dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (07/27/84)
/***** iuvax:net.philosophy / dsaker / 1:26 pm Jul 27, 1984 */ [] Could those denying the existence of mind please give an account of mental experience? "Mind" certainly is a fuzzy concept; it is very broad and hard to pin down; but so are other things - eg. "life". Are those denying the existence of mind denying the difference between brain/body states and mental experiences? Let me make some comments about brain/body states and mental experiences. I am in a laboratory, looking at a red square. The scientists around me determine the frequency of the light entering my eye, exciting the rods and cones in my retina. Other scientists trace the firings of my neurons (yes, my shaved head looks like a pin cushion) and observe how the electro- chemical messages make their way from my retina to various parts of my brain, interact with the general activity their, and so on and so on. But all of that neuronal activity is distinct from my experience of seeing the red square. You can say that the brain/body states cause the mental experience (and philosophers can have lots of fun with "cause" and how you are going to prove your claim -- but let's leave that aside for the moment). You can say that the brain/body states cause the mental experience, but the mental experience is not the same thing as those brain/body states. Saying that "neuron so-&-so in my brain is firing at rate such-&-such" is not the same thing as saying "I see red". The two are perhaps connected, but they are not equivalent. Now, my mental experiences have to do with my mind. This question of "mind" is subtle, and I would like to establish the situation with respect to mental experiences before dealing with mind. NOTE: it is only an assumption that a one-to-one correspondence can be drawn between brain/body states and mental experiences. Daryel Akerlind ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker