flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (05/26/84)
Forget the Greek ship -- what about *me*? Are the advocates of various
views willing to extend their criteria of identity to people? If a
criterion of identity doesn't work for people, is it any good for objects?
Norm Andrews writes:
Actually, even if the Greeks left the original ship alone, the
ship's identity would change from one instant to the next. Even
while remaining essentially the same, the fact that the ship exists
in the context of (and in relation to) a changing universe is enough
to vary the ship's identity from moment to moment. The constant
changes in the ship's characteristics are admittedly very subtle,
and do not change the essential capacity/functionality/identity of
the ship. Minute changes in a ships identity have 'essentially' no
impact. Only a change sufficiently large (such as a small hole in
the hull) have an essential impact.
So, does *my* identity change from one moment to the next? (Alas, I guess
I'm just not the man I used to be [:-)].) If I make all the character
reforms that I wish I could, and got in the shape I'd like to be, I would be
drastically changed -- would I no longer be even "essentially" the same
person? Does it matter? From the Objectivist viewpoint, I'm supposed to
care (directly) only about myself, so I guess I shouldn't care about this
(new and different) person who would be the result of these changes. But
then I'd better not make them -- it would be (essentially) my death! Alas,
I really am doomed to be riddled with all my faults!
Brad Blumenthal submits Robert Nozick's "closest continuer" theory for
consideration. According to Nozick, whether Y is identical to the object
that was identified at an earlier time, X, depends on whether there is a Z
that is a "closer" continuer of X than Y is. But can the same be said of
me? If I undergo one of these weird brain operations that philosophers
dream up (such as that the left side of my brain is transplanted to another
body, while the right side is transplanted to yet another body), does my
continued identity really depend on what goes on elsewhere? If both halves
of my brain are given bodies, they seem to be tied; neither is closest, and
they can't *both* be me. Does that mean that I survive if only one half is
given a body but not if they both are?
When we talk about identity of an object over time, we can say that it
really doesn't matter which of Y or Z is the same as X -- after all, who
cares? It seems just a matter of definition. But when we talk about
ourselves, the "who cares" response seems mistaken. We suppose that we
ought to care more about the person who will be us; the question "will the
person who survives the operation be *me*?" seems important. But is it?
--Paul Torek, umcp-cs!flink
P.S. Next: some of the weird cases that philosophers dream up.