laura@utcsstat.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (09/05/83)
(for complicated political reasons involving who does, and does not get to post news, umcp-cs!dr_who has been gagged at umcp-cs. I am, however, perfectly willing to help Paul beat the system by posting articles from him until he gets his own system (prometh) up and ready to send news. If you want to reply to this, however, you had better send mail to allegra!umcp-cs!prometh!paul. While I will forward any mail for him that ends up here, the turn around time is not guaranteed to be fast -- laura) ******** begin forwarded article ************ The following is from Paul Torek. Send any mail to ..umcp-cs!prometh!paul This article is in response to several things which appeared in net.religion but which belong in net.philosophy, in my opinion. It concerns quantum physics, causality, determinism, and free will. Many people, physicists included, have inferred things from quantum mechanics which, in my opinion, are not implied by it, or at least arguably not implied. Conclusions are leaped to without looking. For example, Eugene Wigner (quoted by Alan Wexelblat) says that "consciousness enters the theory unavoidably and unalterably." This is not correct -- the idea that consciousness is necessary for observation (observation in the quantum-mechanical sense) is disputed. One person who denies that consciousness is crucial to the theory is Martin Gardner -- see the reference to a paper by Gardner in Gardner's book *Science: Good, Bad and Bogus* (sorry I don't know the page). In general, I would caution against the practice of quoting renowned scientists on the implications of their research as if their opinions were proof. Most scientists make terrible philosophers, in my opinion. When scientists subtly leave the realm of science and start drawing philosophical implications, watch out. When laypersons do the same, take a double dose of skepticism. ---------------------- The Uncertainty Principle and the idea that quantum mechanics disproves determinism are deserving of special caution. There are two possible responses to the success of quantum mechanical theory: the ignorance response and the arrogance response. The ignorance response is to say, "we *don't know* what causes certain sub-atomic events, and perhaps we can't in principle; we can only assign probabilities." The arrogance response is to say, "the reason we can't find a cause for certain events is that *there is none*." I have never seen a convincing argument for the arrogance response as being superior to the ignorance response. If someone thinks she has one, please present it. ----------------------- Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the arrogance response is the only reasonable one, what does this imply about the human brain? According to what I have heard about brain function (I'm no expert), a small change in the behavior of a few neurons is likely to make little or no difference. Also, I know that each cell is made up of millions of molecules, and many of those molecules (especially DNA) contain large numbers of atoms. It seems plausible to me that random fluctuations at the quantum level will cancel out at the cellular level, and especially at the level of overall brain function. In any case, what comfort would it be to know that brain function involved important elements of randomness? Indeed, what comfort can quantum randomness give to anyone who is worried about determinism precluding free will? Is it better that one's actions are determined by random, arbitrary accidents in the universe, than by the inexorable unfolding of the predestined???!!! (Hint: NO!!) ----------------------- The absence of determinism does not imply free will. Nor, I now wish to point out, does the presence of determinism negate free will. I know that this last statement will come as a shock to many, but it has a long history in philosophy -- it is called "compatibilism". Someone said that free will claims that the actions of an intelligent agent are not predictable; someone else substituted "not causally determined" for "not predictable". They are both wrong -- free will claims, trivially, that at least some actions are free. Less trivially, the claim is that some actions are under the control of the agent; are done by the agent. It is highly disputed whether this is compatible with the idea that all actions are caused. Defining free will as the absence of determinism commits a twofold error -- it ignores the fact that the absence of determinism does not imply free will, and it begs the question of compatibilism. Moreover, incompatibilism -- the idea that determinism precludes free will -- is false. Whether one's will determines one's actions; controls one's actions, is independent of whether one's decisions are themselves predetermined. If I throw a book at a glass and the glass breaks, the book broke the glass. The velocity of the book determined that the glass would break. The fact that I caused the book to have that velocity, does not negate the abovementioned fact. "But if you threw *me* at the glass, it would be different -- I would not be as willing to say that *I* broke the glass as I would be to say that the book broke it in your example." True, but what is important in the case of human action is that a person's mind is a necessary part of the causal process that leads to the breaking of the glass. The fact that some physical events caused your decision to do something, does not necessarily negate the fact that your decision determined what you would do, any more than the fact that I threw the book negates the fact that the book broke the glass. However, the picture is not yet complete. There are ways in which a decision could be caused which *would* negate the freedom of the action -- for example, "brainwashing". But what makes such cases cases of unfreedom? It may seem to be that the causation comes from the outside -- but accepting advice does not constitude unfreedom, though the advice comes from the outside. It may seem that the decision which is brainwashed is caused entirely from the outside -- but not so; the brainwashing technique is only part of the cause; the nature of your brain is another necessary causal input. The difference is, I submit, that with brainwashing one chooses an option not evaluated by a norm, whereas the advice is evaluated. Freedom is the possession and exercise of an ability to evaluate behavior according to a well justified, consistent set of norms. For more of this normative conception of freedom, see Chin-Tai Kim, "Norms and Freedom," *The Philosophical Forum* 12 (1981) 311-321. --Paul Torek, new address: ..umcp-cs!prometh!paul (this message brought to you courtesy of laura creighton)