laura@utcsstat.UUCP (Paul Torek) (10/09/83)
The following is from Paul Torek. Replies to ..umcp-cs!prometh!paul +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ A new variant of Twist-O-Flex! Now, instead of twisting his positions, Tom is twisting mine. Specifically, I refer to this: If the victims dont know they are being damaged, *and Bud doesnt suspect that he is hurting them*, how can you expect Bud to do anything about it? Emphasis added to highlight the new twist. I never said that Bud doesn't know that his pollution is hurting them. I did say that he isn't able to LOCATE all the victims, but THERE IS A BIG DIFFERENCE. He knows that if he pollutes he will hurt anonymous people, but there IS something he can do about it -- not pollute. Your idea of buying pollution rights from other polluters is a good one. However, it just pushes the problem back a step -- how do the first polluters get their pollution rights, except through the impractical method of buying such rights from the area residents? Your argument against the idea that the rest of the world must give Bud permission to pollute was interesting. However, I think you caricatured the position you argued against. I think a more plausible argument can be given that Bud's pollution really does restrict people's liberty. Instead of saying that even inaction restricts people's liberty by not making them able to do more, this argument would only condemn actions that *cause* others to be able to do less. Do you see the difference? Your analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma covers only the one standard case. However, the term "Prisoner's Dilemma" is often (mis?)used to cover all situations which exhibit the same "payoff structure". I was hoping that you would take the term in this wider sense. I agree that the one standard case is pretty contrived. --Paul Torek, ..umcp-cs!prometh!paul