trc@houti.UUCP (08/25/83)
Response to Paul Torek: {Objectivist morality; impossibility}
No, I did not say, and in fact, gave a specific example denying,
that one should never make an agreement when the risks are high.
Thus, I wont bother with your cave-men example.
You state that "third party enforcement ... is not always available,
and almost never for free". I gave the "third party enforcement"
only as a secondary example of how satisfying agreements can be made
ensured to be self-interested. So what if it is not free? And
contract enforcement is often handled by the government, so there
is commonly a source of enforcement available.
I have already provided you with the basis for rights, several times
now, as well as the basis for normativity. You ask why one would
rather have rights than be treated as if one has rights. First, why
would one be treated that way, if one did not have rights? Second,
if one does not have rights, then one cannot object if those non-
existent rights are to be violated - "So what if we kill you? You
have no right to life!" "Yes, you are correct, I dont - there is no
reason you should not go ahead and kill me." That is the reason for
*wanting* recognized rights, and says nothing about the actual existence
of those rights. The distinction is that, whether a man has rights
or not, if he denies them, he is unable to claim them.
I've already discussed the "value as thought-to-be-of-value", and I reject
that that is the basis for value. That is a *perceived* (subjective) value.
A *real* value is one that objectively benefits one. And neither could
exist without a valuer. I agree that "valuing another person as an end in
herself can only get started by leaving the self-centered viewpoint" - if
by that you mean "self-purposed viewpoint". Now tell me how you can do
that without having your brain wiped, and that other person's mind somehow
impressed upon your brain. And even then, could you really claim it was
"you" that was doing the valuing? Of course, I see no real reason to value
someone else *intrinsically*. There is no need for it, and no basis for it.
You say that I "try to escape the point" on the car-vs-operation example.
Oh really? Who is it that has changed that example every time I try to
get them to the point? Now you are changing back to "moderate pain".
So you believe that a man can be loving his wife fully, but not care
that she is in pain? That in fact the relationship will not be affected
by her knowledge that she is in pain, while he is riding around having
a good old time in his new car? I will make it quite clear this time, I
hope: YES - if the man does not benefit more from the operation than
from buying the new car, he should buy the new car. NO - I do not believe
that the man can say he loves his wife very much if he values a new car
above his wife. His knowledge of her pain, vs his knowledge of having
removed that pain from her, is sufficient pain or pleasure to motivate
his choice, if he really loves her. He may evade that knowledge, but
he cannot totally do so - he must continually choose to evade it, and
suppress any evidence he sees of her pain. Why would someone who loves
another do that? (For clarity, to others reading this, I am not meaning
only *material* benefits. The pleasure of the car vs the pleasure of a
healed wife are the important benefits here.)
I have already given my answer to your question on "Adam's foot".
Nothing you have added changes that answer. If you like Adam enough
that you wish to keep him from feeling twice as much pain as you would
feel in making him avoid it, you should take the pain.
In the case of "losing your life for a loved one" - such cases are usually
not given lengthy consideration at the time - one has already decided how
much one values a given other. One will rarely sit down and say "Well, I
would be willing to die for Jane, but only to lose a leg for Dan..."
One acts upon one's *implicit* value judgement - "Jane is drowning - I'll
jump in after her!" or "My Gosh - Dan's drowning - but if I jump in I might
drown - I'll stay on shore and try to help!" The value one has already
assigned to that other determines how one will act in such a situation.
If you wish to change the situation to one where lengthy deliberation is
possible, I still believe that a person who really loves another passionately
can decide that life it not worth living without that other. Only if that
person decides that he does love the other more than life, and then fails
to risk his life for that other, should he call himself a coward.
You are still clutching at life-boat cases - do you really want to stand by
the implication that the principle of altruism can only be supported by
such cases? How often do you find yourself "in the lifeboat"? Even if
it fitted in those cases, why would it fit in normal, everyday life? The
implication is that there are no actions of moral consequence in normal life.
I say that one values another because of the pleasure one gets, you say that
one gets pleasure because one values the other. While it is true that one
does get pleasure by valuing the other, why does one value the other? That
is what I was getting at - that the benefits to one's self is the basis
for valuing the other. I think it is obvious that one's own benefit can
be one's purpose. Why is someone else's benefit a purpose for oneself?
Tom Craver
houti!trc