trc@houti.UUCP (T.CRAVER) (08/17/83)
Response to Paul Torek: {"It's imposible"}
You state that "Thomas says that a consistent egoist is willing to exploit
others -- which is true, but which Tom Craver won't accept." I object
to your phrasing - this is equivalent to saying that I refuse to accept
something that *is* true. Rather, I deny its truth. Quite a difference!
As to your car-vs-operation example: I still say that, if the man loves
his wife, in any real sense of the word "love" (or at least in the egoist's
sense of love, which is what we are discussing), he will benefit more from
a reduction in pain in his wife, than he will from a car. On the other
hand, if your modified statement of "mild" pain is taken (maybe the wife
has minor arthritis that would be very expensive to cure and that a couple
of aspirin relieves), and that the man would indeed be truly better benefited
by the car, then I would say - sure, go ahead and get the car. In fact,
one could even argue that if the wife would be happiest if the husband got
the car, that even a utilitarian would want him to get the car rather than
pay for the operation! My point here is that in your attempt to make this
case "fit" your argument, you have to keep moving it closer and closer to
the dividing line between the condition of more benefit to the wife, and
more benefit to the husband. I claim that, in the process, you make it
essentially arbitrary under your own principles, without showing anything
immoral about egoism.
I dont think I have "mistaken desires for long-term happiness". In fact,
I am assuming that the man involved was acting rationally, and so could
determine what is in his long-term best interest. (And as to my jumping
to the conclusion that a man who loves a car more than his wife doesnt
love his wife very much, I'll gladly leave that to the readers. This
is not to condemn him - he may have no cause to love her.)
In your example of hurting your feet, you claim that - if you could make
the choice (which seems impossible) and knowing how much pain would be caused
- it would be in one's self-interest to choose to hurt the other, rather than
oneself. I say "maybe". If one *really* had way to avoid one being hurt,
(which makes it a "lifeboat" situation) then it might be rational to try to
avoid one's own pain. Note that under utilitarianism, it should make
absolutely no difference *who* experiences this pain - so I think you are
not advancing your own position with this example, either. On the other hand,
a selfish person might choose to suffer the pain, rather than have a loved
one be so hurt - though, from the description of the pain, I would expect
that it would have to be a very close someone. (A better example would be a
father choosing torture, rather than allow a beloved child to be tortured.
He would not feel the same desire to experience torture if it were a total
stranger.)
On the topic of "purpose", I have made a distinction of "purpose". As I
have been using it, I have generally meant "selfishness, the only rational
purpose". When one starts to consider people who claim not to act from
selfishness, one has to distinguish between *actual* and *declared* purpose.
(I used "real" and "claimed" before.) However, you seemed to ignore the
meaning of this! Your statement that "I claim not to be selfish" is a
*declared* purpose - and I claim that you are wrong, since when one declares
a purpose, one means that that is one's actual purpose. Similarly, when you
state "if it were true that the only real purpose is self-benefit, it would
not follow that it is the proper one. We all could have wrong (immoral)
purposes". (I interpret your last few words to mean that the "self-benefit"
would be the "wrong (immoral) purpose" you mean - otherwise, it would be
stating what *I* am claiming about *declared* purposes.) I must disagree -
if there is only one *actual* purpose, it is, implicitly, the correct one for
one to *declare* as one's purpose. As to whether I am correct about the only
*actual* purpose, I think I have provided sufficient evidence before for this
being a valid purpose. I *will* modify my statement to "the only actual
purpose I know of". Can you provide another?
As to "intrinsic value" without relation to a human valuer - I will merely
point out that your example - "pleasure" - is scarcely divorced from the
human that experiences it! Hence, that human is the direct valuer of the
pleasure. Another could experience a derivative pleasure at seeing the
pleasure of one that they value for some other reason, and they would value
the derivative pleasure, and hence the original pleasure. I think my
arguments opposing "intrinsic value" still stand.
Tom Craver
houti!trc