[net.philosophy] ity vs izing

trc@houca.UUCP (10/29/83)

Response to Laura Creighton:

I agree that I was defining the commonly used meaning of rationalize - which 
was what Stan was asking for, I believe.  It is a shame for a good word to 
be used for a concept that is nearly opposite to what it should mean.

You state that you have trouble with my definition because you will not be
able to tell the difference between being rational and rationalizing, as you
do it.  I think that it *is* possible to tell the difference.  And not being 
able to distinguish right away does not necessarily invalidate the definition 
- it merely means that it might be a complex thing to analyze.

However, to get practical, how can one tell that one is, or commonly does,
rationalize?  One simple sign, that can be detected by introspection, is if 
one was not sure why one was doing the thing, until one thought about it 
afterwards.  This indicates that one did not bother to think about it.  The 
indications is (generally that one did the thing, disregarding justification, 
and looked for justification after.  (Note that making a decision is "doing"
something too.)

When one rationalizes, it is usually because one believes, in a first 
reaction, that one has done something wrong.  The honest person would then
examine the decision, and decide whether it was right or wrong, independent
of the fact that it has been done.  The dishonest rationalizer will examine 
the decision for reasons that it was right, only incidentally thinking about 
(and dismissing) any objections that might pop into his head.

	Tom Craver
	houca!trc

laura@utcsstat.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (11/03/83)

I think that I live in a less clear-cut world than you do. If  you have any
suggestions on how to make it more clear-cut I would love to hear them; because
if they work, they will make my life a lot easier.

Note your suggestion on determining whether I am rationalising or being
rational. I am forced to conclude that you think that if I have to think
about a reason for doing things, I must be rationalising. This does not
quite work for me.

What did you have for breakfast? Why?

Now, there is some chance that you have thought about that question, but
a lot of people would have to answer "I ate cornflakes, because I always
eat cornflakes. I like cornflakes!". They may never have considered why they
eat cornflakes.

So are they rationalising? Would they be better off to say "Because it is
a truly American product and I want to support American Industry?" or
"Because it is too much trouble to think of anything else?" or "Because
my mother always fed me cornflakes?" or "becaues I want to?"

Nobody is going to have to justify his breakfast choice to me. But how am
I to know what is the "real" reason? Perhaps the "real" reason is some
combination of the above. Whatever it is, I had better have the ability
to discover the reason! And I could not tell you for certain why it is
that I ate toast for breakfast this morning.

If I have such a tough time with toast for breakfast -- how am I going
to handle more emotionally charged issues like how I feel about the
invasion of Grenada? or the death of a friend?

Without a more strict set of rules (or meta-rules for determining rules)
I am lost. Rationality remains a noble ideal that I can never attain.

Laura Creighton
utzoo!utcsstat!laura

mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (11/03/83)

For once I partially agree with Tom Craver about something! He hit
the nail on the head about the difference between rationality and
rationalizing. One rationalizes when one considers logically the
reasons behind a decision already made (I don't agree with Tom that
it need be a wrong decision); one decides rationally when the logical
argument is used in order to make a decision.

I remain unconvinced that rational decisions are necessarily better than
intuitive ones, or even that ANYONE can make a truly rational decision
on a matter of substance. After all, everyone agrees that Newtonian
mechanics is a pretty good representation of how planetary bodies
interact gravitationally, but how many people can solve even the
interactions among three point masses analytically? If such a simple
system is insoluble, how much further from solubility must be the
interactions among three people!

(In respect of my last note, it may have seemed that I was criticizing
Tom personally for not providing rational arguments on specific issues;
I intended only to say what I put more clearly(?) in the last paragraph.)

Martin Taylor