[net.philosophy] From Paul Torek #9 -- the verb "value", etc.

laura@utcsstat.UUCP (Paul Torek) (09/27/83)

The header is still too baroque for my taste. people who are still confused
as to how Paul Torek can be in Maryland and Toronto at once -- it works
by magic. (and has the side-effect of confusing the newsstats, gotta
keep working on those side effects!)	Laura Creighton

************ begin forwarded article *****************

The following is from Paul Torek.  Send replies to ..umcp-cs!prometh!paul

Response to Tom Craver {values, and why I want you to be selfish}:

Well, you defined the *verb* "to value" for the FIRST time.

	To say one values something means that one believes it is an actual
	value - but one should believe this of things that really are of
	actual value.  

Now, if I take your definition of "actual value" and stick it into the first
part of your sentence here (I think that should be OK), I get

	To say one values something means that one believes it directly 
	supports one's life, or other actual values.

I see that you agree that the verb "to value" means "to believe [blank]"; we
just disagree about what belongs in the blank.  (In my opinion, "worthwhile"
belongs there.)  But tell you what I'm gonna do:  I'll use the verb "to
value" the way you do, and I'll use "to think valuable" where I used to use
"to value".  

Now I see why you say that one cannot value the benefit of others for its
own sake -- you are correct, given your definitions of "to value" and
"actual value".  However, your definition of "actual value" seems to be just
another attempt to settle substantive issues by definition.

	There is no such thing as intrinsic value, in the sense you seem to
	mean it (something that would be valuable without anyone valuing it,
	in either sense of value.) 

That is not how I mean it.  "Intrinsic" value is that which is the most
basic; "extrinsic" value is anything which supports the most basic value(s).
Recall your statement in mail to me that one's own human life ends the
regress of "needed for"?  In my terms, intrinsic value means whatever stops
the regress; therefore your opinion is that one's own human life has (what I
call) "intrinsic value."

	Things are only of value *TO* someone.  If you wish to extend that
	definition, I suggest that you provide an basis equally as real as
	one's own life, and preferably as important.  One's life is
	important in the sense that no other values can be held if one is
	not alive.

"Provide a basis."  OK: pleasure, joy, and happiness are the most basic
goods that I know of.  (I am willing to entertain the idea of adding things
(e.g. perhaps freedom) to this list if I hear a convincing argument.)  Pain,
discomfort, and depression are basic bads.  (Similar parenthetical remark.)

Let me try to reconstruct what you mean by "No other values can be held if
one is not alive."  You define value recursively:  something is an actual
value if it directly supports one's life, or directly supports something
that directly supports one's life, or ...(etc).  In other words, something
is an actual value if it directly or indirectly supports one's life.  It
*follows from this definition* that nothing is an actual value if one is not
alive, since then nothing can support one's life.  Have I got you right?

	I agree with [Laura Creighton] that you are assuming that selfish
	means "miserable bastard", as she put it so neatly.  This has
	certainly been apparent in most of the examples you have chosen to
	present.  Might I suggest that you are simply accepting a cultural
	bias, without bothering to *really* consider it?  

I am not simply accepting a cultural bias; I agree that selfish should not
be *defined* as "bad".  As I pointed out to Laura, I never condemned
selfishness in that article.  I did point out some results of it which I
think are bad, but I did not express my opinion that those results are bad,
in that article.  Of course, if you think that only a miserable bastard
would refuse to contribute to providing public goods, then:  if the shoe
fits, wear it.

	Here are a few reasons I would like to see other's being selfish: It
	would make the world a better place to live in for ME.  Since some
	good degree of rationality is needed to act selfishly, I am
	effectively asking others to be more rational.  

The whole point of that article was that it *won't* make it a better place
for you, and you haven't refuted that point!  Some good degree of
rationality is required to act in the way recommended by almost *any*
ethical theory.  Besides, many people are very rational in every respect
*except* (in *your* opinion, it is an exception) that they aren't selfish.

--Paul Torek, ..umcp-cs!prometh!paul

laura@utcsstat.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (09/27/83)

And this one is truly from laura creighton...

Okay gang, in case you have missed it, I claim to be both selfish and
irrational. (Sounds wonderful, doesn't it! Guess we can see who's society
places an emphasis on rationality and unselfishness!). There is a problem
which prevents me from being either rational or selfishness. I don't
think that Paul or Tom are going to get to it though, so I am going to
toss it in here.

How on earth can one be rational or unselfish if one does not believe in
an absolute value system? It strikes me as impossible. Without universal
values the whole thing simply comes to rest at your doorstep. Thus there
is nothing left but selfishness, and rationality becomes a joke. The
best that one can do is determine whether such-and-such an action is 
useful at any given time, which may be enough to live by, but is rather
difficult to build a truly rational system on.

Of course, the next big question is where does an absolute value system
come from. Apart for the existance of God, which is a valid foundation
which I do not want to touch, there seems to be very little that I can
find that seems to support the theory that there is any universal and
absolute value.

Laura Creighton
utzoo!utcsstat!laura