williams@kirk.DEC (John Williams 223-3402) (08/03/84)
Yes, cause and effect do exist!
The observation that certain things preceed others is easily proved.
In the time/space continuum, there is a fundamental limit of propagation.
This is the speed of light. All energy propagation is limited by this.
The phenomenon of simultaneous events is only relevant when being analyzed
in modular time samples.
For example:
When I drop a dish, I am capaple of detecting the amount of time it takes
for the dish to fall to the ground and change states. The act of dropping
the dish preceeds the the actual change that occurs. There is also a degree
of certainty that the dish will break, it might not. It may land in such a
way that the dish will be able to emit the energy without fracture. If I had
chosen to take a much longer sample as an event, say the entire interval,
then the two actions would appear to be simultaneous. If I drop the dish
from a sufficient height, then I can assure repeatability, that is, the
probability of the dish breaking is so large, that having the dish not break
is unobservable. It is important to understand that analysis depends on
sampling, and sampling requires a finitely small amount of time. The whole
field of differential calculus is aimed at making these successive samples
very small to the point of being negligable. I can describe something called
acceleration, which causes the dish to approach the floor with increasing
velocity.
My limitation of awareness excludes my perception of the future. If my
predictions of the future were ideally accurate, then I could transcend
the the direction of time. My recollections of the past are also not
accurate, although they are much more accurate than my predictions of the
future. Thus, my experience is a sample of reality. My free will determines
what choice of action I will take having interpretted the probability of
certain outcomes. When I use my intuition, I am freely admitting that I
am relying on unconcious decisions.
Because of the limitations enforced by reality, we recognize the existence
of both cause and effect, AND free will. Our living efficiency excludes
us from disregarding either aspect of finite time samples or finite
resolution. We respond to the present which we see with magnified resolution.
Cause and effect imply propagation. Free will implies limited accuracy.
The system you call your life needs them both. They both work.
( yeah, it's a monkey wrench, but it can fix your plumbing )
(DEC E-NET) KIRK::WILLIAMS
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williams%kirk.DEC@Purdue-Merlin.ARPAmmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (08/07/84)
****************
. . . If my
predictions of the future were ideally accurate, then I could transcend
the the direction of time. My recollections of the past are also not
accurate, although they are much more accurate than my predictions of the
future. Thus, my experience is a sample of reality. My free will determines
****************
How do you know that your recollections of the past are more accurate
than your predictions of the future? There seems to be no way other
than concensus to make that assertion (photographs and written things
may also count, but like other people's memories, they could be faked
or wrong). What you have is the "now", in which is embedded some
notion of a "past" you have experienced, which feels subjectively
quite different from the "future" you guess at. This subjective
difference is with us all our lives, but it really doesn't have any
bearing on an absolutist position in regard to cause and effect.
If you are a relativist, then the possibility of perception is all-important,
but if not, then you have to look to the mathematics, and be very
careful not to let subjective impressions creep in unannounced.
--
Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt
{uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsrgv!dciem!mmtrcc@imsvax.UUCP (08/07/84)
>Yes, cause and effect do exist! >The observation that certain things preceed others is easily proved. >In the time/space continuum, there is a fundamental limit of propagation. >This is the speed of light. All energy propagation is limited by this. >The phenomenon of simultaneous events is only relevant when being analyzed >in modular time samples. Ahem. Cause and effect may exist, and indeed, in order to function as human beings, we seem to need to behave as if it exists, but I don't think the principal of cause and effect can be *proved* to exist. The association of two events in time does not imply a connection between the two. (For a more detailed argument, read Hume and Kant) (Sorry for the nit-picking, but this is net.philosophy, after all :-) -- The preceding message was brought to you by -- Ray Chen UUCP: {umcp-cs!eneevax || seismo!rlgvax!elsie}!imsvax!rcc
norm@ariel.UUCP (N.ANDREWS) (08/12/84)
> Ahem. Cause and effect may exist, and indeed, in order to function as > human beings, we seem to need to behave as if it exists, but I don't > think the principal of cause and effect can be *proved* to exist. The > association of two events in time does not imply a connection between > the two. > > (For a more detailed argument, read Hume and Kant) > > --Ray Chen The concept of proof depends upon the concepts of cause and effect, among other things. Even the ideas "anything" and "functioning" depend upon the idea of cause and effect. All of these concepts depend on or are rooted in the concepts of identity and identification. Here's why: To be is to be something in particular, to have a specific identity, or having specific characteristics. What does it mean to have specific characteristics or a specific identity? It means that in a particular context, the entity's existence is manifested in a particular way. An entity IS what it can DO (in a given context). So what's causality? The law of identity applied to action. Things do what they do, in any given context, BECAUSE they are what they are. "What they are" includes or consists of "what they can do". This is true irrespective of our ability to identify what they are. Hume's and Kant's arguements re causality are the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. For the original presentation of the views that smash this false dichotomy, see Leonard Peikoff's article "The Analytic- Synthetic Dichotomy" in the back of recent editions of Ayn Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology". For the epistemological basis of Peikoff's article, read Rand's Intro. (I almost posted this to net.cooks, but GOOD cooks know this already...) -Norm Andrews, AT+T Information Systems, (201) 834-3685
gwyn@brl-tgr.ARPA (Doug Gwyn <gwyn>) (08/14/84)
Or, putting it slightly differently, the traditional view of cause-and-effect is that one action causes another action; an alternative viewpoint is that actions result from entities being subject to particular environmental conditions and responding according to their natures. This avoids the endless backward causal chain problem (and the "prime mover"). (Hume avoids the problem by reducing causality to correlation, which makes it a very uncertain proposition; see following.) Kant's analytic-synthetic dichotomy amounts to a declaration that reality is inherently unknowable and that the things we can be certain about do not express anything about reality. Even if one is not fully up on this stuff he should be able to appreciate that acceptance of such a dichotomy would hamper one's ability to function effectively in the "real world" (whatever that is). Glad to hear that there is someone else out there who does not swallow the conventional philosophical "wisdom" whole.
kissell@flairvax.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (08/14/84)
(Norm Andrews challenges Ray Chen's agnosticsm on cause and effect) > The concept of proof depends upon the concepts of cause and effect, among > other things. This is simply not true. The notion of logical proof involves implication relationships between discrete statements in discourse. This is an agreed upon rule of the game. Causality assumes implication relationships between discrete events in the world. The universe may or may not argue like a philosopher, and it is not always clear what constitutes a "discrete" event. > So what's causality? The law of identity applied to action. Things do > what they do, in any given context, BECAUSE they are what they are. This is a denial of causality, not a definition. If things do what they do because they are what they are, then they certainly can't be *caused* to do anything by something else. Unless, of course, the only *thing* is everything. uucp: {ihnp4 decvax}!decwrl!\ >flairvax!kissell {ucbvax sdcrdcf}!hplabs!/
jim@ism780b.UUCP (08/17/84)
#R:decwrl:-311300:ism780b:27500036:000:1545 ism780b!jim Aug 9 19:45:00 1984 > How do you know that your recollections of the past are more accurate > than your predictions of the future? That is an epistemological question. Why is this any different than any other "how do you know" question? Provided that induction based upon perception is valid, then certainly the statement is true. If perception is not valid, than no statement about the real world is valid. Are you questioning his certainty in his belief? > There seems to be no way other > than concensus to make that assertion (photographs and written things > may also count, but like other people's memories, they could be faked > or wrong). No, he made the assertion by typing on his keyboard. Oh, but that's not what you meant. Then what did you mean? Are you saying that consensus is the only source of information by which one can validate the nature of the past? Why should you say so? We could all be in a dream, but that doesn not affect the validity of our statements based upon our observations *within* the dream. I don't understand why so many people ignore the multiplicity of levels of discourse. It is perfectly reasonable to discuss phenomena within the assumption that our gross interpretations of our perceptions are reasonable. We only should discuss the flaws in trusting our perceptions when that is in fact the philosophical issue at hand. Otherwise, it is like checking that the microcode is properly interpreting the instruction set as the first step in find the bug in your high-level C program. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
yba@mit-athena.ARPA (Mark H Levine) (08/18/84)
Now and then I feel so fine, Now and then I don't feel lonely. Now and then, but only in my mind.... (It's a song) -- yba%mit-heracles@mit-mc.ARPA UUCP: decvax!mit-athena!yba
jim@ism780b.UUCP (08/18/84)
#R:decwrl:-311300:ism780b:27500039:000:3232 ism780b!jim Aug 16 20:15:00 1984 >Or, putting it slightly differently, the traditional view of >cause-and-effect is that one action causes another action; But what does it *mean* for one action to *cause* another action? This says nothing. >an >alternative viewpoint is that actions result from entities >being subject to particular environmental conditions and >responding according to their natures. How is an entity identified, and what is its environment? In what way is an entity subject to its environment? If the entity and the environment are separate, how does the environment go about affecting the entity? What is the nature of an entity? How is it identified other than by its causal interactions? What does this really say? >This avoids the >endless backward causal chain problem (and the "prime mover"). How so? To avoid the "prime mover" I would think requires accepting that the causal chain extends infinitely into the past, or accepting the universe's right to behave capriciously, and substitute "prime mover" with "prime spontaneous event". Causative behavior due to inherent nature plus a finite causal chain seems to me to imply a first cause. >(Hume avoids the problem by reducing causality to correlation, >which makes it a very uncertain proposition; see following.) Since we can only observe correlations, but not inherent natures, this seems pretty rock-solid to me. Causation is as certain as the universe chooses to make it. As long as the correlations hold perfectly, it is certain. But what possible argument can you make for a claim that the laws of the universe won't be totally different tomorrow? Do you see that saying "because they have always worked that way" assumes the conclusion? >Kant's analytic-synthetic dichotomy amounts to a declaration that >reality is inherently unknowable and that the things we can be >certain about do not express anything about reality. Even if one >is not fully up on this stuff he should be able to appreciate >that acceptance of such a dichotomy would hamper one's ability to >function effectively in the "real world" (whatever that is). It is a matter of the definition of "know". All you need are beliefs which have reasonable predictive ability in order to function. I can know that 2+2=4, which is totally independent of the particular nature of reality, although I never would have gotten around to finding that analytical truth without having synthesized it from aspects of reality. I can believe very strongly that the sun will rise tomorrow, although I can't possibly know it. Kant accepted his dichotomy without it hampering his ability to function in the "real" world, so I find statements like yours very strange. >Glad to hear that there is someone else out there who does not >swallow the conventional philosophical "wisdom" whole. This is the same line you take with cosmology, and it rings of Von Daniken. I am also against people swallowing things whole, but I see little evidence that most philosophers who share a position with other philosophers, whether conventional or not, got there with any less deep thought and analysis or more sheeplike behavior than what led you or people you happen to agree with to your positions. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
cmm@pixadv.UUCP (cmm) (08/21/84)
This is extracted from net.philosophy. >>Or, putting it slightly differently, the traditional view of >>cause-and-effect is that one action causes another action; >>This avoids the >>endless backward causal chain problem (and the "prime mover"). >How so? To avoid the "prime mover" I would think requires accepting that the >causal chain extends infinitely into the past, or accepting the universe's >right to behave capriciously, and substitute "prime mover" with >"prime spontaneous event". Causative behavior due to inherent nature >plus a finite causal chain seems to me to imply a first cause. My question: Is it unreasonable to presume a "prime spontaneous event"? Doesn't quantum mechanics allow for "spontaneous" movements at the particle level? (Spontaneous here meaning that the particle is found to be in a very improbable location.) Can these spontaneous particle translations not have an impact on other particles, resulting in an amplified result, eventually changing something at the macroscopic level? My second question: Just how incorrect is my interpretation of quantum mechanics? -- ____________________________________________________________________________ cmm (carl m mikkelsen) | (617)657-8720x2310 Pixel Computer Incorporated | 260 Fordham Road | {allegra|ihnp4|cbosgd|ima|genrad|amd|harvard}\ Wilmington, Ma. 01887 | !wjh12!pixel!pixadv!cmm
jim@ism780b.UUCP (08/23/84)
>The concept of proof depends upon the concepts of cause and effect, among >other things. Even the ideas "anything" and "functioning" depend upon >the idea of cause and effect. All of these concepts depend on or are >rooted in the concepts of identity and identification. Here's why: I don't think the *concept* of proof depends upon cause and effect, as deduction or mathematical induction involve no causes, but certainly *empirical* proof involves cause and effect. "functioning" means acting which involves change, which implies a time arrow, and so it involves cause and effect, but "anything" and identity do not depend upon cause and effect, although the identification of *empirical* objects requires it. But the null set can be identified without recourse to cause. >To be is to be something in particular, to have a specific identity, or >having specific characteristics. What does it mean to have specific >characteristics or a specific identity? It means that in a particular >context, the entity's existence is manifested in a particular way. An >entity IS what it can DO (in a given context). Things (e.g., concepts) can be identified without having manifest existence. For empirical entities, you might be able to say that a thing is identified by what it has *done*. The basis of induction is to assume that what an entity has done can be projected into what it can do, but this is merely a modus operandi which has paid off heavily in the past; it has no inherent validity, as shown by Hume. >So what's causality? The law of identity applied to action. Things do >what they do, in any given context, BECAUSE they are what they are. >"What they are" includes or consists of "what they can do". >This is true irrespective of our ability to identify what they are. This totally begs the question. Clearly we use our expectation of cause and effect to make accurate predictions. What you have offered is merely a definition of identity, as being equivalent to the set of effects. It isn't even interesting at that level, because it says nothing about the delineation and persistence of an entity. If you replace the head of an axe, is it still the same axe? What if you then replace the handle? What if you build a new axe from the old head and handle? So much for identification. The interesting observation is that humans are involved in recording relationships observed in the past, for the purpose of predicting the future. Sufficient consistency of relationship gets labeled causation. It is this *measure* of behavior which is cause and effect. You may choose to believe that entities have inherent relationships equal to their observed ones, but you have no basis for doing so. Suppose that you could get outside of the time-space continuum and look down at it, and you discovered that some super-being was creating a "tapestry" and all our known observations were contained in a small particularly well-crafted portion, but the rest looked quiet different and was quite a bit more sloppy. What's wrong with this as a possible model of the universe? Answer: Nothing, but it is not as handy as simpler ones, so we slice away complexity with Occam's razor until we are left with the simplest kernel which is consistent with all past observation. That is the fundamental game of science and philosophy. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)