dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/15/83)
Before I reply to Tom Craver on values and morals, I think that I should
introduce the distinction between axiology and moral theory. I use these as
technical terms; they are not necessarily used here in the same way as they
are used in common English. You have been warned.
Axiology is the study of what is valuable -- what is good and what is bad.
Moral theory is about how one should act in promoting what is valuable,
especially with regard to how valuables should be distributed. These fields
are distinct; however, certain answers to the questions of one field may
imply answers to questions of the other. For example, suppose someone (call
her "the Collectivist") says that only the advance of civilization (a whole
which is alleged to be greater than the sum of its parts) is valuable. Her
axiological position implies a moral position that all valuables (there is
only one, according to her, but we can still say "all") should be
distributed to "civilization."
For a better understanding of the axiology-morality distinction, see E.J.
Bond, *Reason and Value*, 1983. (I agree almost entirely with that book.)
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Here is Tom Craver on valueds vs. valuables:
On the topic of values, I think you are misunderstanding my position.
I am *not* saying that it is the *act of thinking something valuable*
that makes it valuable. So, yes, food, air, etc are valuable - as
should have been clear from my example of values to a plant, which
cannot think. Values are not subjective, nor are they implicit in the
thing alone - they are *objective* - that is, they arise from the
interaction of humans and the nature of the thing. So I stand by the
view of "no values without a valuer".
I'm not sure it's fair of me to ask, but please be more specific about
"interaction of humans and the nature of the thing."
Do you really stand by "no values without a valuer" as *I* defined "valuer"
-- as "one who thinks something to be valuable"? Recall that I defined the
verb "to value" as "to think to be valuable", from which the above
definition of "valuer" follows obviously. If you do stand by this statement
(as interpreted), how can you speak of "values to a plant, which cannot
think"?
In my opinion, only the experiences of sentient beings have intrinsic value.
Since experiences are internal to human beings, it is hard to see how their
value "arises from the interaction" of the experience and the human. Even
if you disagree that *only* experiences have intrinsic value, I think you'll
agree that they are *among* the things which have it -- in which case you
seem to face this problem. But perhaps I am taking "interaction" too
literally, and you meant it more loosely.
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Tom Craver on needs, in an absolute sense:
I disagree that needs are "imaginary" in an absolute sense - though it
is true that needs are based upon acceptance of something that they are
needed for. The reason to continue living is that nothing else can be
valued, done, etc without life. Living can be fun, and pleasurable.
Life is (normally) its own reward. Can you say the same for being
"petty, oversensitive, and unobservant"?
If you agree that all needs are only valid in relation to something they are
needed for, then you agree that no needs are absolute in my sense. Perhaps
you are pointing out that if something is rational to pursue, then whatever
is needed for it is also rational to pursue. However, when "need" is used
in an absolute sense, it means more than "something which it is rational to
pursue". The idea of "needs" is contrasted to "luxuries", and these are
supposed to be fundamentally different. But there is no difference in kind
to be found here, or so I maintain.
When you say "living can be fun", you are appealing to experiences, not to
the fact that "nothing can be valued, done, etc without life [i.e., life is
needed for these things]." But if it is the experiences which are valuable,
why talk about "needs" (and thereby mislead everyone) at all? Why not tell
your audience, "go directly for good experiences"? And why put rationality
on a pedestal when it is simply one tool among others for getting good
experiences?
It might be true that pettiness, etc are fundamental qualities of a
jerk - but as I suggested above - is being a jerk its own reward? Is
being a jerk more basic than being a human being?
Is being a jerk *less* basic than being a human being? NO, and that fact is
fatal to your argument. Is being rational its own reward? No, good
experiences are the reward. Is life its own reward? In a way you could say
that, since experiences are so closely connected to our concept of "life".
But it is more precise to say that enjoyment is its own reward, and is the
reward to life (in most cases -- you admit that life isn't always a reward).
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The reason that we are not "free" to do anything we please, is that we,
as humans, can only claim certain rights *because* we are human. To
deny those same rights to any other human is to deny ourselves those
rights. ...It is in one's best interest to take the risk of dying
rather than violate someone else's right to life. Such an act in
effect declares "I am not human", since that right and the obligation
(not duty) to respect it arises from being human.
Why should a selfish person care about having rights (as opposed to being
treated *as if* she had rights)? Why does murdering stop me from being human
(or is it from *thinking* that I am human?)? You will have to explain to me
how you think a right to life is implied by the "(metaphysical) condition of
independent life that is true of humans."
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In order to "appropriate" something, you have to do more than stick a
flag in it and yell "MINE!". You have to use it, prepare it for use,
or otherwise *take* ownership "from" nature.
Now wait a minute: I'm supposed to use by (miniscule) powers of reason to
determine who has obtained a property right to what, right? But how do I
decide how much use or preparation is sufficient? Suppose I'm stranded with
a bunch of others on a desert island, and I discover that one guy has
dragged all the useful wood to one corner of the island. He claims to have
a property right to the wood, based on this dragging. Now I'm sure you can
imagine variations on this case in which dragging the wood constitutes a)
0.1% of the effort required to build something, b) 5% of the effort, c) 50%.
How much is enough? If you say 0.1% is enough, what about if he just
measured the wood (out loud, so everyone can hear)?
There's an even worse problem. Just what are the boundaries of the
"something" which I appropriate? If divert the course of a stream, do I
earn the property right to the flow of water which it provides? Can I say
to someone who lives upstream, "you're violating my rights by using too much
of *my* water for irrigating your farm"? Can I demand that he not pollute
the water in the stream? Even if he only pollutes it with toothpaste that
goes down the drain every morning? (Suppose he uses his other "wastes" for
fertilizer, and they don't enter the stream.) Or suppose I plow a field
once, and then leave it. How long does it have to be before my property
right to the field expires, and others can use it? Do I only own the
topsoil, or do I get mineral rights too? If a mining company digs under my
land and causes subsidence, can I complain?
Well, I hope all these questions don't leave you undaunted.
--Paul Torek, U of MD College Park