dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/07/83)
First, the limited good example. Alan Wexelblat points out four assumptions in my defense of the universalizability of a maxim directing one to consume limited goods under certain conditions. I maintain that even where all four of these assumptions are false, there may be a maxim which is universalizable and which allows consumption. Suppose a certain good is indivisible, and there is only one of it, so only one person can enjoy it. Still, the maxim "first come, first served" is universalizable in this case. If everyone followed this maxim, there would be no conflict as to who could use the good -- it would be whoever discovered it. Next, operation rescue the loved one. A universalizable maxim is "other things being equal (e.g. equally unknown), choose the loved one." No contradictions arise if everyone follows this maxim. As for when things are not equal, that depends on what goals Kantian morality obliges us to take. I'm not knowledgeable enough about Kant's full ethical theory to say (sorry!). Kant *does* consider happiness important, in fact, Hoffman quotes another Kant scholar as saying "Kant speaks ... of the happiness of others as a categorical end." (Hoffman, p.68) I assume that the quoted scholar knows what he's talking about. As far as wishing to speak of moral actions motivated by love, I'm not sure. Moral as in not immoral, yes; moral as opposed to nonmorally-motivated, I'm reluctant to concede. Forgive me for agreeing with Tom Craver, but I tend to think of morality as pertaining especially to rational action. Tell me: who's going to get your goodies when you die? How much do you contribute to charity each year? How much do you spend on frivolous things like vacations, entertainment, etc? This is not a personal attack (I don't expect you to answer)... ...But I will anyway. It is quite likely that a charity might get my money when I go. I'm serious, honest. Of course, by the time I'm 75 I may have changed my mind. I contribute zero to charity every year (but then I'm a student, and it takes all my money to learn, so that I may later earn). I spend zero on frivolous things as of lately (but I do spend *time*). If I had no wish to help the vast huddled masses, would I feel guilty? If I didn't, it could only be because I didn't see any moral value in helping. If someone is to create a complete moral system, he must either follow mankind's (general) intuitions about what is moral, OR he must provide an explanation of why morality conflicts with intuition. Kant does not provide this sort of explanation. See below on justification of the CI (first formulation). In fact, the universality test extols pure altruism. ...Everything he did would mesh perfectly with the four-part test, ASSUMING THAT HE (or only a small group) WAS THE ONLY ONE ACTING THUS. Pardon me for being so obstinate, but it seems to me that the second sentence quoted immediately above, blatantly contradicts the first! By emphasizing that *not* everyone can act on the pure altruist's maxim, you yourself show that "pure altruism" can't be willed to be a universal law (since then, nobody could *act*!). What does it mean to treat a person as "an end"? A good question -- I don't know. And once we know, we have to ask whether Kant justifies the requirement to so treat people. But I would be hesitant to jump from *my* failure to figure Kant out to the conclusion that he isn't making sense. (Not that I think you do, necessarily.) Throughout his works, he says, effectively "This is the way it is, and you should be this way because this is the way that it is." (Incidentally, this is what turned me off of Kant early on.) He says that just because he has a concept which he calls purely practical (despite demonstrations of its impracticality), it is absolute, and a product of pure reason. Whoops -- I should have given you a fuller quotation or paraphrase. Kant isn't just being dogmatic here; he thinks that only the concept of a categorical imperative can explain what Hoffman calls "the rationality of action." Apparently Kant thinks that practical principles are exhausted by the categories of hypothetical imperatives, prudential imperatives, inclinations, and categorical imperatives, where the latter must be "completely a priori" and must have the content of the imperative determined by the form of rational law as such. It is in thinking that these categories are exhaustive that I think I would part company with Kant. It is because Kant finds the first three categories to fail to explain adequately how action can be rational, that he assumes that there must be a categorical imperative. Since all a priori principles are universal -- what binds one person a priori must bind all -- it follows that any categorical imperative that says "Paul Torek, do A!" must say "Everyone, do A!". It follows that he who would act according to a categorical imperative must act in such a way that he could will his maxim be a universal law. I apologize for using "deontologist" in a not-quite-literal sense, but I acquired the term from philosophical literature that itself abused the term. Anyway, for the meaning of "deontologist" in this (perhaps twisted) sense, I suggest you check out just about any introductory text, because it has come to be used as opposed to "teleologist" or "consequentialist". Anyway, take my word for it, most of the opinions I've seen separate Kant sharply from consequentialism. --Paul Torek, U of MD College Park