[net.philosophy] flaming watchbands, batman!

trc@houca.UUCP (T.CRAVER) (09/01/83)

Response to Alan Wexelblat:

Alan, I have to object.  If you read your second note to me in the 
"Plato" series, I think you will find that you were already "flaming".   
In light of your tone in that note, I think I used remarkable restraint 
in my responding note.  You now claim that I "weaseled and twisting" 
to evade answering your questions.  In fact, as I will show below, I
have not done this.  I resent the accusation, since the obvious
implication is that I am hypocritically trying to avoid admitting
a mistake.  And in further point of fact, I will mention that YOU
are the one that insisted upon re-specifying the Plato question, and
that I objected, in my response, to moving away from "normal" cases.
And at what point did I accuse you of supporting murder?

You claim that I ignored some of your note, while saying that you 
did not repond to my main point.  I stand by that claim, which I
gave clear evidence for, and would like to ask you exactly which
major point I "ignored".  I certainly did not intend to do so. 

As for my "twisting your words", lets look at the evidence - what you said,
and how I then rephrased the "Plato" problem.
--------------
You said, in your rebuttal note, "Who said anything about A being irrational?
All I said was that he was angry, and he need not be even that.  He might
have worked out his anger before visiting B."

I said "A comes to B's house, perfectly rational, having worked out his
anger on the way over, and asks for his sword back.  ("Hi, nice day, mind
if I ask for my sword back? - I just want to kill my wife and her lover.")
So far, this seems to be, though perhaps sarcastic, in line with what you
said.  I would like to add, here, that I cannot understand how you think
that someone could rationally *murder* another human being, which is the
implication of saying that A is not irrational, yet would commit the murders. 

You said "B may not know A's wife, or her lover?  Why should he (selfishly)
care?"

I said "B doesnt know either of them, so this somehow makes it ok for him
to sanction their murder. ("Who? Never heard of them.  Have fun!")"
Again, sarcastic, but, I think, accurate.

You said "Who said anything about him being mad?  He might be more than 
just mad; he might attack or kill B."

I said "A either wont get mad, or will get so mad as to attack to kill
B. (with his bare hands, against a man with a sword? Well, OK.)"

You said "Who said anything about A getting into trouble?  If he's careful,
he might get away with it.  Also, don't forget that to the Greeks, women
were ... considered as legal property.  A's trouble is something that you
are inventing to get you out of the problem."

I said "After A goes merrily off and kills the wife and lover, he will
get away with it, because wives were property back then."  Here, I seem
to have missed the fact that you meant he might get away with it some
other way.  However, A's not getting in trouble is not the most important
selfish factor involved, so I am willing to allow that he *might* get away
with it, so far as the rest of society goes, but not as far as B is concerned.
I assume here that B knows of A's intention.

You said "You could (selfishly) give him the sword, and then (selfishly)
stop being friends with him, because as a rational person, you don't want
a murder for a friend."

I said "And B can then drop him as a friend, after the fact, with no
selfish loss."
-------
In short, Alan, exactly what did I twist?  I merely took you literally,
and then answered your points, as *you* stated them.  I apologize for
using such a sarcastic tone, but I do not think that that is sufficient
cause for the flame you directed towards me in your "Spiedel" note. 

I will consider answering the other points you made in your "Spiedel"
flame, separately.  However, I am starting a new project, and will
be having less time, and less inclination, to answer such unwarranted
jets as you have directed at me in the past two notes.  Frankly, if 
your last note is indicative of what you intend to post in the future, 
I would just as soon you "simply stop responding".

	Tom Craver
	houca!trc

sts@ssc-vax.UUCP (Stanley T Shebs) (09/05/83)

Read the last couple chapters in Atlas Shrugged again yesterday,
while unpacking...

In it, Dagny Taggart shoots a guard who was having trouble deciding
whether to let her pass - in fact she kills him.  It was later
approved by everybody as a rational act.

Now, I don't understand the necessity to kill him.  There seems to be
no suggestion that incapaciting him would be preferable - after all,
his gun wasn't drawn, and she had already been talking with him for
several minutes, so it wasn't a matter of "shoot or be shot".  About
all I could figure, going by the description, is that the guard was
so pathetic and irrational that it was an act of kindness to kill him.
If I recall correctly, Dagny felt less remorse at killing him than if
she had killed an animal.

Rand hints at this in other places.  It *is* logical.  If humanity
is defined as rationality, then persons who act irrationally are less
than human.  This is true whether or not they violate someone else's
rights by their acts.

This makes the passage in the book more interesting!  Dagny was trespassing,
came up and threatened the guard.  Apparently she had a *right* to do all
this, but it was less than clear where that right came from.  Government
property, therefore stolen, therefore ok to trespass?  Still doesn't give
her a right to threaten someone with a gun and basically challenge him to
a shooting match, does it? (read the passage, it's very intriguing; in one
of the last two chapters)

It reminded me of Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, where the hero imagines
that he can do anything, as long as he has a rational justification for
it.  Of course, he later discovered that he was not actually an Objectivist
(or the Nietzsche superman :-) )

						stan the lep hack
						ssc-vax!sts (also utah-cs!shebs)