kissell@flairvax.UUCP (Kevin Kissell) (06/24/84)
(ahem) Gordon Moffet contributes: > What you have is a brain. What you do is behavior. You are an > organism that responds to AND IS CHANGED BY your environment. > That's all. The rest you've made up or assumed was true because > some dead greek person said it was there. > Show me your "mind" -- demonstrate its existence. I dare you. Well, gosh, there's going to be a bit of a problem here. The "behavior" which constitutes my mind is observable only to me by introspection. That is to say, I am aware that I am aware, and I am aware of myself reflecting, observing, wondering, remembering, and various other activities that are not externally observable. When I speak of my mind as the realm of these activities, others understand what I mean, and so I conclude that I am not alone in my experiences, even though I cannot observe their minds directly. My brain is an organ. My mind is the set of its activities that I am aware of directly or by inference. Problems arise when the mind beholds itself, and takes itself for something else. Kevin D. Kissell Fairchild Research Center Advanced Processor Development uucp: {ihnp4 decvax}!decwrl!\ >flairvax!kissell {ucbvax sdcrdcf}!hplabs!/ "Any closing epigram, regardless of truth or wit, grows galling after a number of repetitions"
karl@dartvax.UUCP (S. Delage.) (06/24/84)
Perhaps Mr. Moffet should not have denied the existence of other
minds/brains. As Mr. Kissell points out, we all [at least to my
knowledge] are aware of ourselves, and can think about ourselves,
and so on.
A more traditional behaviorist position, which is Skinner's, if I
remember correctly, is that attributing causes to the
mind/brain is not useful. That is, "I did something because I
thought about it and came to the conclusion that it was a good
thing to do." does not tell us anything more than "I did something
because Zeus gave me a hint that it would a good thing to do.".
That does not deny the thinking-about-it part, just its usefulness
as an explanation for behavior.
Instead, our behavior is caused by (a) our genetic endowment.
( A predisposition to certain acts, if you will. ) (b) our current
environment. ( Immediate threats/enticements to act on. ) and (c)
our past conditioning history. ( If something was bad or good last
time, our behavior will be changed appropriately. )
If I'm misrepresenting Skinner, let me know.
What this all means in light of the current mind/brain discussion
is not very clear to me. It seems to me that if we understand the
mind/brain better, we will be able to predict behavior more
accurately, and understand which parts of the brain are involved
in more decisions, and so on. Whether or not this is an
interesting topic is a matter of individual choice.
karl@dartmouth ~~ {cornell,astrovax,colby,decvax,uvm-gen}!dartvax!karlyba@mit-athena.ARPA (Mark H Levine) (06/25/84)
GOT IT! No Buddha, no problem. Just net.ai.... -- yba%mit-heracles@mit-mc.ARPA UUCP: decvax!mit-athena!yba
gam@proper.UUCP (Gordon Moffett) (06/28/84)
> From: kissell@flairvax.UUCP (Kevin Kissell) > Organization: Fairchild AI Lab, Palo Alto, CA > > Well, gosh, there's going to be a bit of a problem here. The "behavior" > which constitutes my mind is observable only to me by introspection. > That is to say, I am aware that I am aware, and I am aware of myself > reflecting, observing, wondering, remembering, and various other activities > that are not externally observable. When I speak of my mind as the > realm of these activities, others understand what I mean, and so I conclude > that I am not alone in my experiences, even though I cannot observe > their minds directly. Ah, herein lies the problem: your claim that "others understand what I mean" is not adequate to justify that the mind exists or performs the activities you attribute to it. If, in some other culture, we were to speak of ghosts, and we knew that others knew what we meant by ghost (because they had seen them too), would that be enough proof to say, "there are indeed ghosts" -- and worse yet, to start making hypotheses about these ghosts (because we've all seen them, right?). It is also a problem that while your mind may be doing things, I can't measure your mind's activities or compare them to my own. "Well, of course you can!" you would say, "do I not speak, do I not analyze, do I not create ideas?" Yes, you do all of those things, and all of those things are MANIFESTED AS BEHAVIOR and it is by BEHAVIOR that we measure these activities. I assert, again, that the mind itself has never been seen. It is a ghost. .... Do you see what I am doing here? I am applying the scientific method to behavior and finding little evidence to support the existence of ``mind'', other than in a mystical or colloquial context. And my original object to ``mind'' was: just where is this mind anyway? SHOW IT TO ME. Then we can continue to discuss it's function. Otherwise it is a piece of mythology used to support the presumed deism of human beings. -- Gordon A. Moffett { hplabs!nsc, decvax!sun!amd, ihnp4!dual } !proper!gam
bprice@bmcg.UUCP (07/20/84)
>It is also a problem that while your mind may be doing things, I can't >measure your mind's activities or compare them to my own. "Well, of >course you can!" you would say, "do I not speak, do I not analyze, >do I not create ideas?" Yes, you do all of those things, and all of >those things are MANIFESTED AS BEHAVIOR and it is by BEHAVIOR that >we measure these activities. I assert, again, that the mind itself >has never been seen. It is a ghost. >.... > >Do you see what I am doing here? I am applying the scientific method >to behavior and finding little evidence to support the existence of >``mind'', other than in a mystical or colloquial context. And my >original object to ``mind'' was: just where is this mind anyway? >SHOW IT TO ME. Then we can continue to discuss it's function. >Otherwise it is a piece of mythology used to support the presumed >deism of human beings. It is also a problem that while your electron may be doing things, I can't measure your electron's activities or compare them to my own. ...all of these things are MANIFESTED AS ELECTRICITY and it is by ELECTRICITY that we measure these activities. I assert, again, that the electron itself has never been seen. It is a ghost. Do you see what I am doing here? I am applying the scientific method to electricity and finding little evidence to support the existence of ``electron'', other than in a mystical or colloquial context. And my original objection to ``electron'' was: just where is this electron anyway? SHOW IT TO ME. Then we can continue to discuss its function. Otherwise it is a piece of mythology used to support the presumed granularity of electricity. :-) My paraphrase is exactly as valid as the original: both of them demonstrate the bias in the connotations of 'science' and 'myth'. In fact, except for these connotations, both words (generically) denote the same notion. That notion is "a system for understanding part of the universe." Both use, at times, insensible constructs in their explications. It is not the insensibility of the electron or of the mind that forms any real issue. The only issues are the "scientific" issue of utility--Is this explanation useful in my understanding of the universe?--and the human issue--Is this explanation satisfying to my emotional sense of 'rightness'?. If the explanation is useful and feels right, a scienitifically oriented person accepts it as "science". Otherwise, he rejects it. If the theory is useful but not emotionally 'right', he rejects it as "myth". Read and understand Kuhn before reacting to these simple truths. -- --Bill Price uucp: {decvax!ucbvax philabs}!sdcsvax!bmcg!bprice arpa:? sdcsvax!bmcg!bprice@nosc
dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (07/27/84)
[] Could those denying the existence of mind please give an account of mental experience? "Mind" certainly is a fuzzy concept; it is very broad and hard to pin down; but so are other things - eg. "life". Are those denying the existence of mind denying the difference between brain/body states and mental experiences? Let me make some comments about brain/body states and mental experiences. I am in a laboratory, looking at a red square. The scientists around me determine the frequency of the light entering my eye, exciting the rods and cones in my retina. Other scientists trace the firings of my neurons (yes, my shaved head looks like a pin cushion) and observe how the electro- chemical messages make their way from my retina to various parts of my brain, interact with the general activity their, and so on and so on. But all of that neuronal activity is distinct from my experience of seeing the red square. You can say that the brain/body states cause the mental experience (and philosophers can have lots of fun with "cause" and how you are going to prove your claim -- but let's leave that aside for the moment). You can say that the brain/body states cause the mental experience, but the mental experience is not the same thing as those brain/body states. Saying that "neuron so-&-so in my brain is firing at rate such-&-such" is not the same thing as saying "I see red". The two are perhaps connected, but they are not equivalent. Now, my mental experiences have to do with my mind. This question of "mind" is subtle, and I would like to establish the situation with respect to mental experiences before dealing with mind. Daryel Akerlind ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker
gam@proper.UUCP (Gordon Moffett) (07/29/84)
> From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (Daryel Akerlind, ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker) > > Could those denying the existence of mind please give an account of > mental experience? If I am denying the existence of `mind' then why should I define what I assert is not there? > I am in a laboratory, looking at a red square. The scientists around me > determine the frequency of the light entering my eye, exciting the rods and > cones in my retina. Other scientists trace the firings of my neurons (yes, > my shaved head looks like a pin cushion) and observe how the electro- > chemical messages make their way from my retina to various parts of my brain, > interact with the general activity their, and so on and so on. > But all of that neuronal activity is distinct from my experience of seeing > the red square. Let us say that neurological activity is the domain on neurologists; I am talking about behavior, and I need no `mind' (or neurons, for that matter) to explain behavior. > You can say that the brain/body states cause the mental experience, but the > mental experience is not the same thing as those brain/body states. No argument. The mental experience does not exist. > Saying that "neuron so-&-so in my brain is firing at rate such-&-such" is > not the same thing as saying "I see red". The two are perhaps connected, > but they are not equivalent. That is correct. Saying, "I see red", is a verbal behavior, typically associated with the speaker observing the color red in their visual field, or metaphorically describing a state of anger. Other associations occur but are rare. (And, still, there is no need for a `mind' here, either). > Now, my mental experiences have to do with my mind. This question of > "mind" is subtle, and I would like to establish the situation with respect > to mental experiences before dealing with mind. Perhaps it is subtle because it is so ill-defined (which we seem to agree on). But the burden of proof on the existence or definition of mind is on the mentalists, not the behaviorists. I am happy to simply refute the need for mentalist explanations of behavior. -- Gordon A. Moffett { hplabs!nsc, decvax!sun!amd, ihnp4!dual } !proper!gam
jim@ism780b.UUCP (08/08/84)
>> From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (Daryel Akerlind, ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker) >> >> Could those denying the existence of mind please give an account of >> mental experience? > >If I am denying the existence of `mind' then why should I define what >I assert is not there? You may assert that there are no mental experiences. I personally have what I call mental experiences. I experience a self-awareness that no one outside of me can verify exists. If I take a poll, I believe almost all of the subject bodies will open their mouths and project vocal sounds which can be interpreted as asserting that they represent egos with such experiences. The simplest model I have is that those other egos do exist and that they have experiences like mine. As for your denial, my model suggests that either you are either a) dissembling, b) confused, c) a different sort of entity which acts just like it has an ego but does not. The latter seems very unlikely to me, and since I can't verify it one way or another, I will model you as having an ego with mental experiences. >> I am in a laboratory, looking at a red square. The scientists around me >> determine the frequency of the light entering my eye, exciting the rods and >> cones in my retina. Other scientists trace the firings of my neurons (yes, >> my shaved head looks like a pin cushion) and observe how the electro- >> chemical messages make their way from my retina to various parts of my brain, >> interact with the general activity their, and so on and so on. >> But all of that neuronal activity is distinct from my experience of seeing >> the red square. > > Let us say that neurological activity is the domain on neurologists; > I am talking about behavior, and I need no `mind' (or neurons, for that > matter) to explain behavior. HE WASN'T TALKING ABOUT BEHAVIOR. He was talking about internal experience. Your fingers may continue to hit keys which read as saying that Gordon Moffett has no internal experience, but I will continue to believe that they are driven by a dissembling ego. > Perhaps it is subtle because it is so ill-defined (which we seem to > agree on). But the burden of proof on the existence or definition > of mind is on the mentalists, not the behaviorists. I am happy to > simply refute the need for mentalist explanations of behavior. I claim that I have mental behavior. The only way you can refute the claim is to say I am lying. You claim you do not have mental behavior. The only way I can refute it is by saying you are lying. You can tell me that it is only my behavior, and that I have no ego, but that claim *must* be predicated upon the lie that you have no ego either. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
neal@denelcor.UUCP (Neal Weidenhofer) (08/17/84)
************************************************************************** >That is correct. Saying, "I see red", is a verbal behavior, typically >associated with the speaker observing the color red in their visual >field, or metaphorically describing a state of anger. Other associations >occur but are rare. (And, still, there is no need for a `mind' here, >either). In the absence of a 'mind', what do "observing" and "state of anger" mean? >Gordon A. Moffett Regards, Neal Weidenhofer "The law is for protection Denelcor, Inc. of the people" <hao|csu-cs|brl-bmd>!denelcor!neal
gam@proper.UUCP (Gordon Moffett) (08/19/84)
From: neal@denelcor.UUCP (Neal Weidenhofer) Organization: Denelcor, Aurora, CO >>That is correct. Saying, "I see red", is a verbal behavior, typically >>associated with the speaker observing the color red in their visual >>field, or metaphorically describing a state of anger. Other associations >>occur but are rare. (And, still, there is no need for a `mind' here, >>either). >> >>Gordon A. Moffett > > In the absence of a 'mind', what do "observing" and "state of >anger" mean? Ah, very good, you're getting the hang of this too, I see. "State of anger" is easier so I'll start with that: it is a physical state which one is culturalized to sense as emotion, which is called anger. (In behaviorist philosophy, the physical state PRECEEDS the emotion, and emotions are considered mentalist phenomena). "Observing" is clearly a subjective description and I shouldn't have used it; better to say, "presented with the stimulus of." (By the way, I also say "sunrise" and "moonrise" even though I know better). -- Gordon A. Moffett { hplabs!nsc, decvax!sun!amd, ihnp4!dual } !proper!gam
gam@proper.UUCP (08/28/84)
ima!jim, can you say "ad hom-i-nem"?
I thought so.
--
Gordon A. Moffett
{ hplabs!nsc, decvax!sun!amd, ihnp4!dual } !proper!gamjim@ism780b.UUCP (08/31/84)
>"State of anger" is easier so I'll start with that: it is a >physical state which one is culturalized to sense as emotion, >which is called anger. But who or what senses the state as emotion? The behaviorist observes (receives physical stimulus about?) the physical state, and observes subsequent behavior which he calls emotion, *in others*. But the behaviorist or anyone else *senses* emotion in themselves, even without external observable behavior. This sensing is done by the ego, which is not accessible to any behaviorist (or anyone else). But behaviorists persist in claiming that there is no one there to do such sensing, even though they themselves constantly do so all the time. This is the one and only piece of evidence for the existence of an ego: one's personally being one. You cannot demonstrate that anyone else has one; you cannot even demonstrate that you have one; but you do know you have one, I think. Certainly I do know I have one. However, I am coming to believe that the bio-automaton known as GAM is malfunctioning, and producing bad outputs, so those "real" folk out there should ignore its subsequent outputs. It will most likely produce outputs simulating feelings of offense to its ego, but since it apparently does not really have one we should feel no guilt or compassion for what is simply a complex organic structure with complex behavior. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
neal@denelcor.UUCP (Neal Weidenhofer) (09/06/84)
************************************************************************** If a half-formed article by me gets out on this, please ignore it (and forgive it). I tried several times to cancel it but (locally at least) none of them worked. On the other hand, if it didn't get out, please ignore this one ;-) Regards, Neal Weidenhofer "Blame it on the Rolling Denelcor, Inc. Stones" <hao|csu-cs|brl-bmd>!denelcor!neal