my argument means there cannot be watered- down altruists. Obviously there can be, and are. You need to point out some contradiction between their existence and my claims. When you state that "Objectivism says ... the ONLY REASON to care for others ..." it implies that Objectivism states that there can be no other *cause* for the action. This is not true. A *proper* reason to care about another is that one reacts to that other's "sense of life", or "projected self", with admiration. One might also care for another out of guilt, on principle (She's my mother - I have to care about her.), etc. However, underlying any such reason, one will have some personal purpose - "object, aim, or intention" - even if it is misguided. Acting from guilt means that one aims to please others, or to try to improve oneself under the accusing standard, by making amends for something. Acting from perceived duty means that one believes that one will not be moral unless one cares for the other person. Again - I believe these purposes to be misguided - they are not truly in one's self interest. Objectivism does say that the only *proper* purpose for caring for others is for the benefit of oneself. The *reason* one should love someone else is one's reaction to their "sense of life". (On this I think we agree.) That is, it is your reaction to them that causes you to love them, but the reaction *is* a benefit - the personal pleasure that is the first aim of loving. There must be additional pleasure, if the love is to continue - if the person's sense of life is inconsistent, or if one has mis-read it, the initial pleasure may dry up. You state that it is "IMPOSSIBLE to care about another while looking only to my own benefit". You claim this, and repeat your statement of July 18, but again provide no support for it. Until you do, I cannot accept your claim that Objectivism implies that it is impossible for one to (morally) care for another. What do you mean by "looking only to my own benefit"? If you simply mean, as the previous context would imply, that one's purpose is to achieve the benefit of being loved, and the pleasure involved in that, I see nothing impossible about it. Only if the previous context is ignored, and you mean that one does nothing for the other, does it become impossible for one to care for the other. Regardless of any convoluted argument you might make, I need only point out that it *is* in my self interest to love a worthy other, for the pleasure I get from it. This immediately makes it possible to (morally) care for another. You will have to point out the contradiction that would have to exist, if you are correct. As for my remarks misinterpreting or ignoring what you said, I disagree. You wrote "it is ... emphatically NOT the benefit *I* get that serves as my reason for loving". I said 'you were "emphatically" sure that good feelings should have nothing to do with your reasons'. It doesnt sound to me as if I ignored what you said - I practically repeated it. My point in putting that statement in was to show that you were not being consistent from note to note. This makes it very hard to argue with you. Otherwise, I dont really care how consistent or inconsistent you are. In light of the fact that it is *not* impossible for one to care for others "just for the good feelings it gives one" (as I said), what is wrong with having that purpose? While you are answering, how about answering my request for any substantial evidence of the value of altruism, that would make it worth mixing with selfishness, and vice versa. You try to get out of the question by claiming not to have made a positive statement, by re-stating it in negatives. I have already posted notes stating (in positives) the arguments for selfishness as a basis for morality. You make a counter-claim that needs support. That makes your statement a positive one, regardless of the number of "not"s and "nothing wrong"s you use. On the definition of values as "valueds" vs "valuables" - I disagree. Nothing is a valuable until is it valued. A diamond would have no value if there were no one to value it. Gold in the ground is not valuable until it is found. Also, we are mainly discussing values that are directly relevant to humans - such as life, food, air, pleasure etc - these things obviously must have a human present, to be valuable. So I again say - values do not arise without a valuer. There is another distinction, however, that is important - between what is desired and what is valued. It is open for anyone (including utilitarians) to desire anything, including things that are of no value to them (such as suicide). Values arise from the interaction of the nature of a living creature with its environment. Things in that environment are good for it (sun, water, air, and soil for a plant), and hence are valuable to it. Human beings are (by nature) rational animals. Things that support life and the needs of a rational mind are valuable to humans. I agree that you did not try to justify your assertion (and since you state "The way I see it...", it *is* your assertion, not merely an example of a middle ground position) that maximizing total happiness or welfare is the right thing to do. So how about some justification ? And if one does not judge the maximum good on the basis of average (summation) good of all people, then how? On the whim of the moment? Yes, I do assume that selfishness is already justified - perhaps you did not read my previous submissions on this subject? Your converse is not a true converse. Your original statement was "a selfish person who knew that he would have to live each and every life in the universe would act like a utilitarian" and your "converse" was "a Utilitarian who knew that he was the only person in the universe would act just like a selfish person". First, "not selfish" is not "utilitarian". Second, "not living each and every life" is not being "the only person in the universe". In fact, the proper opposites are "altruist" (see my note on definitions) and "living only his own life of all those in the universe". The latter converse is exactly the *real* situation that humans find themselves in. Your statement about solipsism does not apply. My original statements are in no way negated by your arguments on this point. How do you answer the idea that utilitarianism, by your statement, is best supported by mysticism? And my point on the basically collectivist nature of utilitarianism? Tom Craver houti!trc