trc@houti.UUCP (T.CRAVER) (08/12/83)
Response to Paul Torek on his "success": You claim to have focused our arguments on: "what Objectivism says about caring" I agree - and think that only an altruist would think that is the one of the most important facets of Objectivism. "why caring for others is impossible to ground on purely selfish reasons" I disagree - I agreed that caring for others being *caused* by one's reaction to them is valid. When you say "impossible to ground on selfish reasons", you seem to still be using "reason" in the sense of "objective". I do not agree with the statement "impossible to ground on selfish purposes". "the relation of valueds to valuables" If my (and the dictionaries') definition of altruism and selfishness is correct, it does indeed rule out the middle ground. I recently posted several notes pointing out the contradiction that arises, which will prevent a complete and self-consistent moral system from being created based upon both altruism and selfishness. The contradiction is that there will be cases where the two *require* mutually exclusive actions. In such a case, one must supply a general principle of choice, or the moral system is incomplete. If one says "flip a coin", one is saying "it is impossible to resolve this contradiction" - IE that the moral system is not self-consistent. If one always chooses one or the other of altruism/selfishness in cases of conflict, there is no difference between such a system and the pure system of the type one favors. If one makes a choice on some other basis, one is declaring that one's moral system is incomplete without that basis - and so it must be added. If the "completed" moral system, with the new basis added, is still a mixed system, other contradictions still exist, which requires that one start at the top of this argument again - in effect a recursive problem that can only end in either a purely altruistic system, a purely selfish system, or an incomplete/inconsistent system. Which is what I said in the first place. My statement of "purpose for caring" was both descriptive and normative. I think that all human actions are at some level based upon selfishness - and that furthermore, that is the right thing for them to be based openly upon. This is not to say that any action is moral because any action is based upon selfishness. An action can benefit one's self and still be immoral - as when it violates another's rights. Also, while one particular action may not be immoral of itself, if one is doing it on the wrong *assumed* basis (EG altruism), it is immoral because it is self-deceptive, and perhaps deceptive to others. It thus opens the door for other actions that are not moral - as altruism opens the door for government enforced altruism. In what way are *you* using "reason" in a normative sense? There seems to be no moral imperative that *requires* one to care about others in the idea that one cares about others because of one's reaction to them. You ask "why should I care about that description [of why one cares]". I ask - why must there be normative force involved in caring? That is your position, not mine. You claim that the fact that utilitarians are mistaken when "we think that we act for the benefit of others" implies that "there are no practicing utilitarians". No, if one defines "a utilitarian" as "one who believes that one should act for the summed benefit of others", there are plenty who *believe* they should have that purpose. Their mistake in no way negates the results of acting upon that mistaken purpose. You quote me as saying "*proper* purpose", and then imply that I am being ambiguous in my use of the word purpose. I disagree - when I say that self-benefit is the only real purpose, I am speaking descriptively. When I add the word *proper* in front of it, I am speaking normatively, and further, am talking about *claimed* purposes - since I believe that there is only one real purpose. Self-benefit is the proper purpose *exactly because it is the only real one*. You go on to say "one can do something simply because it is the best thing to do in the situation... best, full stop". Best on what basis? How do you judge if not in relation to *some* human being?! (This gets us back to the question of values without a valuer, which I see as impossible.) It is true that, in descriptive terms, all humans are selfish - but this says nothing about what explicit or implicit philosophy one holds - it merely describes an aspect of the metaphysical nature of humans. I am not "deciding what is in [your] interests" - I am claiming to *know* what, in general, is in your interest. You state "if you really care about someone's welfare, intrinsically and not just as a means to your own, then you fail to be a good Objectivist". This is correct - if you understand "intrinsically" to mean "with no outside support" - as with no supporting purpose of self-interest. However, who claimed (not me!) that one should *intrinsically* care about others? - This is just another way of restating your belief that one should care about others based on the purpose "they exist". It certainly does not make it "IMPOSSIBLE to care about another", as you claimed in your previous note. An analogy will not help make this clearer - it is already clear enough. In fact, I think it was clear that this is what you meant, several notes ago. I think the only thing that might still be unclear is your realization of the difference I am making between "purpose" and "reason". You make this lack of distinction apparent when you say: "There's another problem with the idea that one can care about others solely for the purpose of one's own benefit. If someone's welfare has some finite importance as far as you are concerned, ...you are willing to forgo...part of your own welfare, to promote theirs." There is nothing in conflict between having one's own benefit be one's purpose, and benefiting others. The question that must be asked is "Why, fundamentally (in purpose), do you want to benefit the other?" - and the answer can be that one values that person, and hence their well-being. But you imply that the above means that having someone else's benefit as one's *cause of action* is equivalent to having it as one's purpose. I think that this is a major flaw in your argument for the impossibility of self-purposed love. In the light of this flaw, I think you need a new argument against the morality or possibility of selfishness. In light of the change in my use of the word "reason", I am willing to agree that you did not mean the "emphatically" statement to be normative, and that "should have" made my words a mis-interpretation of your words, in that context. I think it also clear, however, that you are indeed "emphatically" sure that self-benefits should have nothing to do with your *purpose* (which is what I interpreted the word "reason" to mean at the time) in loving. And on that we still disagree. On the topic of values, I think you are misunderstanding my position. I am *not* saying that it is the *act of thinking something valuable* that makes it valuable. So, yes, food, air, etc are valuable - as should have been clear from my example of values to a plant, which cannot think. Values are not subjective, nor are they implicit in the thing alone - they are *objective* - that is, they arise from the interaction of humans and the nature of the thing. So I stand by the view of "no values without a valuer". You state that it is the summation of good of others that Utilitarians base their actions upon (in the context, average has a similar effect - IE of taking into consideration all effects, rather than just the effects on one person. Average is just scaled down relative to self-benefit.) This seems to be in contradiction with your statements in a previous notes that you are a utilitarian, and that you agreed with my statement that you meant "each other individual's needs deserve equal concern", rather than "concern for the sum of all other individuals' needs is equal to your own." I agree that your latest statement is more consistent with what I understand of utilitarianism, so I'll assume you prefer that - but you should clarify this if possible. You justify using summation by stating "there are no inherent and ethically significant differences between an agent himself and others". I am assuming that you mean *the sum of all others* (as would be implied by your use of summation good as the basis of moral action). There *are* significant differences, from each individual's point of view. A person lives only his own life, thinks only his own thoughts. He does not have to live with the consequences of others' actions for themselves, nor do they have to live with his. Every person's life is their own to live. A right to one's own life is implied by this (metaphysical) condition of independent life that is true of humans. This right gives rise to the right to freedom to support it, and hence to freedom to live it as is seen fit by oneself - though always within the constraint of not violating other's rights. This is the root of the inherent selfishness I have mentioned before, and this inherent selfish human nature is the basis for moral action. It is moral, or "right" because it is in accord with that which is *real*. Selfishness is equivalent to "motivated by what is truly in one's self- interest", and that true self-interest can be discovered by use of one's rationality, directed towards finding it, rather than towards finding that of others. This, in a capsule, is the argument for selfishness. Whether "many people" have been convinced or not is an open question - since most of those currently questioning me have apparently not seen my previous notes on the above basis for selfishness. --------------- I must object - you are now claiming that the claim for utilitarianism being based on living all lives is *my* argument. *You* were the one to supply that. You are, in fact, parodying your own statement. Further, the parody was not true, even if one assumes utilitarianism is already justified. (Perhaps your original is not true either - but then I never claimed it was - I merely showed you what *you* were saying, if it were true, and that it is not correct to equate Objectivism with solipsism.) So please - do not attribute your "bad arguments" to me. I have shown above that "who values" is not "irrelevant to [a thing's value" benefit. Again, there are no values without a valuer. As I have shown above, there is good reason to value benefits to one's self, as they are the proper purpose for action. Thus, if that is the "best support" for Utilitarianism, Utilitarianism is unsupportable. I agree that Utilitarianism does seem to accept that values start with individuals - what they seem to fail at is explaining why they do not end there as well. (These notes are getting too big!) Tom Craver houti!trc