[net.philosophy] Subjective pleasure defended; a reply to Paul Torek

wex@ittvax.UUCP (Alan Wexelblat) (08/23/83)

Paul, I must confess to confusion over your article on pleasure.  You make the
bald statement that pleasure is concrete, but do not go on to support it.
Also, your counter to my posistion seems to have contradictions in it:

	"Let us define 'pleasure' as some brain state."  Let us not.  
	
But you go on to say (see below) that you agree that mental states are brain
states.  So why this objection?

	Pleasure is first and foremost a type of experience, and IF 
	mental states like having a certain type of experience are 
	identical to brain states, THEN...  But in that case (i.e. 
	the case that 'materialism' is true), being in "some" brain
	state is harder to deride. 
	
Who's deriding it?  I merely wanted to clarify what I was speaking of, so that 
we could avoid definitional confusion over the word "pleasure" which is a 
somewhat vague word.

	IF mental states are identical to brain states (you seem to 
	assume this, and I happen to agree, but why drag brain states
	in?), then all we need to do is remember that "such-and-such 
	brain state" can be equally be described as "so-and-so experience".

Here is the contradiction I spoke of.  To be quite honest, I used 'brain
states' because that is the terminology I was taught to use in phil classes.
Do you use a different terminology?

	... my answer to "the ascetics, again" is:  they're making a
	mistake.  
	
Why?  I know your position, but can you support it?

	Hopefully, they promote good experiences which they don't 
	describe as "pleasure" (e.g., some people distinguish 
	between "pleasure" and "joy").

Why should they do this?  As a matter of fact, the people to whom I refer
tend to promote intellectual achievement (learning).  However, they admit
that their choice of desire is just as arbitrary as your choice of pleasure.
You just seem to deny the arbitrariness of your choice.

	(A question I posed:)
	2) How can you say that a brain state is "intrinsically valuable"
	   when that brain state probably varies from person to person?
	(Paul's answer:)
	But the variety of brain states are, supposedly, alternative 
	correspondents to the same experience!  Differences in brain 
	states are beside the point if the experiences are the same.

Now you're trying to tell me that I experience the same thing you do when
we both see a painting, hear a symphony, eat chocolate ice cream?  I think
that this statement is false on the face of it.  If nothing else, the 
differences in our eyes, ears, and mouths will transmit different sets of 
signals to our brain!

There's also the second half of the question remaining:
	   And what of non-human sentients?  Should a human brain-state
	   be of any intrinsic value to them, especially if their brains
	   are different from ours?

	(Another question of mine, this one in three parts)
	3) Let us assume that we know that if we electrically stimulate
	   certain portions of the brain, the "pleasure state" will 
	   occur, regardless of other stimuli.  Would you then wish to
	   be hooked up to a machine that simply supplied the appropriate
	   current?  How long would you like to be there?  Do you think
	   that your answers to these questions will be the same as 
	   anyone else's answers?

	Paul's answers:
	The answers to your three (sub)questions, in three sentences, 
	respectively: Yes, if the machine is inexpensive enough and 
	does not interfere too greatly with my activities.  Until I 
	die.  No, but -- I want you to understand this -- I DON'T 
	CARE!!! -- talk about totally beside the point ...

Now Paul claims that he would like to be hooked up to the machine "if ... [it]
doesn't interfere too greatly with my activities."  But why this caveat, Paul?
Why should you engage in ANY activities?  Isn't the great universal pleasure
(which you have said that we should all seek) being provided for you?  What
purpose would these other activities have?

Lastly, and most importantly, Paul admits that his answers WOULD NOT BE THE
SAME AS ALL OTHER PEOPLE'S ANSWERS.  But, Paul, if pleasure is so universal,
why would anyone disagree with you?  This is entirely TO the point:  your
pleasure is yours and yours alone.  Any attempt to define a universal 
pleasure will lead to a similar reductio ad absurdum.

--Alan Wexelblat
decvax!ittvax!wex