dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/07/83)
Tom Craver's response to me on the middle ground reveals that I have
succeeded in focusing the argument on (among others) three very important
issues: just what Objectivism says about caring, why caring for others is
impossible to ground on purely selfish reasons, and the relation of valueds
to valuables. First, the other issues.
First, read my recent submission on the definition of altruism and
selfishness. I claim that that note removes any strong probability
of there being a worthwhile "middle ground".
Assuming for the sake of argument that your definition of altruism were
correct, it still wouldn't rule out the middle ground. If altruism is what
you say it is, then the middle ground is simply neither selfishness nor
altruism. It seems you are still trying to force the issue into "either/or"
terms.
Purpose means "object, aim, or intention". Reason means "cause for
a belief, act, etc." (This is from my American Loose Leaf
Dictionary.) They are related, but not the same. The purpose is
that of the individual. No, there probably are no practicing "True
Altruists". You did not provide any support for the claim that my
argument means there cannot be watered- down altruists. Obviously
there can be, and are. You need to point out some contradiction
between their existence and my claims.
Unfortunately, your dictionary gave you only one of the two senses of
"reason". The other sense is justification. Anyway, I emphasized the
distinction between normative and descriptive statements. You seem to
affirm that you meant your statement to be descriptive, since you didn't
object to my saying so. In that case, I ask again why I should care about
that description; what normative force does it have? And if the only
purpose that an individual ACTUALLY has (as DISTINCT from SHOULD HAVE) is
his own benefit, this *implies* that we utilitarians are mistaken when we
think that we act for the benefit of others as well. And if that's so, then
there are no practicing utilitarians.
However, underlying any such reason, one will have some personal
purpose - "object, aim, or intention" - even if it is misguided.
...Acting from perceived duty means that one believes that one will
not be moral unless one cares for the other person. Again - I
believe these purposes to be misguided - they are not truly in one's
self interest. Objectivism does say that the only *proper* purpose
for caring for others is for the benefit of oneself. The *reason*
one should love someone else is one's reaction to their "sense of
life". (On this I think we agree.)
Now you accept the *normative* statement! I guess you accept both the
descriptive and the normative statements. On your last two sentences
quoted, we do agree (it's a miracle! {:-)}). As to whether one ALWAYS has
some "personal" purpose, I say no. One can do something simply because it
is the best thing to do in the situation; not "best for me" or "best for
others" but just best, full stop. But suppose I'm wrong, there IS always a
personal purpose. Lo and behold, we are all being selfish, really! Your
criticism of us misguideds is that our purposes are not TRULY in our
self-interest, but now YOU are deciding what is in OUR interests. Hmmm...
You state that it is "IMPOSSIBLE to care about another while looking
only to my own benefit". You claim this, and repeat your statement
of July 18, but again provide no support for it. What do you mean
by "looking only to my own benefit"? If you simply mean, as the
previous context would imply, that one's purpose is to achieve the
benefit of being loved, and the pleasure involved in that, I see
nothing impossible about it.
That's what I mean, all right. Now, if you really care about someone's
welfare, intrinsically and not just as a means to your own, then you fail to
be a good Objectivist. You cannot say, "I will care intrinsically about
this person's welfare because (for the object, aim, ...) it will make me
better off." If that is the only object or aim, then you are failing by
that very fact to care intrinsically about the other! You are caring
intrinsically only about yourself. If this is still not satisfactory, I
will try to give an analogy next time.
There's another problem with the idea that one can care about others solely
for the purpose of one's own benefit. If someone's welfare has some finite
importance as far as you are concerned, then this must be greater than some
trivial aspect of your welfare. But this means that you are willing to
forgo at least a tiny part of your own welfare, to promote theirs.
As for my remarks misinterpreting or ignoring what you said, I
disagree. You wrote "it is ... emphatically NOT the benefit *I* get
that serves as my reason for loving". I said 'you were
"emphatically" sure that good feelings should have nothing to do
with your reasons'. It doesn't sound to me as if I ignored what you
said - I practically repeated it.
It may seem to you that there is practically no difference, but I implied
have, not *should have*. I emphasized the words "should have" when I quoted
you. It is the recasting of my factual claim into normative form that
bothered me.
While you are answering, how about answering my request for any
substantial evidence of the value of altruism, that would make it
worth mixing with selfishness, and vice versa. You try to get out
of the question by claiming not to have made a positive statement,
by re-stating it in negatives. I have already posted notes stating
(in positives) the arguments for selfishness as a basis for
morality. You make a counter-claim that needs support.
I missed your previous notes; I'm a relative newcomer to the newsnets. If
you can provide a justification for caring about self-regarding things which
does not also apply to caring about others, then I will indeed need support
for nonselfish caring. If I can make out my claim about impossibility, then
I will have an argument for the value (even in the narrow self-regarding
sense of value on which you will no doubt insist) of nonselfish caring. It
will start with the premise, provided by yourself, that caring about others
can provide benefits to oneself.
On the definition of values as "valueds" vs "valuables" - I
disagree. Nothing is a valuable until is it valued. A diamond
would have no value if there were no one to value it. Gold in the
ground is not valuable until it is found. Also, we are mainly
discussing values that are directly relevant to humans - such as
life, food, air, pleasure etc - these things obviously must have a
human present, to be valuable. So I again say - values do not arise
without a valuer.
"Nothing is valuable until valued" is a hoary old philosophical thesis over
which a seemingly never-ending war of words has been waged. Diamonds and
gold are valuable because they are the most trusted currency, better even
than the dollar. But what about food, or better yet pleasure? Surely these
would still be valuable even if nobody thought that they were. If it were
true that nothing is valuable until valued, we would have no criterion for
rationally deciding what to first value. The issue of what is valuable
would be ultimately subjective. I disagree with that view. Putting valuing
before value is putting the cart before the horse.
I agree that you did not try to justify your assertion (and since
you state "The way I see it...", it *is* your assertion, not merely
an example of a middle ground position) that maximizing total
happiness or welfare is the right thing to do. So how about some
justification ? And if one does not judge the maximum good on the
basis of average (summation) good of all people, then how?
Second question first. The summation, but not the average is used. To
obtain an average, one divides the summation by the number of persons. The
view that one should divide by the population is called the average view or
"average utilitarianism," while the opposing view is called the total view
or "total utilitarianism." The two utilitarianisms give different
assessments of increasing the world's population. I take the total view.
The justification for my assertion is that there are no inherent and
ethically significant differences between an agent himself and others. By
"ethically significant" I mean having justificatory force concerning action;
justifying an action or way of acting.
Yes, I do assume that selfishness is already justified - perhaps you
did not read my previous submissions on this subject?
Right. And you don't seem to have convinced many people with those articles.
Your converse is not a true converse. ...My original statements are
in no way negated by your arguments on this point. How do you
answer the idea that utilitarianism, by your statement, is best
supported by mysticism? And my point on the basically collectivist
nature of utilitarianism?
"Converse" was a bad choice of word. Substitute "analogous argument." My
parody of your argument was right on: it showed that if only *I* assume
that *utilitarianism* is already justified, I can construct bad arguments
for your position just like you did for mine. And that is all your
"arguments" did. Utilitarianism is best supported by the recognition that
whether benefits are mine or yours or Jones's is irrelevant to their value;
that looked at objectively (if you'll pardon the expression), other people's
happiness is no more and no less important *per se* than your own.
Utilitarianism is individualistic (I have seen it criticized as such!)
because it starts from the welfare of each individual rather than society as
a whole. Utilitarians deny that society has a good (a welfare) apart from
that of individuals.