[net.philosophy] The lack of universal values: a reply to Paul Torek

wex@ittvax.UUCP (Alan Wexelblat) (08/16/83)

Here's a switch:  I want to disagree with Paul Torek on one of his
latest points, thereby agreeing with Tom Craver.

	From Paul:
	...I maintain that some things (e.g., pleasure) 
	are valuable per se; one need not consider the 
	"relation" of pleasure "to some human" -- if 
	there is such a relation -- to see that it is 
	good.  Pleasure is good because of the nature 
	of the experience alone.

Well, not really.  Think this though:  pleasure is either an abstract 
concept, or it is something concrete.  If pleasure is an abstract concept,
then you may define it as "that which is valuable to humans," or some other
circular definition.  But then what will you say about ascetics who 
deliberately deny themselves pleasure?  Obviously they do not value it.

Similar problems will arise if you try to relate "pleasure" to something more
concrete.  Obviously we do not want to identify 'pleasure' with 
that-which-causes-pleasure, since the latter varies wildly from individual 
to individual.  So let us define 'pleasure' as some brain state.  Now we
can say that people who desire 'pleasure' desire to be in some brain state.

But this leads to three separate problems:
	1) The ascetics, again.
	2) How can you say that a brain state is "intrinsically valuable"
	   when that brain state probably varies from person to person?
	   And what of non-human sentients?  Should a human brain-state
	   be of any intrinsic value to them, especially if their brains
	   are different from ours?
	3) Let us assume that we know that if we electrically stimulate
	   certain portions of the brain, the "pleasure state" will 
	   occur, regardless of other stimuli.  Would you then wish to
	   be hooked up to a mchine that simply supplied the appropriate
	   current?  How long would you like to be there?  Do you think
	   that your answers to these questions will be the same as 
	   anyone else's answers?

--Alan Wexelblat
decvax!ittvax!wex

larry@grkermit.UUCP (Larry Kolodney) (08/17/83)

"But then what will you say about ascetics who 
deliberately deny themselves pleasure?  Obviously they do not value it."

Ascetics, like hunger strikers, are denying themselves pleasure for
something they value higher than it.  That doesn't mean they don't
value it at all.  The whole point of Asceticism is that you are denying
yourself something which you crave.-- 
Larry Kolodney 
{linus decvax}!genrad!grkermit!larry
(ARPA)  rms.g.lkk@mit-ai