kissell@flairvax.UUCP (Kevin Kissell) (07/03/84)
(Gordon Moffett still wants to get his empirical hands on my mind) > Ah, herein lies the problem: your claim that "others understand what > I mean" is not adequate to justify that the mind exists or performs > the activities you attribute to it. If, in some other culture, we > were to speak of ghosts, and we knew that others knew what we meant > by ghost (because they had seen them too), would that be enough proof > to say, "there are indeed ghosts" -- and worse yet, to start making > hypotheses about these ghosts (because we've all seen them, right?). > It is also a problem that while your mind may be doing things, I can't > measure your mind's activities or compare them to my own. "Well, of > course you can!" you would say, "do I not speak, do I not analyze, > do I not create ideas?" Yes, you do all of those things, and all of > those things are MANIFESTED AS BEHAVIOR and it is by BEHAVIOR that > we measure these activities. I assert, again, that the mind itself > has never been seen. It is a ghost. It is pretty common for me to have an idea, think about it's possibilities, remember it, but do nothing about it until the opportunity presents itself. It seems to me that in your model, I have not had the idea until I act on it, and if I do not act on it, the idea does not exist. This is strongly counterintuitive to say the least. It may be true that as far as *you* are concerned I have not had the idea, but that does not invalidate my experience. For a more concrete example; I have a long commute, and so it is normal for me to work on problems in my head as I drive. In your model, I am doing nothing but guiding my vehicle. Yet the problems are solved. My impression is that my experiences are far from unique, which is why I said that "others understand what I mean" (arguably a poor choice of words). I do not need their corroboration to experience these things, only to have some assurance that such experiences are relatively normal and not a result of some brain dysfunction (but more on that later). > Do you see what I am doing here? I am applying the scientific method > to behavior and finding little evidence to support the existence of > ``mind'', other than in a mystical or colloquial context. Pardon me, but I have yet to see any application of the scientific method in this discussion. You have stated a thesis - that the mind does not exist - and challenged us to disprove it. You never gave any definition of what a mind *is* (other than something that doesn't exist). The closest dictionary to hand gives as a primary definition Mind n 1. The element or elements in an individual governing reasoning, thought, perception, feeling, will, memory, and imagination. So I suppose you mean to say that you do not reason, think, perceive, feel, will, remember, or imagine. How, then, do you hope to apply the scientific method? > And my original object to ``mind'' was: just where is this mind anyway? > SHOW IT TO ME. Then we can continue to discuss it's function. > Otherwise it is a piece of mythology used to support the presumed > deism of human beings. As far a science can tell, consciousness (the mind, if you will) is a brain function. Our understanding of the workings of the brain is incomplete. It may well be that, should we both live another 200 years, I will be able to sit down under some to-be-invented instrument, point to the display and say "that's my mind over there on the left". In the meantime, we will have to make due with "thought experiments" (if you believe in those) and the evidence of our own experience. As to the bit about the presumed deism of human beings, I don't see what that has to do with it, except as an epithet for the difficulties in applying behaviorist precepts that work well on relatively un-self- conscious beings like pigeons to relatively self-conscious beings such as humans. I suspect that it is precisely these difficulties that condition some behaviorists to reject the existence of the mind: it clutters up their nice model. Kevin D. Kissell Fairchild Research Center Advanced Processor Development uucp: {ihnp4 decvax}!decwrl!\ >flairvax!kissell {ucbvax sdcrdcf}!hplabs!/ "Any closing epigram, regardless of truth or wit, grows galling after a number of repetitions"
karl@dartvax.UUCP (S. Delage.) (07/04/84)
Behaviorists do not deny the existence of thoughts. As Mr. Kissell
correctly points out, that would be very counterintuitive, since I
know I have thoughts, and since you tell me that you do too, and I
can relate what you tell me you're doing when you're thinking to
what I do when I'm thinking.
At this point, the word "thoughts" becomes fuzzy. Let's take
the easier ( Read: more comprehensible. ) case first. When
"thoughts" is taken to mean things like "I should go to the
supermarket now, I'm out of food and I'm hungry.", thinking can be
considered to be another form of behavior. ( Skinner's somewhat
more succinct way of putting that is: "Thinking is behavior." )
That is, certain stimuli [e.g., empty cupboards] have conditioned
certain responses [e.g., going to the supermarket], which will
bring about changes in the environment. [e.g., I can eat now.]
Yes, I'm oversimplifying the case, ( For example, if I don't have
any money, then I know going to the supermarket won't do any good,
and so on. ) but nothing intrinsically different is going on than
external behavior. [e.g., I'm hungry and I have food, so I eat.]
Unfortunately, "thoughts" also seems to mean, sometimes, the
mental processes that go on in our head that make us conscious,
have free will, and all the rest of what the dictionary entry Mr.
Kissell quoted tells us.
( I hope that because the dictionary tells us what a mind is,
that's not the end of the discussion! )
Behaviorists are not particularly interested in this second part,
this "mind". ( Not that it's not a fascinating topic, as The
Mind's I, Godel, Escher, Bach, etc, etc, will attest to. ) This is
because, I think, that this "mind" doesn't explain anything that
we couldn't explain before. We don't need free will to explain why
we eat when we're hungry, or why we don't eat when we're hungry,
for that matter. Only genetic endowment, current environment, and
past conditioning history. I tried to go into some of the limits
of current behaviorism in my previous article, and won't do it
again.
I'll be interested to see the examples of things that Skinner
can't explain that I presume will be floating in!
{decvax,cornell,colby,linus,uvm-gen,astrovax}!dartvax!karl;karl@dartmouthyba@mit-athena.ARPA (Mark H Levine) (07/06/84)
Where was Noam Chomsky when you needed him? -- yba%mit-heracles@mit-mc.ARPA UUCP: decvax!mit-athena!yba
steiny@scc.UUCP (Don Steiny) (07/06/84)
*** > Mind n 1. The element or elements in an individual governing reasoning, > thought, perception, feeling, will, memory, and imagination. There are many words in English that do not refer to a specific thing in the world but are used nonetheless. Some thought shows that this is usually the case. For instance if I talk about how I like cats, the word "cat" does not refer to any specific cat. However, if asked what a "cat" was I could point to my cat and say, "one of those things." There are perfectly good words like "justice" that do not refer to anything I can point to in the same way I can point to a cat. You would have as hard a time pointing to "reasoning", "thought", "perception", "feeling", "will", or memory as you would "mind." Many words serve as descriptions and explainations and do not refer to objects in our shared universe. > As far a science can tell, consciousness (the mind, if you will) is > a brain function. Our understanding of the workings of the brain is > incomplete. It may well be that, should we both live another 200 years, > I will be able to sit down under some to-be-invented instrument, > point to the display and say "that's my mind over there on the left". It is not correct that science generally believes that mind is a brain function. Mind is a explaination not a thing. There are many books with different views of what constitutes the "mind." There are many technical reasons to believe that given the complexity of the brain that we could ever know the succession of states of all the neurons over time and thus measure "brain function". But even if we could, how could we tell what part of that was the part that was "mind" and not something else. Is there is some dividing line that we could all agree on? Karl Popper, for instance, says that if it is a brain function, then it is not mind. He believes in mind/body dualism. There are better ways to argue a case that to use "I am absolutely sure this will happen someday" as a premise. People can instantly start a debate about "mind" any time because of the equivical nature of the word "mind". "Mind" is abstract, and abstract things do not exist, prime numbers do not exist, there is not such thing as the number 3 and truth, honesty, justice, mind, thought, and many other things are abstract. The argument can never be terminated by reference to the shared world of the participatants. Saying that "minds do not exist" does not denigrate the term "mind". The idea of "mind" becomes an organizing principle. It is an abstract "object". We cannot act on the world without making generalizations. We commonly use these abstract notions to our best interest. It is surprising to some at first that "English" is also abstract. Everyone talks slightly differently, there are many accents, *emperically* and *behaviorially* is is nonsense to talk about "English" is the sense we use it. Practically, however, we cannot study only the utterances of a laboratory base of speakers. It is useful to us for many purposes to talk about "English" in the abstract sense. > In the meantime, we will have to make due with "thought experiments" > (if you believe in those) and the evidence of our own experience. I do not believe that "mind" is a useful abstraction. There is nothing in my experience to make me want to use the concept of "mind." In "our own experience", "our" must refer to all people. I am sure as human beings we notice many of the same types of things about the world, but I do not think any of them could be "mind". That means that the evidence of "our" experience does not always support the premise that "mind exists." I would believe in minds in a minute if I thought it would gain anything for me. "observations which no one has doubted but have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes." Don Steiny Personetics 109 Torrey Pine Terr. Santa Cruz, Calif. 95060 (408) 425-0382 ucbvax!hplabs!pesnta!scc!steiny harpo!fortune!idsvax!scc!steiny
rlr@pyuxn.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/07/84)
>> Do you see what I am doing here? I am applying the scientific method >> to behavior and finding little evidence to support the existence of >> ``mind'', other than in a mystical or colloquial context. > Pardon me, but I have yet to see any application of the scientific > method in this discussion. You have stated a thesis - that the mind > does not exist - and challenged us to disprove it. You never gave any > definition of what a mind *is* (other than something that doesn't exist). Pardon me (for breathing, which I never do anyway...), but the mind is the "thesis" that has been stated and is in need of proof via scientific method. The notion of "mind" as some sort of "extraphysical" entity goes against currently understood scientific postulates, so it's clear where the burden of proof lies. If one desires to simply chuck all of scientific knowledge to date, the idea is that one has to have something pretty damn good to replace it with. > The closest dictionary to hand gives as a primary definition > > Mind n 1. The element or elements in an individual governing reasoning, > thought, perception, feeling, will, memory, and imagination. > > So I suppose you mean to say that you do not reason, think, perceive, feel, > will, remember, or imagine. The definition of unicorn is also offered in the dictionary. The word simply describes an entity that people BELIEVE performs those functions. Until otherwise shown, why should we not believe that those functions take place in the physical brain? > As to the bit about the presumed deism of human beings, I don't see > what that has to do with it, except as an epithet for the difficulties > in applying behaviorist precepts that work well on relatively un-self- > conscious beings like pigeons to relatively self-conscious beings such > as humans. I suspect that it is precisely these difficulties that > condition some behaviorists to reject the existence of the mind: it > clutters up their nice model. Is it behaviorism that is befuddled by the existence of the mind, or is it "mind-ism" that is afraid of the notion that our behavior could be manifested in the physical world rather than in some extraphysical entity? I don't see any contradictions in the "nice model". Where's the clutter? -- Now I've lost my train of thought. I'll have to catch the bus of thought. Rich Rosen pyuxn!rlr
kissell@flairvax.UUCP (Kevin Kissell) (07/08/84)
(Rich Rosen enters a scene of general pandemonium - all demons in the machine) > Is it behaviorism that is befuddled by the existence of the mind, or is it > "mind-ism" that is afraid of the notion that our behavior could be manifested > in the physical world rather than in some extraphysical entity? I have not been holding the mind to be any more "extraphysical" than a computer program. It is a notion of process rather than of substance. It is a word to describe the way my brain experiences its own function. Feedback, if you will. Don Steiny does not find it to be a useful abstraction. I do. No problem there. I think that behaviorists may be somewhat frustrated in their attempts to understand human behavior in that, for a given situation, a certain set of deterministic stimulus-response mechanisms may be at work, but a large, *unobservable* portion of the stimuli arise internally to the brain, and the nature and intensity of these stimuli may well be sufficiently complex and/or random to preclude a concise, predictive science of human behavior. Kevin D. Kissell Fairchild Research Center Advanced Processor Development uucp: {ihnp4 decvax}!decwrl!\ >flairvax!kissell {ucbvax sdcrdcf}!hplabs!/ "Any closing epigram, regardless of truth or wit, grows galling after a number of repetitions"
locke@convex.UUCP (07/09/84)
#R:flairvax:-62000:convex:46100004:000:2223 convex!locke Jul 9 11:17:00 1984 It appears that the problem surrounding the understanding of the mind deals with our point of perception. As an explanation of this, I recall a scene from the book " The Fire From Within" by Carlos Castaneda. Carlos was with his teacher and friend, Don Juan. An aquaintence of Don Juan's, called Genero, was also present. During their time together, Carlos describes a horrifying and fearful experience which he says Genero had brought about. After the event, Genero asks Don Juan if he thought Carlos had enough energy to repeat the experience. Don Juan's reply (directed to Carlos) was that that was just Genero's morbid way of having fun. It was several years later that Carlos "saw" that Don Juan had initiated his turmoil (while all the time Don Juan appeared from Carlos' observations to be the last person to ever instigate such an event). Genero was Don Juan's "heavy". When Genero asked if Carlos has energy to repeat the experience, Carlos now 'understood' that Genero was worried about him. It was a change in perception that allowed that understanding. T. Leary had a similar approach in his 1960's experiments on his patients with hallucinagenic drugs. The idea was for his patients to understand that no perception of awareness was final. This background was in preparation to considering the concept of using the scientific method to evaluate and classify the 'mind'. Such properties of the mind as 'will' and 'intent' may very well be impossible to realistically approach by these means, but everyone knows or has an awareness of them. Maintaining that a logical,rational (and perhaps judgemental) point of awareness will permit oneself to understand the totality of one's awareness makes as much sense as using the scientific method of proving the existenc of God (which is also a very real experience to some). The most difficult realization to accept may be that in order to expand our awareness, we must forget about everything we have been taught to be able to realign our awareness. This might not bring about a new understanding, but perhaps a more total understanding. By that time, who knows, we may all be out of our minds and never consider the question of their existance.
rbg@cbosgd.UUCP (Richard Goldschmidt) (07/11/84)
>I have not been holding the mind to be any more "extraphysical" than a >computer program. It is a notion of process rather than of substance. It >is a word to describe the way my brain experiences its own function. >Kevin D. Kissell I would agree completely. The program analogy is a good one. Imagine trying to use some of the methods analagous to those of brain research to identify computer programs. You take a probe and watch single bits toggle, and try to understand a program (or worse yet an operating system) in the cpu. You might find that certain bits near I/O portions of the hardware had activity that correlated in some relatively obvious way with external events, but to "point to" the program or really comprehend it near the source level would be a gargantuan task. Specifying the high level properties of the mind by examining the activity of brain hardware is possible, but will take a very long time. Then again, maybe programs aren't real and should be relegated to the realm of metaphysics or imaginary constructs :-} There was also a request for flaws in Skinner's perspective. The biggest problem is that he relies on contingencies of reinforcement as the only explanation for environmental control of behavior. Social psychologists have shown that the principle of cognitive dissonance also has great explanatory power. It deals with the effects of social roles, prior expectations, a posteriori rationalizations on behavior and attitude change. In many cases, its predictions contradict those based on reinforcement. For example: take a group of undergraduates, and have them publicly read a speech defending Hitler. Some of them get paid, say $50 or $5, and some get nothing. The amount of attitude change (the extent to which they begin to believe what they said) is inversely proportional to the reward. Those who are paid nothing have the largest attitude change, which is hypothesized to result from rationalization, in the absence of external justification. Human behavior is not as simple as Skinner and his model developed from pigeon and rat studies would have us believe. Rich Goldschmidt cbosgd!rbg