dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/15/83)
Response to Alan Wexelblat (almost the last, I hope) on Kant: You state that Kant's universality principle "is irrelevant. Specifically, it allows on to construct maxims which may pass the ... test, yet still not be useful." I agree that maxims which are pretty bad, or which are inconsistent with other maxims that pass the test, can pass the test. However, I've never read the side that claims otherwise (Onora Nell, in the book Acting on Principle, (I'm not sure I've got the exact title or name), supposedly claims otherwise). Also, W. Michael Hoffman apparently agrees that Kant's CI, 1st formulation, does not determine for us what maxim to use; but Hoffman denies that this condemns it. I guess the idea is that it at least rules some maxims out. Admittedly, my maxim for "operation rescue" is no help when other things are not equal, but I don't know if Kant would accept the idea of one person being (even "slightly") more important than another. So I can't say anything interesting about your criticism of Kant on this point. "Just look what would happen if everyone followed your maxim (spend all my money on education NOW, so ... earn more ... LATER)!" If you take into account my complete maxim, however, you will find that I am getting educated now partly because I am young enough to make this worth it, partly because I have not already been educated for what I would consider plenty long enough, ... In short, there are a lot of factors that figure into my decisions about what to do. Now, if you analyze a philosophical type like me you will find a coherent set of maxims based on one root like "maximize the welfare of all sentient beings" or "realize my true self; authenticity" or something like that. If you analyze an unphilosophical type, you will find a hodgepodge of root maxims or motives. I think, though I'm not sure, that it is these root maxims to which the test is supposed to be applied. You state that Kant does not prove that morality should be based solely on rational maxims. I'm inclined to deny that it needs to be proved; although my understanding of "rational" in this context is probably different from Kant's, and possibly from yours. Anyhow, for a brilliant (it agrees with me) article on normativity and rationality, see Chin-Tai Kim, "Norms and Freedom," *Philosophical Topics*, a recent (1982 or 83) issue. Kim criticizes Existentialism, by the way, at just the point I would. I've got the article at home; if you'd like, I can quote it at you next time. --Paul Torek, U of MD College Park