[net.philosophy] The fact of universal values: a reply to Alan Wexelblat

dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/21/83)

I just knew Alan Wexelblat would object.  What do you expect from an
Existentialist sympathizer [:-)].  As a beginning:  pleasure is concrete.

"Let us define 'pleasure' as some brain state."  Let us not.  Pleasure is
first and foremost a type of experience, and IF mental states like having a
certain type of experience are identical to brain states, THEN...  But in
that case (i.e. the case that 'materialism' is true), being in "some" brain
state is harder to deride.  IF mental states are identical to brain states
(you seem to assume this, and I happen to agree, but why drag brain states
in?), then all we need to do is remember that "such-and-such brain state"
can be equally be described as "so-and-so experience".

	As far as I know, asceticism (little a) is a philosophy that denies
	that "pleasure" is of any value whatsoever. 

And in that case my answer to "the ascetics, again" is:  they're making a
mistake.  Hopefully, they promote good experiences which they don't describe
as "pleasure" (e.g., some people distinguish between "pleasure" and "joy").

	2) How can you say that a brain state is "intrinsically valuable"
	   when that brain state probably varies from person to person?
	   And what of non-human sentients?  Should a human brain-state
	   be of any intrinsic value to them, especially if their brains
	   are different from ours?

But the variety of brain states are, supposedly, alternative correspondents
to the same experience!  Differences in brain states are beside the point if
the experiences are the same.

	3) Let us assume that we know that if we electrically stimulate
	   certain portions of the brain, the "pleasure state" will 
	   occur, regardless of other stimuli.  Would you then wish to
	   be hooked up to a machine that simply supplied the appropriate
	   current?  How long would you like to be there?  Do you think
	   that your answers to these questions will be the same as 
	   anyone else's answers?

The answers to your three (sub)questions, in three sentences, respectively:
Yes, if the machine is inexpensive enough and does not interfere too greatly
with my activities.  Until I die.  No, but -- I want you to understand this
-- I DON'T CARE!!! -- talk about totally beside the point ...

--Paul Torek, U of MD College Park