trc@houti.UUCP (T.CRAVER) (08/09/83)
Response to Alan Wexelblat: First, let me say that I must object to the tone of your notes to me so far - I dont mind you attacking my arguments, but I will not continue to respond if you continue to use insulting phrases like "slavish devotion", "ghoul", "morally rephrehesible", etc. Lets keep it clean, OK? You state that you agree with Paul Torek that "the two [altruism, selfishness] are not NECESARILY opposed". First, I think that Paul agrees that they are opposed - the dictionaries are clear on that point. I think Paul believes that they are not contradictory - that is, that there is no logical problem with combining the two. Secondly, I have supported my statements by stating that both are moral systems (declare actions to be right or wrong) (and I have also supported that statement), and that they are opposed (supported by dictionary definitions), and I have just posted a note in which I point out a contradiction that can arise in any system that attempts to mix the two. Namely, altruism and selfishness will not always agree on the moral action in a particular circumstance - there will be cases in which the two specify mutually exclusive courses of action. Any mixture of the two systems will allow internal contradictions. Resolving these on a case by case basis is no solution. If one states a general principle of how to choose, the principle will either be arbitrary (on what basis will you decide to choose, since your moral system gives no guidance? And if you do specify some basis for choice, you really specifying, by that basis, that the moral system without that basis is incomplete. And if the "completed" system is a mixed system itself, the contradiction still exists.) or will *always* favor one system over the other when the two conflict (in which case, what is the real difference between the mixed system and the "pure" system?) You state "under many philosophies, this is a null statement. You need to show why this is not so" in reference to human nature being "qualities that humans have in common, and which they cannot really change"(me). I completely disagree - I have stated examples (living creature, rational capability) that you need to refute. I cannot address "many philosophies" unless you present them. The burden of disproof now lies with you. (And to avoid one cycle of notes: when I say "change", I mean "change and remain human", and yes, I am assuming that human life is the fundamental value.) You state that my quote "One aspect of the human mind is that it is independently conscious" is a "Null statement." As support you claim that "eastern masters *claim* [emphasis added] to have reached..." Nirvana, which you describe as "the loss (or submergence) of the individual consciousness". Need I point out that hearsay evidence is not acceptable? As to your claim that "I myself ... have come close", I would have to know what you mean by close (this isnt horseshoes or hand grenades!) Do you mean that you can *nearly* enter the state where you can "read" the conscious minds of those around you? Or just that you can *nearly* lose consciousness? I would point out that I can do the latter with a rock! Even if you *could* change this aspect of your consciousness (and I do not accept that), what about the rest of your mind - for example the *ability* of your mind to be rational - how do you go about cutting that out while preserving human life - the *capability* is hardwired into the brain. Apology accepted for the "slavish devotion" comment - now about "ghoul" and "morally reprehensible".... In my original note, I said "societies of altruists, mystics, and other irrationalists". This does not say that altruists and mystics are the same thing, but it does say that they are the same as "irrationalists", but it does say that they are the same as "irrationalists". In your terms, the above says "societies of A's, B's, and other C's. I do not see what my "not accepting any middle ground between selfishness and altruism" as valid has to do with this. Explain please? It is true that they can sometimes "lead to the same conclusion", but that does not mean that they are not contradictory - in order to be contradictory, there need be only one contradiction. See above for a *class* of examples. You state that what "the Russians are doing is not altruism by any definition". First, check out my note on definitions. To quote my own summation of those definitions "altruism is concern for or devotion to the interests of others ...opposed to ...selfishness as a moral principle for action." In my previous note, I pointed out that "Soviet Russia's version of altruism is "serve the state, *because* it serves all people". That is, the motivation and justification that the Soviets (and other collectivists) claim, is that they are serving the interests of others, so it is right for people to "serve the state". I also noted Russia's "opposition to self-interested actions". Do you see how this is exactly altruism, in a concrete example? This is not an "imaginary motive", but the *stated* motive of the Soviets. You disagree with my statement that you appear to be making the implicit assumption "the Soviets are bad, so how could they be considered altruistic (IE good)" by saying "I do not think that I made any assumptions about the Soviets... I simply argue that a *bad result* may issue from a *good philosophy*..." [emphasis added]. What "bad result"s are you talking about, if not the results of Soviet Russia, and what "good philosophy" are you talking about, if not altruism?! You claim that I "take a bad result, hypothesize back to an imaginary motive, and then call the motive bad" when I say "in practice, altruism is not practical, and so the Russian people are not well served by the state." In your terms "in practice, the bad motive is not practical, and so causes the bad result". I make no induction - only a deduction. You may disagree with my premise, but please do not reverse what I say. You state that you have already given an example of a modern philosophy that is not anti-mind/anti-life - existentialism. First, you did not offer that as an example in your original note - you did mention it in passing with regard to a previous topic of "human nature". Second, you cannot just say "existentialism. Q.E.D." - you need to support the claim that existentialism is not anti-mind/anti-life in order to convince me that I should withdraw the statement that all other modern philosophies are such. That is what I meant by a "presentation of another modern philosophy". With regard to your confusion on whether the nature of the human mind is required for supporting the right to life or the right to freedom: I am sorry I did not make the referent clear - To restate it: One's rational human mind is one's main tool in support of one's human life. The right to freedom is derived from the right to life and from the need for freedom in order to act upon one's mind's most rational thoughts, in order to best support that life. Is that clearer? You make the claim that 'there is no such thing as the "nature of the human mind"', and support it *apparently* (you say "see above") on the basis that there are modern philosophies such as existentialism that *claim* that there is not such thing. Do I need to point out that a *claim* is not *proof* that there is not such thing? What evidence do those philosophies offer in support of that conclusion? The fundamental nature of a human mind, as opposed to an animal mind, is its ability to be rational - to form consistent concepts and to initiate action upon them. Do you claim that this does not exist, or is not common to humans? And what if I simply claim that one is not human *unless* one has this ability? Unless you claim that there are *no* people with that ability, (and *I* for one, claim to be an exception to that), the argument is not a "null statement". (Actually, there probably are a few people - insane, moronic, or otherwise mentally deficient - that partially lack the ability. They are not *my* standard for "human" - are they yours?) I misunderstood what you were claiming was an unfounded conclusion. I thought that you meant that you did not agree that the mind can consider all areas of human life. I conclude that you meant it is an unfounded conclusion that there is thus "no area that Objectivism could not benefit one in." I still disagree. Objectivism claims that rationality is the human means of survival for one's self - and so one should be rational. I did not mean to imply that one could not be rational in some areas without being an Objectivist - merely that if one were not rational in some area, Objectism would benefit one there. (Sorry if I appeared to be misquoting you - I quoted my own statement that I thought you had disagreed with, from the questions you posed about weeds and symphonies.) You ask "How can you quantify the amount of altruism in something?" which you apparently regard as essential to ranking political systems by altruism. It is not necessary to assign numbers in order to rank something - for example, one can line people up by height without first measuring them. The process involved is to first understand the quality that one is comparing the things upon, and to understand what constitutes greater or lesser amounts or degrees of the quality, and then apply SORT( set, comparision_function ). For altruism, you need to understand what it is, and what its opposite is. For altruism, one can either rank the systems upon the professed or practiced degree of altruism. (I suspect that they will be very similar, in any case.) It is true that theory is not practice - but they are certainly not un-connected. When one sees someone with a certain theory, acting in a certain manner, one should not automatically assume that that person is acting in a manner opposed to the theory! Some evidence is required. This is what I have stated twice now - the first time you mis-interpreted me, and when I rephrased it for you, you said is was merely "repeating myself". You will have to tell me what is so inobvious about the idea that there is a causal connection between one's philosophy and one's actions, and that this implies that bad actions *can* and *frequently do* mean a bad philosophy, rather than a "bad implementation". You claim that you can "point to literally dozens of cases where the Soviets ... violate the principles of altruism. Be my guest! Merely stating your ability neither proves that ability, nor does it show that the Soviet philosophy is not predominantly altruistic. I agree that you "vehemently denied that the Russians practice altruism". And I think you will also agree that I responded with a description of Soviet altruism in principle, which you have not yet agreed to. As to the Soviets practicing altruism - they demand that their people sacrifice to the state - *in practice* - their entire life - physically, mentally, emotionally. The state - *in practice* - provides jobs, food, practically everything, on the basis of need, for most people. I do not claim that the Soviets rationally or evenly apply altruism - but then, I see that as being impossible, since I view altruism as irrational, and impossible to practice fully and live. In the example of the boys, their joining ROTC has nothing to do with capitalism. They made a free choice, and I dont think that even you are claiming that *they* were victims of capitalism. You could easier make the case that the father was a victim of his boys irresponsible choice to join the ROTC. Suppose that the boys had not been killed. How would the old man be kept from dying? If the boys had or felt a responsibility to him, they should not have gone off to war without providing for him if they knew hed suffer. If they could not know, then neither they, nor capitalism should be blamed - the father was a "victim of circumstances". If they did not have or feel a responsibility to him, there is no difference between their being killed (in the sense of whether the old man suffers) and their simply choosing not to help him. How does this incriminate capitalism? You make (at best) a tenuous connection of responsibility by capitalism for the boys' deaths, and then a tenuous connection from their deaths to responsibility for the old man's dying. I am not convinced. You claim that I am morally reprehensible if I claim "that it takes an explicit agreement between father and sons in order for them to care about each other". First, this is not what I said, and I object to your implication that it is, and that I am therefore "morally reprehensible". I said that you "did not mention any agreement between them", and from the context, I think it is clear that the agreement would have been for them to provide for him in his old age - not to "care about each other". Secondly, even if I claimed what you implied I did, do not think it would be morally wrong - just strange - why would one need or want a contract for that? You claim that the man would be a "vulture, feeding off the corpses of his sons" if he insured them. So all those widows and orphans and widowers out there are vultures because they had the foresight or good fortune to have a loved one insured? You might claim that it is the *intention* to insure for one's benefit in case of another's death that is vulture like - in which case, when one buys insurance for one's self, is one intending one's loved ones to be vultures? I claim that you have used a false analogy. As to my being a ghoul because I might think clearly, and so, rationally decide that I should insure a loved one that intends to support me - I am in excellent company with millions of other people. You would apparently rather have us evade the thought that one we depend upon might die and leave us in a situation where one has to handle what two or more handled before (as with a family in which the mother dies). (As for insurance not being given for death in war - what about government payments to survivors? In effect, the govt acts as insurer.) You draw the analogy: Objectivism is to Christianity as a kick in the shins is to a kick in the kidneys. Support this please. You say "as an off- the-top-of-my-head example, lets take existentialism". Yes, lets. Huh? We stopped right there - we didnt seem to take it very far, did we? You ask for a "rationally selfish non-modern person". In the original context, I think you will see that I was talking of the possibility of writing a biography - and assumed that such would be about someone reasonably recent - IE *modern*. I did not have in mind the possibility that there might be a non-modern person who was rationally selfish. There probably were some - but I intended no claim in that regard. I will post another note describing how I conclude that "self-interest ... is the proper purpose" for action. I believe that I answered your 3rd unanswered question, above. Simply, rationality can help you in any area, and Objectivism supports rationality. I answered your 4th question, in both my orginal note, and above. Tom Craver houti!trc