kissell@flairvax.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (09/06/84)
(ahem) > For example: > I know the sky is blue. > I think the sky is blue. > I don't know what color the sky is. > I don't think the sky is blue. > I know the sky isn't blue. > There are two symbols, sky and blue, that I wish to > establish an association with. What I showed was the various > strengths of interconnection between them. At the top, strong > connection is expressed, at the bottom, weak connection is > expressed. There is a homogenous middle where nothing is stated > except for the speaker's ignorance. > ----{ john williams }---- On the other hand, it could be asserted that *none* of the statements in the example list say anything about the strength of the interconnection of sky to blue. They are *all* statements about the speaker's confidence. Consider statements like: I know the sky is blue. I think the sky is blue. I know the sky might be blue. I think the sky might be blue. Confidence and strength of asssociation vary independently of one another, or so it seems to me. I recognize that this has little to do with the thrust of John's article, but I think it serves to illustrate that, while he (and others) feel that linguistic formalism is only required in limited subsets of philosophical discourse (if we dare to so dignify our blather in this newsgroup), sloppy expression can all-too-easily conceal both truth and error. "Words are tools, m'am, like screwdrivers and pistols." Kevin D. Kissell Fairchild Research Center Advanced Processor Development uucp: {ihnp4 decvax}!decwrl!\ >flairvax!kissell {ucbvax sdcrdcf}!hplabs!/ "Any closing epigram, regardless of truth or wit, grows galling after a number of repetitions"