trc@houti.UUCP (T.CRAVER) (08/24/83)
Response to Paul Torek: Altruism is a moral system that holds the ideal principle for human action to be exclusively the benefit of others, with no mixing of concern for self. On the "spectrum of moral systems of concerned purposes for action", this lies at one end, and selfishness at the other. The intermediate systems *can* be said to be a mix of the *principles* of altruism and selfishness. On what *basis* can we declare any intermediate "mixed principles" systems to be better than the good principle of the two that make it up? Note that I am not yet attacking the idea that there can be such a basis - I am merely pointing out that you need to provide that basis. In light of the fact that I believe selfishness to be a valid purpose, I will not demand that you make that side of the argument. Rather, I am asking you to supply some justification for the principle of benefit to others being a valid purpose (whether *equally* valid, or not). Note that I am asking for a *purpose*, not a cause, motivation, etc. And even if one doesnt assign good or bad, the contradictions between the two principles that arise in intermediate systems have to be resolved somehow. How? I claim that actual purposes can only be based upon *actual values* to ones' self. Note that I am not saying one cannot "value someone else benefitting", but rather one cannot "hold someone else's value". The former can be done by valuing one's pleasure at a loved one's benefiting, for example. The latter simply means that you do not experience the other's benefits, and so cannot *directly* value them, only indirectly, through one's own benefit that arises because of their benefit. Have I made the distinction clear yet? This is important, because it is a distinction I think you have not noticed me making. As to proof by definition - I do not claim to prove humans have rationality. I claim that that is obvious. I claim that I define, on the basis fo that reality, the term "human" to include "rationality". I have sent a note already showing that "jerks" may be a valid definition, but it requires the more fundamental definition "human". I agree that applying labels does not tell one what to do - but that was not what the discussion was about. The discussion was about whether it is valid to define "human" to include "rationality". Once we have accepted that defintion, we can use it to say "we are able to be rational, and rationality is good becaues it works in reality for our survival, so we should be rational". Tom Craver houti!trc
laura@utcsstat.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (08/25/83)
May i interject something here? Tom Craver, can I attempt to paraphrase your beliefs? Feel free to make ammends if I have distorted them and left out important parts. 1. Humans, by definition, have the ability to be t-rational. 2. It is much better to be t-rational than not to be. 3. All apparant conflicts in life as one tries to be t-rational are a result of: a) Not understanding t-rationality properly. b) Dealing with jerks who do not understand or refuse to accept t-rationality. c) Not having all the relavant information (is being unaware of this lack necessary? I have been unable to acertain this from your articles -- Laura) d) calamities and natural disaster which are not very likely to happen (and could be prevented by a rational person that was prepared? Again I am not sure -- Laura) 4. therefore, the 'ideal human' should always be striving to be more and more t-rational, where the ideal state is an entirely t-rational being. is this it? BIG QUESTION TIME: How do you know that t-rationality is a constant between all individuals? In other words, how do you know that what is t-rational for Tom Craver is also t-rational for Alan Wexelblatt, Paul Torek and Laura Creighton?? Sounds to me as if you will have a real problem if we all attain 'ideal t-rationality' and find that it is not the same t-rationality! We will all be perfectly correct and entirely in disagreement! If "by definition" you claim that t-rationality is constant between all individuals ( a reasonable way out) then I need to know what grounds you have for assuming this. I should think that t-rationality is related to intelligence, myself, something which I have observed NOT to be constant between all individuals. laura creighton utzoo!utcsstat!laura
bill@utastro.UUCP (08/26/83)
Please someone create net.objectivism so that I can unsubscribe. Thank you. Bill Jefferys Astronomy Dept, University of Texas, Austin TX 78712 (Snail) ihnp4!kpno!utastro!bill (uucp) utastro!bill@utexas-11 (ARPA)