dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/14/83)
Response to Tom Craver on purposes and causes for caring:
"what Objectivism says about caring" I agree - and think that only an
altruist would think that is the one of the most important facets of
Objectivism.
Why is it one of Objectivism's most important facets? Because that's where
it goes wrong.
"why caring for others is impossible to ground on purely selfish
reasons" I disagree - I agreed that caring for others being *caused* by
one's reaction to them is valid. When you say "impossible to ground on
selfish reasons", you seem to still be using "reason" in the sense of
"objective". I do not agree with the statement "impossible to ground
on selfish purposes".
Whoops -- you're right. I shouldn't have used "reasons", I should have used
"purposes", or perhaps "justifications". My apologies. Anyway, I have
another goof to make amends for:
In what way are *you* using "reason" in a normative sense? There seems
to be no moral imperative that *requires* one to care about others in
the idea that one cares about others because of one's reaction to them.
You ask "why should I care about that description [of why one cares]".
I ask - why must there be normative force involved in caring? That is
your position, not mine.
I was indeed using "reason" in a descriptive sense when I said that I love
others because of what kind of people they are. On the other hand, there
typically is some sense that the loved one deserves the love, so to that
extent love might carry normative force. As to why there must be normative
force involved in caring -- good question. Some of the things I've said
have come close to implying that one (thinks one) has some justification for
caring, whereas that's probably false in some cases. Is this what you're
driving at, and could you clarify what you mean by "normative force [being
or not being] involved"?
You claim that the fact that utilitarians are mistaken when "we think
that we act for the benefit of others" implies that "there are no
practicing utilitarians". No, if one defines "a utilitarian" as "one
who believes that one should act for the summed benefit of others",
there are plenty who *believe* they should have that purpose. Their
mistake in no way negates the results of acting upon that mistaken
purpose.
I don't think I'm quoting this out of context, so could you clarify the last
sentence here? Are you just saying that people who believe in that purpose
cause bad results through that belief (if so, how)? Or are you granting
that we utilitarians actually DO act from this purpose, rather than our own
benefits? If you don't grant this, it would seem that you're calling me a
hypocrite, insofar as I preach utilitarianism but practice (albeit badly)
selfishness. Is that (you think I'm a hypocrite) a fair statement?
You state "if you really care about someone's welfare, intrinsically
and not just as a means to your own, then you fail to be a good
Objectivist". This is correct - if you understand "intrinsically" to
mean "with no outside support" - as with no supporting purpose of
self-interest. However, who claimed (not me!) that one should
*intrinsically* care about others?
Yes, I meant intrinsically to mean "not based on ('supported by') self
interest." Wow! I didn't think you'd take this route. But first, let me
make sure that you deny that one should care about others non-derivatively
-- that is, not derived from the more fundamental object, aim, or intention
(your definition of "purpose") of one's own welfare. In other words, should
one care about others (their welfare) only as a means, and not as an end --
is this a fair statement of your view?
I think the only thing that might still be unclear is your realization
of the difference I am making between "purpose" and "reason". You make
this lack of distinction apparent when you say: "There's another
problem with the idea that one can care about others solely for the
purpose of one's own benefit. If someone's welfare has some finite
importance as far as you are concerned, ...you are willing to
forgo...part of your own welfare, to promote theirs." There is nothing
in conflict between having one's own benefit be one's purpose, and
benefiting others. The question that must be asked is "Why,
fundamentally (in purpose), do you want to benefit the other?" - and
the answer can be that one values that person, and hence their
well-being.
I agree that the big question is "why, fundamentally, do you want to benefit
the other?", which I think is equivalent (correct me here) to "what is your
fundamental purpose in trying to benefit the other?" However, I don't get
your answer -- what do you mean by "one values [the other] person"? Do you
mean that one thinks him to be valuable (if so, valuable for what, and
think on what grounds)?
Also, when you say that "There is nothing in conflict between [a selfish]
purpose, and benefiting others," are you denying my statement about
willingness to forgo part of your own welfare? Or are you denying that such
a willingness is incompatible with true selfishness? Or both? Perhaps I
still don't understand what you mean by "purpose".
But you imply that the above means that having someone else's benefit
as one's *cause of action* is equivalent to having it as one's purpose.
I think that this is a major flaw in your argument for the
impossibility of self-purposed love.
I don't know what "the above" refers to. I don't think I implied that; if I
did, I was wrong.
I think it also clear, however, that you are indeed "emphatically" sure
that self-benefits should have nothing to do with your *purpose* (which
is what I interpreted the word "reason" to mean at the time) in loving.
And on that we still disagree.
I'm not sure that I agree with your wording of my position. Does one really
HAVE a purpose in loving? In addition to my possible fogginess on
"purpose", I don't know if you mean by "loving" the acts or the
disposition/emotion. I suggest that we both avoid the ambiguous word
"reason" from now on, in favor of "cause", or "object, aim, intention", or
"justification", as appropriate. If you insist on using the word, I suggest
that we stick to your definition: reason=cause.
--Paul Torek, U of MD College Park