trc@houca.UUCP (10/12/83)
Response to Paul Torek: On defining "to value" - if you re-read my note carefully, I think you will find that I did *not* agree that "to value" means "to believe [blank]". I said "To say that one values something means that one believes it is an actual value". The important verb here is "say", not value. This was my explanation of what I mean by a "held" value, as opposed to an "actual" value. If this is still not clear, you might consider the distinction between needs and wants. I would be willing to use them in place of "actual value" and "held value", if it is not confusing. The difference between these two pairs is mainly in one's attitude towards "needs" and "wants" - an altruist might object that they are implicitly selfish, and so would, if taken as exactly equal to values and held values, eliminate his position by definition. Of course, I would agree with the altruist that his position is not included in the terms, but claim that it did not really exist in the first place. You claim that you did not mean "intrinsic value" to mean valuable without a valuer. Then why did you spend so much time claiming that there is no need for a valuer in connection with "intrinsically valuing others' welfare"? If you change the meaning to 'of most basic value', then yes, one's own life is the sole "intrinsic value" to oneself. I asked you for a basis for extending the definition of value to not require the concept of value *to someone*, and you responded "pleasure, joy, and happiness are the most basic goods that I know of". Cant you see that these "basic goods" *all* require a living person to do the valuing, and that they are of *basic* value only to that person experiencing them? Those experiences in others might be valued, but only indirectly through the way that they create values for the valuer. And how can these experiences be more fundamental than one's human life, which they are inextricably tied to - and how can they be as fundamental, since one's life is required to experience them but they are not required to experience life and any other values that might depend upon one's life? How can your *list* of "basics" be considered more fundamental than the *single* thing that they all require? In fact, the experiences you list are really reactions to achievement of *held* values - they indicate the *degree* of achievement of held values. Similar arguments apply to your "basic bads". And again - even if one accepted your "basics" as truly fundamental, that would *not* imply that they are valuable to *others* - only to the experiencer of those basics. You asked me why I should like to see other's being selfish, and I provided an answer - independent of trying to refute your previous statements. And the examples you gave seemed to assume that there was something that people should do, and that a selfish person would never do, and so a selfish person is a "miserable bastard". Since I dont agree that contributing to the public good is morally required, I dont agree that those arguments *need* refuting. I have stated elsewhere that a selfish person would not be a parasite, living off of the "public good". A truly selfish person is a producer and a trader. I dont see what "being rational in every respect *except* ... that they arent selfish" has to do with anything - if I am rational in every respect except one, (in your opinion), does that mean that you are wrong to think that I am being irrational in that one area? And in fact, being selfish or altruistic is so fundamental, your statement is like saying a window is clean, except for 90% of its surface. Tom Craver houca!trc