[net.philosophy] Tom Craver vs Plato

wex@ittvax.UUCP (Alan Wexelblat) (08/18/83)

Since Tom and Paul have drifted away from selfishness/atruism, and
into the nature of humans, I feel compelled to ass my two sense again:

	From Tom Craver:
	You say I am using "proof by definition" in regard to 
	the nature and definition of humans as rational, and 
	imply that this is somehow a flaw in my argument.  In 
	fact, I say that it is *obvious* that humans have the 
	rational capability - your being able to read and 
	(frequently) understand what I write is evidence of that.  
	
Not at all.  My abilities to read, understand, and reply to your articles are
indicative merely of a comprehension of the rules of English, and some
knowledge of the subject matter (plus a little typing skills).  My 
understanding may be aided by rationality, but it is in no way dependent
upon it.

	So, it is perfectly valid to make up a name for the 
	class of creatures that is capable of that, and call 
	them "human".  The word "human" can be used because 
	the class of creatures my definition refers to is almost
	exactly that which is commonly refered to as "human".  
	
That is a non sequitor.  If you wish, you may define a class of creatures
(call them t-humans) which are defined exclusively by their ability to be
rational.  You may say that rationality is not only necessary, but 
sufficient for membership in the group t-humans.  However, that does not
stop me from defining a group (call them a-humans) which are defined by
their ability to learn and use rules of phrase-structure grammars (what we
call "natural language").  I think that my definition of a-humans is *EXACTLY* 
that which is commonly referred to as "human."  That does not mean that I 
have proven anything about humans.

	Because it is so obvious, I think that it will be 
	rather difficult for either you or Alan to prove 
	that that which is normally called "human" does
	not have the rational capability, (which I refer 
	to as "rationality").

See my previous submission on rationality.

	If it was rational (with full information of the 
	risks involved) to make an agreement at one time, 
	it is still in one's self interest to keep the 
	agreement, even should some of the dangers involved 
	become concrete.  
	
Interestingly enough, Plato took up just this issue:  his example involved
two men (call them A and B).  At one time, A loans his only sword to B.
B promises to return it whenever A asks for it.  B has known A for a long
time, and makes this promise with full information.  Time passes.  One night,
A appears at B's house, and asks for the sword back.  B sees that A is 
obviously angry, and asks why the sword is needed.  A replies that he has 
found his wife in another man's bed, and wishes to avenge his honor.  Through
careful questioning, B learns that A intends to murder his wife and her lover
while they are in bed together.  Plato argues that the *rational* thing to do
is to NOT give the sword to A.  Tom, why do you hold the opposite position?

Be careful, Tom!  If you say that you agree with Plato, then you are (in
effect) saying that the selfish thing to do is the irrational thing!

(To wit: keeping the sword would (poosibly) prevent A from doing murder, but
it would get him mad at you, which hurts your self interest.  Giving him
the sword will keep your word (which you have said is the selfish thing to do),
and it will not harm you in any way.  So it is in your best interests to give
him the sword.  But that is irrational, as Plato would have it.)

--Alan Wexelblat
decvax!ittvax!wex

davidson@eosp1.UUCP (08/19/83)

Plato and the Sword:

The reasoning behind this analogy is as follows; when I borrow a sword
from my friend Damocles, he is giving me a tool for some possible uses
(given that I am sane at the time).  When I return the same object to him,
when he is insane, it is NOT the same thing.

A similar analogy would be my friend Benje who threw a bucket of water over
my head when I was on fire, thus saving my life.  If he were drowning,
and I returned the same object to him, a bucket of water, I would not be
returning his favor.  

--Greg Davidson (taken from a Political Theory seminar at Swarthmore College)
Also leaving EOS forever in about 5 hours, so I'm sorry but I won't be here
to hear this out.