dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/25/83)
At the request of Tom Craver for a reality-basis for the idea that it is
moral to have the purpose of benefiting others [I would add: among other
purposes], I will attempt to provide at least two (maybe more -- it depends
"how you cut it"). These arguments are addressed to everyone, so if you
disagree with the thesis: prepare to attack!
First, I attempt to suggest why it is correct to have benefitting others as
one of one's fundamental purposes (goals). My own position is more specific
than this; the first argument supports what I have been calling "the middle
ground" between True Altruism and selfishness, but not any specific position
within the middle ground. Second, I argue for a stronger thesis: that
there is no ethically significant difference "in principle" between one's
own welfare and that of others. A difference "in principle" means one that
is necessarily implied by the very distinction between self and others.
These two arguments do not necessarily stand or fall together; one might be
correct and the other incorrect.
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One conclusive reason to believe something is that the alternative(s) imply
a contradiction, or that all the ones which do not are unacceptable on other
grounds. Similarly, one conclusive reason not to take something as one's
only fundamental purpose is that to do so would be self-defeating. Let us
call any set of fundamental purposes a "policy". If Policy B would promote
the purposes of Policy A better than A would, but not vice-versa, then
Policy B is superior to A. (Students of game theory will notice the
similarity of this type of superiority to "dominance" in game theory.)
For example, I believe that True Altruism is a policy which is
self-defeating in that one who has *some* small amount of self-regard could
do better at making others happy than could a True Altruist. To offer the
reasons for this would be a digression; I hope the reader can think of some
(Tom Craver could probably offer some, since he frequently makes claims to
the effect that True Altruists mess up others' lives). Note that it is not
valid for the True Altruist to complain to me, "Your very line of argument
assumes -- probably since you unconsciously realize how reasonable it is --
that one should try to make others as happy as possible." My argument
assumes no such thing; it is the True Altruist who makes that assumption --
I merely use it against her.
Selfishness is a self-defeating policy in the same way -- a policy which
allows *some* fundamental purpose(s) of benefitting others is superior to it,
in the way that Policy B was superior to Policy A. Briefly, the reason is
that 1) love and friendship are important sources of personal benefit -- not
merely by others loving oneself but also vice-versa; and 2) egoism (the
policy of selfishness) is not compatible with these. I take it that 1) is
not in dispute; and I have argued for 2) before. See also below.
Of course, selfishness is not the ONLY alternative to having (among others)
the purpose of benefitting others. However, the other alternatives would
have to deny that anyone's welfare (regardless of whether that welfare is
defined hedonistically (this parenthetical remark with Alan Wexelblat in
mind)) has any importance. I will assume until proven otherwise that none
of my readers hold such a view.
I have already cited one article in defense of 1) & 2) above; however,
Michael Stocker offers a fuller defense of 2) in "The Schizophrenia of
Modern Ethical Theories," *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 73, #14 (August
12 1976): 453-467. He explains better than I have, the conceptual
impossibility of egoists loving, so allow me to quote him below:
...it is essential to the very concept of love that one care for the
beloved, that one be prepared to act for the sake of the beloved. More
strongly, one must care for the beloved and act for that person's sake
as a final goal; the beloved, or the beloved's welfare or interest,
must be a final goal of one's concern and action.
To the extent that my consideration for you -- or even my trying to
make you happy -- comes from my desire to lead an untroubled life, a
life that is personally pleasing for me, I do not act for your sake.
In short, to the extent that I act in various ways with the final goal
of getting pleasure -- or, more generally, good -- for myself, I do not
act for your sake.
Of course -- to phrase this in terms which have been suggested for clarity
-- an egoist's *cause* of action might be different from his *purpose* in
acting. E.g., while the welfare of a loved one *causes* his actions, the
egoist does not take it as his fundamental *purpose*. Stocker complains
that this makes it impossible for egoists to "embody their reason [their
justification, or reasoning] in their motive [cause or "spring" of action]."
Also, although
...there may be nothing inconsistent in egoists' adopting a policy
that will allow them to forget, as it were, that they are egoists, a
policy that will allow them ... to develop such final goals and motives
as caring for another for that person's own sake. Indeed, as has often
been argued, the wise egoist would do just this.
Several questions should be asked of this response: would the
transformed person still be an egoist? Is it important, for the
defense of egoism, that the person remain an egoist? Or is it
important only that the person live in a way that would be approved of
by an egoist? ...This raises the question of whether such people will
be able to check up and see how their transformed selves are getting on
in achieving egoistically approved goals. Will they have a mental alarm
clock which wakes them up from their nonegoistical transforms every once
in a while, to allow them to reshape these transforms ...? I suppose
that this would not be impossible. But it hardly seems an ideal, or
even very satisfactory, life. It is bad enough to have a private
personality, which you must hide from others; but imagine having a
personality that you must hide from (the other parts of) yourself...
I think that such a mental alarm clock, if possible at all, would be a
source of problems (internal conflicts). The situation described in the
last sentence quoted is indeed well described as schizophrenic. But is such
a policy of intermittent forgetfulness necessary for separating purpose from
cause? I think so. There is a dispositional clash between the tendency to
promote only one's own welfare and the tendency to promote that of another.
When emotions or dispositions like love and friendship are confronted with
reasoning (thought) which is at bottom wholly self-regarding, they will be
slowly eaten away by that mental attitude. Reason and emotion cannot be
totally separated (and *should* not be mostly separated); reason affects
emotion.
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Well, this article is already too long, so the second argument will have to
wait. But for those who may read what I cite: see "Splitting Self-Concern"
by Michael B. Green, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 62 (1981) 213-226.
--Paul Torek, U of MD College Park